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Abstract 
Any entity operating in cyberspace is susceptible to debilitating attacks.  With cyber attacks 
intended to gather intelligence and disrupt communications rapidly replacing the threat of 
conventional and nuclear attacks, a new age of warfare is at hand.   In 2003, the United States 
acknowledged that the speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the 
actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult.  Even President Obama’s Cybersecurity 
Chief-elect recognizes the challenge of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks.  Now through 
April 2009, the White House is reviewing federal cyber initiatives to protect US citizen privacy 
rights.  Indeed, the rising quantity and ubiquity of new surveillance technologies in cyberspace 
enables instant, undetectable, and unsolicited information collection about entities.  Hence, 
anonymity and privacy are becoming increasingly important issues.  Anonymization enables 
entities to protect their data and systems from a diverse set of cyber attacks and preserves privacy. 
This research provides a systematic analysis of anonymity degradation, preservation and 
elimination in cyberspace to enhance the security of information assets.  This includes 
discovery/obfuscation of identities and actions of/from potential adversaries.  First, novel 
taxonomies are developed for classifying and comparing well-established anonymous networking 
protocols.  These expand the classical definition of anonymity and capture the peer-to-peer and 
mobile ad hoc anonymous protocol family relationships.  Second, a unique synthesis of state-of-
the-art anonymity metrics is provided.  This significantly aids an entity’s ability to reliably 
measure changing anonymity levels; thereby, increasing their ability to defend against cyber 
attacks.   Finally, a novel epistemic-based mathematical model is created to characterize how an 
adversary reasons with knowledge to degrade anonymity.  This offers multiple anonymity 
property representations and well-defined logical proofs to ensure the accuracy and correctness of 
current and future anonymous network protocol design. 
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A TAXONOMY FOR AND ANALYSIS OF  
ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 
 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the current and historical issues related to anonymity in 
cyberspace.  In Section 1.0, a brief history of anonymity is outlined.  The problems and 
available solutions for anonymous communications are described in Section 1.1.  The 
research objectives, in Section 1.2, are provided.  The subsequent assumptions/limitations 
and implications of this research are given in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, respectively.  Lastly, 
Section 1.5 summarizes this chapter. 
 
1.0 Background 
Anonymity derives from the Greek word ανωνυμία (anonumos), meaning nameless, 
and is the state of being unknown or unacknowledged.  Thus, anonymity connotes an 
inability to link a name to a specific set of actions.  Also, the term cyberspace, from the 
Greek work Κυβερνήτης, describes anything associated with computers, information 
technology, the Internet and the diverse Internet culture.  In societies throughout history, 
anonymity has always been a pervasive, dichotomous issue.  For instance, millionaires 
differ on the value of anonymity in philanthropic giving [Sch94] and the sociological 
debate about anonymity [Hum98, Mar99] is not new.  Some believe anonymity is 
essential in protecting privacy and freedom of expression while others believe anonymity 
is superfluous and only encourages the propagation of dubious dogma as well as abusive, 
illegal activity.   
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In the boundless digital world and global society of the Internet, recently dubbed 
cyberspace, anonymity is also an increasingly important issue [AbF01, Nis97, Nis98, 
Nis99, Rig95, Wal01, Woo06].  The Internet was first and foremost designed to share 
information, not protect user privacy.  During the 1970s, when military and academic 
research organizations were the primary users, this was acceptable as the nascent Internet 
was a relatively anonymous network anyway.  With the rapid growth of the Internet as a 
means of communication and information dissemination, concerns about Internet privacy 
and security are escalating.  In 1980’s, Chaum began work on untraceable e-mail 
[Cha81].  Technology emerged to protect user privacy on very sensitive, controversial 
newsgroups, such as Dave Mack’s for alt.sex.bondage [Rig95] and the anonymous dining 
cryptographer problem [Cha88].  Then in 1992, Cyberpunk [Pas00] introduced 
anonymous e-mail.  In 1997, nine privacy experts recognized as a major concern the 
pursuit of perfect identity with biometrics and DNA and converting anonymous 
transactions to identifiable ones [Ven97].  Furthermore, the increase of new surveillance 
technologies such as computer matching and profiling, video cameras, and electronic 
location monitoring enable information collection without an individual’s explicit 
knowledge or consent provides future research issues [Mar01].  The Internet has become 
an amazingly powerful surveillance tool:  anyone has the capability to spy on anyone else 
[DiP04].  Today, in an effort to prevent cyberstalking, posting annoying Web messages 
or sending anonymous e-mails has been deemed a federal crime in the United States 
resulting in stiff fines and two years in prison [Mcc06].   
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Any entity operating in cyberspace is susceptible to debilitating cyber attacks.  As 
part of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in 2003, the United States 
acknowledged that the speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing 
among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult [BuG03].  With the 
ability to gather intelligence and disrupt communications in cyberspace rapidly replacing 
the threat of conventional and nuclear warfare, a new age of warfare is upon us.  
President’s Obama’s Cybersecurity Chief nominee is reviewing federal cyber initiatives 
and recognizes the challenge of the increasing sophistication of cyber attacks.  Now 
through end-of-April 2009, the National and Homeland Security Councils are conducting 
a review of federal cyber initiatives' to stop and deter cyber attacks and protect the 
privacy rights of our US citizens.  As millions of individuals and organizations become 
subject to more and more online monitoring, cataloging, and recording, the economic and 
security risks as well as potential threats from adversaries becomes greater and greater.  
Indeed, today’s Internet is an incredibly effective, uncontrolled weapon for 
eavesdropping and spying.  Therefore, anonymity and privacy are increasingly important 
issues.  Web-browsing, message-sending, and file-sharing are three key activities where 
individuals and organizations may prefer a certain degree of anonymity in ubiquitous 
distributed environments [GuF04].  For a typical Internet user, anonymity means using all 
available Internet services while keeping an identity or Internet Protocol (IP) address 
hidden from an adversary.  Pure anonymity prevents the adversary from discovering a 
user’s true IP address.  Pseudo-anonymity hides the IP address from adversaries but 
securely stores the IP address to make the user reachable by non-adversarial users. 
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A number of Anonymous Communications Systems (ACS) have been developed to 
achieve anonymity including Crowds [RmR98], Herbivore [GoR02], Mixminion 
[DaR03], Tor [DiM04], and WonGoo [LuF05].  These technologies offer varying degrees 
of anonymity to protect the user’s identity and provide privacy over a communications 
system.  The effectiveness of anonymous protocols depends heavily on a number of 
factors including: the number of anonymous users; how messages are routed; adversary 
knowledge and ability; and other environmental factors for both the Internet [GuF02, 
Kes01] and mobile ad hoc networks [KoL07, LiK05].  The ability to comparatively and 
quantitatively analyze these anonymity protocols and anonymity services to better 
understand how anonymity is lost, maintained or improved during an attack is an area of 
open research.  Furthermore, developing novel conceptual and mathematical frameworks 
for specifying, designing and verifying anonymity properties and protocols is an area ripe 
for adding to the body of knowledge. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The primary research objectives are to develop a novel taxonomy, appropriate 
anonymity metrics, and a mathematical model to systematically analyze the anonymity 
properties of anonymous communications networks.  Three distinct sub-objectives are to 
be realized.  First, a creative conceptual taxonomy for analyzing anonymity in 
communications networks is developed.  Extensive survey paper(s) on burgeoning 
anonymity issues such as location anonymity in mobile ad-hoc networks and multicast or 
group anonymity are examples of literature contributions.  Second, to fully comprehend 
the nontrivial aspects of defining, measuring and preserving anonymity in a variety of 
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situations, a number of anonymity metrics and their advantages and disadvantages are 
analyzed.  Finally, a modified formal mathematical framework for verifying anonymity 
properties and reasoning about the enhancement, preservation, degradation and 
elimination of anonymity in communications networks is explored.  The results are 
significant and motivate even more anonymity research in application domains such as 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), video teleconferencing, and mobile ad-hoc networks 
(MANETs). 
1.3 Assumptions/Limitations 
The research assumptions vary for each sub-objective.  Without loss of generality, for 
the anonymous taxonomy, a clear distinction between wired and wireless anonymous 
networks is assumed even though the Internet is becoming an increasingly heterogeneous 
networked environment. This is justified because the requirements for providing 
anonymity in highly mobile and wireless networks is unique enough to warrant such a 
separation as the literature clearly indicates in the next chapter.  One key limitation is the 
difference between link, network and application layer anonymity is not specifically 
modelled; however, this would make an excellent extension to this research.  Also, only 
three key categorizations are highlighted in the taxonomy.  Whereas other categorizations 
such as verifiability type, anonymization technique, or application domain may be 
equally valid choices, the three selected complement and even extend the current, albeit 
limited, taxonomy research.  However, unlike other taxonomies or proposed protocols, no 
adversary assumptions are made.  The adversary capabilities are included as part of the 
taxonomy.  For the anonymity metrics, each makes their own assumptions about the 
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underlying anonymous protocol and/or anonymization technique/algorithm.  This is why 
a single anonymity metric is not applicable to all situations; hence, the need for more 
appropriate, robust metrics.  Finally, the key assumptions of adversarial logical 
omniscience and no temporal and dynamic capability are made in the formal model.  
Some of these assumptions can be relaxed if the theorem-proving or model checking 
software used to solve NP-hard problems is available to facilitate and expedite 
anonymity-based deductive proofs or satisfiable decision procedures; however, no such 
software was used.  These limitations are discussed more in later chapters; but, again, 
removing such assumptions is highly encouraged as an extension of this research. 
1.4 Implications 
This research produced an innovative taxonomy, anonymity metric comparison, and 
intuitive rigorous formal model to systematically define, quantify, and analyze how 
anonymity is degraded, preserved or enhanced in existing and proposed wired and 
wireless anonymous communications networks.  These synergistic results accentuate the 
significance and subtlety of anonymity and contribute to future anonymous protocol 
design and development across one or more application domains. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced anonymity, provided a brief motivation for the necessity of 
the research, delineated the research objectives as well as assumptions, limitations and 
implications, and the positive impact this research will have on future anonymity 
research.   
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Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent prevailing literature on anonymity history, anonymity 
nomenclature, wired and wireless anonymous networking protocols, anonymity 
quantification and anonymity formalization.  Chapter 3 provides a discussion on this 
anonymity research and methodology.  Chapter 4 provides analysis and results of the 
anonymous network taxonomy research.  A synthesis of existing and proposed anonymity 
metrics is examined in Chapter 5.  The analysis and results of the formal adversary 
anonymity reasoning model in Chapter 6 is described.  Chapter 7 summarizes the 
contributions of this research and recommends future research to extend the results 
presented herein. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an extensive literature review covering the state-of-the-art 
concepts in anonymous communications systems.  The background of Section 2.1 offers 
definitions for and historical accounts of privacy, identity, anonymity, pseudonymity, and 
reputation.  The advantages and disadvantages of anonymity and an example reputation 
system are described.  The anonymity properties, the adversary, the attacks, and mix 
technology are examined in the nomenclature Section 2.2.  In Section 2.3, the explanation 
of extant and prospective wired and wireless anonymous networking protocols is given.  
Thereafter, ten different ways to quantify anonymity are discussed in Section 2.4.  
Section 2.5 introduces the basic concepts in formally analyzing anonymous systems. 
Thereafter, epistemic-based formal methods are explored in Section 2.6.  The well 
established theoretical approach of using process calculi to model systems in computer 
science is discussed in Section 2.7.  The functional framework of Section 2.8 is covered 
and Section 2.9 concludes this chapter. 
2.1 Background 
This section covers the history of and introduces the terminology of privacy, identity, 
anonymity, pseudonymity and reputation.  The advantages and disadvantages of 
anonymity and the eBay reputation system are also highlighted. 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 9 - 
2.1.1 Privacy. 
The desire for privacy motivates much of the research into anonymity systems.  Even 
Aristotle in 384 to 327 B.C. had a keen interest in privacy when he differentiated between 
two spheres of life: public (polis, city) and private (oikos, home).  Today, the derived 
English words politics and economics still embody the same spirit of separation [WrS05].  
However, Aristotle’s interest in privacy was neither the first nor last.   
With the adoption of the Justices of the Peace Act in 1391 under the reign of Edward 
III, privacy has been a key part of British law [Mic61].  The act outlawed peeping Toms 
and eavesdroppers who invade the privacy of others [Ano06].  Nonetheless, privacy as an 
individual right has only begun to be widely acknowledged in the past 150 years 
[WrS05]. 
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and lawyer Samuel Warren 
proposed that the right to privacy [WsB90] as a natural extension of the individual right 
to liberty.  Liberty as a right had initially been understood with respect to preventing 
physical assault, but as newer business models and media coverage started to 
significantly affect society, intrusion into private lives for public consumption has 
became of concern to many.  The ideal of liberty was extended to include unfair 
intervention into aspects of a person’s life that might be embarrassing or dangerous if 
publicized.  They sought “a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions and 
sensations” but lost their first major courtroom case by a four-to-three decision at the 
New York Court of Appeals in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. in 1902 [PaO02, 
Unk12].   In reference to earlier work by a Michigan Supreme Court Justice, privacy was 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 10 - 
defined as “the right to be let alone” [Cra76].  This concept is still fundamental to almost 
all definitions of personal privacy. 
Serious interest in privacy, however, appears to have begun only in the second half of 
the twentieth century [WrS05].  The modern concept of privacy at an international level 
is found in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
protects territorial and communications privacy in its twelfth article [Com05, Uni97].  
Similarly, article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognize 
privacy as a basic human right [Ano06].  Both the European Union [Ano06] and the 
United States Department of Commerce [Uni04] employ measures to protect privacy, 
however these rights are still emerging and in a state of flux. 
Not everyone supports the notion of individual privacy protection.  Privacy from a 
purely economic basis [Pos81] holds that personal information should be kept private 
only if the economic value to society of such information is decreased by it becoming 
public knowledge.  Furthermore, the only personal value in concealing private 
information is in deceiving or manipulating others for personal gain, and therefore is not 
of economic use to society as a whole.  This view proposes corporate privacy as having 
value, but asserts that personal privacy is not beneficial to a nation’s economy and so 
should not be protected in law.  This view of privacy is not widely accepted; however, 
and many modern world societies have enacted laws that protect individual privacy to 
varying degrees. 
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2.1.2 Identity. 
Many anonymity-related concepts obfuscate information relating to a user’s (or 
agent’s) identity. Identity takes several forms, but the archetypical example is the name 
[WrS05].  The name of an individual is intended to be a unique identifier within some 
group so that individual can be distinguished from others in that group.  When discussing 
the anonymity properties of a user, the existence of a unique identity is implicit.   
However, a distinction must be made between a user’s representation in a system and 
their real identity.  Multiple users may collaborate to form a single online identity or a 
single user may have multiple representations online.  The full implications of this are not 
entirely understood, as the simplifying assumption that a single user is linked to a single 
representation is almost universally made in anonymity research [WrS05].  Although this 
seems logical, there are many other interpretations of what an identity or “name” is 
including an Internet Protocol (IP) address (either IPv4 or IPv6), Media Access Control 
(MAC) address, geographical location, or e-mail address. 
2.1.3 Anonymity. 
Anonymity is a fundamental identity hiding property and totally removes identifying 
information about the user.  Even so, identifying information may be added into a data 
channel within an anonymous system as needed.  As such, anonymity provides the choice 
to limit identity hiding as much or as little as desired by explicitly revealing identifying 
information as necessary [WrS05]. 
Total anonymity is the focal point for identity hiding research.  Additionally, 
anonymous systems are typically based on a small number of approaches with Chaum’s 
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mix [Cha81] being the most prevalent.  Most active research topics on anonymity are 
variations of these basic ideas.  Figure 1 shows the yearly anonymity publications in 
IEEE Xplore [IEE09] and the Freehaven bibliography [Fre09], an authoritative source of 
select anonymity publications from 1980 to the present. 
 
 
Figure 1: Yearly Anonymity Publications 
 
Although not an exhaustive list, the trend is quite clear.  The field of anonymous system 
technologies started receiving attention from the large research community around the 
year 2000 and interest in anonymous system research is growing.   
Despite the focus on anonymous systems, total anonymity is a two-edged sword 
[WrS05].  For publishing, mailing lists, and web surfing applications, anonymity can be 
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highly desirable.  However, for other systems, no possibility of tracking identities is 
detrimental [WrS05].  Sometimes identity needs to be tracked over the course of an 
extended transaction, but not between transactions. For this reason pseudonymous 
communication, which provides a certain amount of information associated with an 
identity, is required for a number of practical identity hiding systems [WrS05].   The 
advantages and disadvantages of anonymity in general are discussed next. 
2.1.3.1  Advantages. 
Any society has a natural inclination towards conservatism, including the global 
society of the Internet.  So anonymity is often seen as a counter-balance to such 
conservatism.  Anonymity inherently offers the advantages of promoting freedom of 
expression and protecting user privacy.   
The Internet allows any user to instantly reach and possibly influence millions of 
others.  In essence, Internet technology offers users a fast, inexpensive way to publish 
anything, anywhere, anytime.  There are many long-standing precedents for anonymity in 
publishing.  For example, the Founding Fathers of the United States anonymously 
advocated the adoption of the Constitution by publishing the Federalist Papers under the 
pseudonym Publius [Luc06].  Prior to the American Revolution, many resorted to secret 
publication to avert English prosecution [GoW98]. 
More recently, the United States Supreme Court favored protection for anonymous 
publication of political speech.  As Justice Stevens wrote:  
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“Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from 
the tyranny of the majority [GoW98].”   
Most newspapers allow anonymously signed letters and credit articles to the “AP 
Newswire” [Rig95].  Additionally, in academic environments, anonymous peer reviews 
of proposals and articles are expected and common.  Thus, anonymous publication is a 
time-honored tradition.  This makes anonymous speech an integral part of free speech, 
and free speech an essential part of any healthy democratic society.   
Anonymity is also important for protecting user privacy in sensitive online forums 
involving sexual abuse, sexual conduct, religious beliefs, cultural issues, racial issues, 
harassment, and whistle blowing [Rig95].  Anonymity gives users a non-attributable 
channel to vent their benign or divisive opinions without fear of eventual identification 
and retribution.  Thus, anonymity circumvents the majority from controlling the actions 
of the minority.  Some prefer to be anonymous to ensure their views are evaluated on 
merit, not authorship name or association. Without anonymity, user actions or opinions 
may result in censorship, physical injury, social inequity, financial loss or legal action.  
Protecting users from such risks means preserving their privacy and circumventing social 
inequities in the global Internet society.  This is a justifiable cause for the introduction 
and preservation of anonymity on the Internet. 
Given the historical precedents of anonymity and growing demand for anonymous 
technologies, anonymity on the Internet is here to stay.  Anonymity offers the advantages 
of promoting freedom of speech and protecting user privacy on the global society of the 
Internet.  Nevertheless, anonymity does have disadvantages. 
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2.1.3.2  Disdvantages. 
Abuse and illegal activity are the most obvious drawbacks to anonymity. 
Governments, businesses and other organizations fear an inability to control abusive and 
illegal activity on the Internet.  A libel suit was brought against online service Prodigy for 
anonymous postings.  Although it ended with a temporary victory for Prodigy [Ano04], 
other site operators dread being held accountable for such nefarious activity and have 
developed a strong aversion to anonymity.  
The concern about excessive abuse has merit.  As mentioned in the previous section, 
the ability for any user to instantaneously publish printed information to millions of users 
around the world is a powerful one.  People of all cultures, races and nations tend to more 
quickly and readily confer credence to the written word as opposed to the spoken word.   
As Walter Mossberg in the Wall Street Journal wrote, operating “… under the cloak of 
anonymity … makes it easier to spread wild conspiracy theories, smear people, conduct 
financial scams, or victimize others sexually” [Ano04].  Thus, online anonymity abuse 
can profoundly and adversely affect others.  Fortunately, the majority of abuses can be 
attributed to new anonymous users and this type of abuse eventually diminishes [Rig95].  
Even so, some abuse is instigated by disreputable individuals who are lured by the ability 
to effortlessly carry out certain actions with impunity.  These actions include kidnapping, 
terrorism, harassment, threats, hate-speech, financial scams, and disclosure of trade 
secrets, personal information or intellectual property [Rig95].  For example, hiding 
behind anonymity to espouse nationally, ethnically, racially, or religiously hateful views 
is unacceptable and harmful to society.  Some feel dealing directly with these societal 
issues is preferable to allowing concealment behind anonymous services.  Yet for 
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centuries, societies have had similar issues.  Offensive and inappropriate e-mails on the 
Internet may best be dealt with in the same manner as the real-world society – ignoring 
them [Rig95].  However, former U.S. President George Bush recently made posting 
annoying Web messages and sending anonymous e-mails a federal crime [Mcc06] based 
on existing telephone harassment law Title 47 [Uni05].  Illegal activity is not so simply 
dismissed.  
Controlling illegal activity is virtually impossible on the Internet since anonymity 
ensures the identity of the perpetrator cannot be discovered or linked to specific actions.  
The topic of child pornography is often cited to vividly highlight the disadvantages of 
anonymous services.  Two Texas men were indicted for using the online pseudonyms 
“Poo Bear” and “Wild One” to lure two young boys and commit sexual acts [Rig95].  
The number of criminals using Internet anonymity services to participate in illegal 
activity is increasing and has motivated lawmakers to limit the use of anonymity.  
Recently lawmakers barred 29,000 known sex offenders from using MySpace to 
anonymously solicit minors [Lem07].  Hence, using anonymity services makes 
committing crimes such as this easier.  On the other hand, law enforcement agencies 
encourage citizens to use anonymous e-mail to report crimes [Ale07, Ano07g, Jor07, 
Rob07].  Businesses that rely on trade secrets and/or intellectual property to maintain 
competitive advantage fear anonymity services will undermine existing laws to protect 
this information.   
Given the disadvantages of excessive abuse and illegal activity, it is no wonder many 
organizations are dissuaded from fully embracing anonymity.  They do not want to be 
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held responsible for acts of terrorism or kidnapping due to anonymous messages passing 
through their system.  Hence, anonymity’s disadvantages are not trivial.  
2.1.4 Pseudonymity. 
One simple form of hiding identity is to use a pseudonym.  Pseudonymity stems from 
Greek (pseudos, false) and refers to the adoption of a false name.  This is also commonly 
known as an allonym (allos, other), nom de plume (pen name) or nom de guerre (name of 
war), after the traditional pre-computer use of pseudonyms as a method by which authors 
could publish politically inconvenient material without the threat of retaliation [WrS05]. 
Pseudonymity, in terms of usable online systems, associates a user with at least one 
semi-persistent identifier.  The normal purpose is to allow types of transactions, relying 
on user history and behavior that are not possible in a totally anonymous system.  This is 
of particular use in systems that rely on networks of trust between users, and thus cannot 
rely on a one-time session identifier approach. 
Pseudonymity can be achieved using an anonymous infrastructure with suitable user 
information and history stored with the explicitly transmitted data.  If the communication 
infrastructure is inherently anonymous then pseudonymity is an easier proposition as data 
can be released as desired without fear of extra information leakage from the system.  
Care must be taken that the interaction between deliberately released data and other data 
within the system does not interact reveal more than is intended. 
Pseudonymity may therefore be seen as a problem that exists at a ‘higher’ level than 
anonymity.  An anonymous channel may have some form of persistent user identification 
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that is kept secret between the sender and receiver.  Pseudonymity typically entails a 
combination of other security properties such as secrecy, anonymity and authentication. 
2.1.5 Reputation. 
Reputation and trust are closely linked properties, particularly within the context of 
anonymity systems [WrS05].  Reputation allows a user to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to trust another user.  This is important in commercial systems 
where users are required to invest real economic interests in other users of a system.  The 
potential risks of such a system are high, especially in cases where there are no legal 
restrictions on the parties involved in a transaction.  In these cases, which are common on 
the Internet which allows commerce between countries with differing legal systems, 
reputation is critical to users and legitimate businesses alike. Anonymity systems rely on 
distributed networks of untrusted users.  Reputation algorithms provide a degree of 
assurance that network users will behave as advertised.  Similarly, for pseudonymous 
online systems, reputation enforces “good” behavior between users.  As such, in many of 
the practical applications of anonymity and pseudonymity, reputation is the key to a 
usable system.   
2.1.5.1   eBay. 
The most well-known reputation-based system is the seller rating on eBay [WrS05].  
eBay is a popular online auction site that manages the buying and selling of a large 
quantity of items all over the world.  Ebay emulates a global auction where buyers bid 
against each over a fixed period of time.  The item is sold to the highest bidder.  When 
the transaction ends, both the buyer and the seller are encouraged to provide a positive, 
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neutral or negative rating and text-based feedback about the behavior of the other party in 
the transaction. When considering an item, potential buyers may examine the ratings of a 
seller and decide whether to trust the seller and make the purchase.  The greater the 
number of positive feedback reports a seller indicates a higher level of trustworthiness.   
A seller wants to protect their reputation to attract more business in the future. As 
such, the seller is unlikely to perform any action that could damage their reputation.  This 
approach towards trust management in commerce systems has been the subject of some 
study [Del05, JuF05, JuF06, JuF07, Li06, LiX06, MiR06, YaI04, YaI05, ZaM99].  Even 
before the invention of eBay and similar systems, reputation as a method of enforcing 
positive behavior in markets had been well-known and received much attention. 
2.2 Nomenclature 
This section reviews terminology and concepts of anonymity systems.  These include 
the anonymity properties, adversary, attacks and mix.  The more abstract term “agent” is 
often used instead of the simpler term “user” throughout.  
2.2.1 Fundamental Anonymity Properties. 
The fundamental anonymity properties covered in the academic literature include 
sender, receiver, communications and location anonymity.   For completeness, the 
unobservability property is also discussed.  
Sender anonymity prevents a particular message from being linked to a particular 
sender identity.  Figure 2 depicts sender anonymity in an anonymous system.  A message 
Bob receives is not linkable to Alice or any other sender in the  
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Figure 2: Sender Anonymity [Ser05] 
 
anonymous cloud.   Furthermore, no message to Bob or any other receiver is linkable to 
Alice.  Thus, sender identity is hidden.  The DC-net [Cha88] mechanism achieves sender 
anonymity.   
Receiver anonymity prevents a particular message from being linked to a particular 
receiver identity.  Receiver anonymity is shown in Figure 3.  A message Alice sends is 
 
Figure 3: Receiver Anonymity  [Ser05] 
 
 
not linkable to Bob or any other receiver in the anonymous cloud.   Furthermore, no 
message from Alice or any other sender is linkable to Bob.  Thus, receiver identity is 
hidden.   Broadcast [PaM86, Wai90] and private information retrieval [CoB95] are two 
mechanisms that achieve receiver anonymity. 
Communication anonymity means a particular message cannot be linked to any 
sender-receiver pair and no message is linkable to a particular sender-receiver pair.  
Figure 4 shows communication (a.k.a. relationship) anonymity where a message is not 
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Figure 4: Communication Anonymity [Ser05] 
 
linkable to the Alice-Bob pair or any other pair.  Furthermore, no message from the 
Alice-Bob pair or any other sender-receiver pair is linkable for others.  Thus, sender-
receiver pair relationships are hidden.  The MIX-net [Cha81] mechanism achieves 
communication anonymity.   Communication anonymity is a weaker property than either 
of sender and receiver anonymity.  This means although the sender and receiver cannot 
be linked, it may be clear the pair are participating in some communication [WaN07]. 
Location anonymity means a particular message is not linkable to any sender or 
receiver location, motion, route or topology information.  An adversary has access to 
routing information on nodes or in packets but is unable to discover location, link 
information of a node, true routing path or tree information.   
Unobservability means the adversary is unable to observe items of interest (IOI) as 
opposed to agent identities or relations.  Unobservability can be achieved in one of two 
ways.  First, if an adversary is unable to observe any message or IOI from any agent 
whether the IOI exists or not.  Second, is if the anonymity of the other agent(s) related to 
an IOI is identical to other agent(s) related to that IOI.  For instance, all agents 
simultaneously send the same size message across the network.  The relationship of 
unobservability to anonymity is [PfK00] 
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             AnonymityUnobservability ⇒                                  
Anonymity + Dummy Traffic .⇒ Unobservability                
 
Unobservability implies anonymity by keeping messages indistinguishable as well as 
identities anonymous as indicated by equation (1); however, anonymity does not imply 
unobservability.  Looking at (2), anonymity plus dummy (indistinguishable) traffic 
implies unobservability. 
Unobservability may be divided into sender unobservability, receiver unobservability 
and communication unobservability [PfK00].  Sender unobservability means it is 
undetectable whether any sender within the unobservability set sends.   For example, in 
Figure 2 if Alice or any other sender transmits a message, the adversary is unable to 
either observe any or distinguish among the sender messages.  Thus, sender messages are 
hidden.  Receiver unobservability means it is undetectable whether any receiver within 
the unobservability set receives.  For example, in Figure 3 if Bob or any other receiver 
gets a message, the adversary is unable to either observe any or distinguish among the 
receiver messages.  Thus, receiver messages are hidden.  Communication unobservability 
means it is not detectable whether anything is sent out of a set of could-be senders to a set 
of could-be receivers.  For example, in Figure 4 any message sent by Alice or any other 
sender and received by Bob or any other receiver is undetectable.  Thus, sender-receiver 
pair messages are hidden.  It is not detectable whether within the communication 
unobservability set of all possible sender-recipient(s)-pairs a message is exchanged in any 
relationship.  The larger the unobservability set, the stronger the unobservability. 
(1) 
(2) 
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2.2.2 The Adversary. 
An adversary is an agent whose aim is to degrade or eliminate anonymity.  The 
objective of an adversary is to link sender and receiver, identify the sender or receiver for 
a particular message, or trace a sender forward/receiver back to messages or disrupt the 
system. 
A global adversary is omnipresent and has full access to the entire network of nodes 
and links.  A local adversary has limited omnipresence and has full access to only a 
portion of the network nodes and links.   This corresponds to the adversary possessing 
complete or restricted information or knowledge about the system.  It may also refer to 
the veracity of this information.  The adversary may either know things to be true or only 
believe things to be true. 
A passive/external adversary is an outsider that can only observe messages traversing 
the network and is typically invisible.  This adversary can only compromise 
communication channels between nodes.  In other words, it is a non-empty set of agents, 
part of the surrounding of the anonymous system and capable of compromising links.  An 
active/internal adversary is a visible insider and may alter messages traversing the 
network.  This adversary controls nodes in the network.  In other words, this describes a 
non-empty set of agents which are part of the anonymous system and capable of 
participating in normal communications and controlling at least some nodes. 
Typically, the adversary is dynamic and collects information about the path selection 
algorithm, its parameters and as much information as possible about network activities 
from compromised nodes and links.  The adversary uses all available facts to infer who 
sent or received which messages in a computationally bounded or even unbounded 
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manner.  The adversary may behave deterministically with a scheduled plan of attack, 
probabilistically depending on the relative frequency of sequences of observed actions or 
events, or non-deterministically (unpredictably).  
A combination of adversarial types constitutes the threat model.  A strong threat 
model is a well-funded adversary who may compromise both nodes (internal) and links 
(external), observe all network traffic (passive, global), alter traffic (active) and operates 
mixes (dynamic) [DaR03].  Although this may appear to be a rather excessive 
assumption, any anonymous system that withstands strong adversarial attacks provides 
very strong security.  However, in practice such threat models may lead to unrealistic 
designs.  Therefore, available adversarial resources are considered carefully and 
countermeasures tailored accordingly to the anticipated threat level.  In brief, anonymous 
communications systems are designed with an assumed adversary threat model in mind. 
2.2.3 The Attacks. 
Whatever the threat model, the goal of an attack is to link sender and receiver, 
identify the sender or receiver for a particular message, or trace a sender forward/receiver 
back to messages.  The attacks and defenses for a passive and active adversary are 
provided in Table 1. 
The goal of passive traffic analysis attack is to observe all traffic.  A defense is to 
obscure traffic patterns by adding noise traffic, obfuscating timing or having same size 
messages.  The purpose of a timing attack is to link incoming and outgoing message 
based on route time traversals.  Synchronizing batching increases the anonymity set and 
is a good defense; however, it results in greater network load and less operator flexibility.   
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Table 1: Attacks and Defenses (Passive Adversary) 
Attack Goal Defense 
Traffic Analysis Observe traffic Obscure traffic patterns 
Timing  Examine route time traversals Synchronous batching  
Content  Extract identifying information Encryption  
Counting  Long or short term communication Obscure traffic patterns 
Intersection  Correlate active times Spread message out over time 
 
based on route time traversals.  Synchronizing batching increases the anonymity set and 
is a good defense; however, it results in greater network load and less operator flexibility.  
Extracting data or location identifying information is the aim of the content attack.  
Employing encryption to not reveal identifying information is a common defense.  The 
counting attack scheme counts long or short term communications to reveal identifying 
information.  Similar to traffic analysis defense, obscuring traffic patterns can thwart this 
attack.  Lastly, the intersection attack targets networks without dummy messages to 
produce constant message stream and correlate the times sender and receiver are active.  
A defense spreads messages out over time to increase the set of possible senders.  Active 
adversary attacks and subsequent defenses are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Attacks and Defenses (Active Adversary) 
Attack Goal Defense 
Traffic Analysis Corrupt/delay traffic  
Partition traffic 
Impose transmission deadline 
Little defense 
Blending/n-1  Isolate target message “heartbeat” messages 
Denial of Service (DoS)  Deny use 
Degrade performance/anonymity 
Digital currency (puzzles) 
Tagging  Modify messages Integrity checks 
Colluding Multiple-mix compromise  Drop messages 
Sybil Add mixes to control paths None  
Compulsion Force mix to reveal decrypt keys Forward secure 
Reputation  Deny access, Cease existence Digital currency (puzzles) 
Replay  Re-use valid messages Use nonces or timestamps 
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The goal of active traffic analysis attack is to corrupt or delay traffic and establish 
many attacker controlled routers.  There are few effective defenses as these attacks are 
difficult to accomplish.  Imposing transmission deadlines at each hop may partly mitigate 
the delay traffic.  Isolating the target message is the reason behind a blending attack.  Not 
relying on batches and sending “heartbeat” messages instead is a defense.  Heartbeat 
messages are sent through the network back to the originating sender.  If all heartbeat 
messages are not received, an n-1 attack is occurring and the sender may either cease 
operations or inject dummy traffic to improve the anonymity of valid messages.  The 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack objective is to force a large number of cryptographic 
operations or deplete bandwidth to deny use or degrade performance/anonymity.  A 
defense using digital currency to make clients pay for router services can be effective.  A 
hard to perform but easy to verify client puzzle, such as  use of a client puzzle in Tor, 
demonstrate its effectiveness [Fra06].  A tagging attack modifies messages.  Performing 
integrity checks on messages counters this attack.  The target of a colluding attack is to 
get multiple mixes to work together to compromise mixes.  Dropping messages if an 
unplanned path is taken ensures agents cannot traverse adversary-controlled paths.  The 
Sybil attack adds mixes and controls message paths.  It is believed that no defense exists 
for this type of attack.   The compulsion attack forces a mix to provide decryption keys.  
Ensuring forwarding nodes are anonymous also or forward secure is a good defense.  
Denying access to the network or making an anonymous service unpopular are two goals 
of a reputation attack.  Defending against this is similar to DoS attacks: use digital 
currency to deny or slow access.  The replay attack goal is to reuse or alter prior authentic 
messages later to masquerade as a valid user.  A simple way to thwart a replay attack is 
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using one-time-only nonces in messages so subsequent similar messages are ignored.  
Another is embedding time-stamps in messages for synchronized systems.  
Unfortunately, one good defense, injecting unique sender and receiver identities into 
messages, runs counter to the purpose of providing anonymity.  The mix technology is 
described next.   
2.2.4 The Mix. 
A mix is the most extensively researched and implemented anonymous technology.  
The original mix was designed to make e-mails untraceable [Cha81].  Other applications 
of a mix include secure electronic voting, anonymous telecommunications, and 
anonymous Internet communications.  Subsequent mix variations protect against or avoid 
specific attacks and/or seek to boost performance in specific application domains.  A 
representative mix is shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: A Mix [SaP06] 
 
Figure 5(a) shows the major mix component.  A mix accepts input messages on links a, 
b, c, d, and e and generates uncorrelated, batched output messages to links o1, o2, o3, o4, 
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and o5 by altering the flow and appearance of each message.  For alter flow, the message 
is delayed and/or reordered.  For appearance, the message is re-encrypted and/or padded.  
The mix decrypts the encrypted input messages and removes all sender information such 
as timing information from the headers.  For instance in Figure 5(b), different input 
arrival times Ta=Tb, Tc, Td, and Te are simultaneously output at time Tout.  This provides 
unlinkability and defends against traffic analysis attacks.  Once a specific condition is 
achieved, the mix forwards a mixed batch of output messages to receivers or another mix. 
Multiple mixes are connected together to form a mix topology and are called mixnets.  
The two main topologies are illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Mix Topologies [SaP06] 
 
 
Cascades consist of a fixed number of sequential mixes a message traverses in the 
anonymous network.  In Figure 6(a), mix one transforms the inputs and concurrently 
transfers outputs to mix two.  Mix two repeats the transformation and forwards to mix 
three.  This continues until mix four outputs the untraceable inputs.  All inputs traverse a 
single path.  Alternatively, free-route networks consist of a variable number of mixes a 
message traverses in the anonymous network.  In Figure 6(b), mix two accepts an input 
and forwards it to mix four; however, not all inputs follow the same path.  While the 
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cascade topology provides overall better security properties compared to the free-routing 
topology in mixnets, under certain conditions, the free-routing topology provides more 
robust anonymity [BeP01].   
Verifiability, a common robustness technique in cascade topologies to protect against 
integrity attacks, checks the correctness of each mixnet output.  The following 
correctness criteria [SaP06] determines whether input messages are 
C1) Transformed as expected. 
C2) Uncorrupted. 
C3) Equal in number (no added/deleted messages). 
 
The verifiability mechanism must satisfy all three criteria.  This region is indicated by 
1 2 3C C C∩ ∩  and the classification of cascade mixnets is shown in Figure 7.  Sender 
verifiable (SV), mix verifiable (MV), universally verifiable (UV), and conditionally 
universally verifiable (CUV) are the classifications. 
The sender verifiable (SV) mechanism detects corrupt output messages and the 
mixnet only satisfies the horizontally hashed C2 area as shown in Figure 7.  The mix  
 
C1 = Transformed as expected.  
C2 = Uncorrupted.  
C3 = No added/deleted input messages.  
Figure 7: Verifiable Cascade Mixnets Classification based on Satisfied Correctness Criteria [SaP06] 
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verifiable (MV) mechanism has each mix verify its own batch output but does not require 
SV.   
Together the mixes execute supplementary subprotocols to ensure output batch 
correctness.  The mixnet satisfies 1 3C C∩  but not necessarily C2.  In a universally 
verifiable (UV) mixnet, even if all mixes are corrupted, an incorrect output batch is not 
possible and satisfies all three criteria or the 1 2 3C C C∩ ∩ region.  Each mix must prove 
an output uniquely corresponds to an input without revealing such a relationship.  
Conditionally universally verifiable (CUV) provide probabilistic guarantees on output 
batches but not necessarily on all batch outputs.  Hence, a CUV mixnet satisfies one, two, 
or three criteria or the 1 2 3C C C∪ ∪  region. 
Several variations on mix methods [Cha88, ChK03, DiM04, Jon04, LeS02, ReR98, 
ShL00] and other peer-to-peer approaches [BoW05, ChW06, GoR03, HaL05, Kon05, 
LiX06, LuF04, ReP02, RsZ04, XiX03, XiX03a, ZhH04] have been proposed as solutions 
to provide anonymity in communication networks.  In Figure 8, the three main anonymity 
solutions are shown. 
 
Figure 8: Anonymity Solutions [SaP06] 
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In Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(b), the sender has two or more connected peers.  If the 
adversary is unable to eavesdrop on all of its connections and the peers are not 
compromised, the sender’s communications are untraceable [PaM86].  Hence, sender and 
communication anonymity can be achieved.  However, the sender may be identifiable 
and traceable to the mix input in Figure 8(c).  Hence, only communication anonymity 
may be achieved.  The Figure 8(a) solution is effective for broadcast communications and 
providing sender and receiver anonymity [Cha88, PaM86, Wai90].  Figure 8(b) solution 
is effective for low latency communications [ReP02, ReR98].  However, both peer-to-
peer solutions are susceptible to single node disruptions and a powerful adversary may 
degrade or eliminate anonymity.  Also, peer-to-peer solutions are not necessarily robust, 
efficient, or scalable for secure applications.  The mixnet solution provides better 
anonymity and is more robust, efficient, and scalable for secure applications [ReP03]. 
The different approaches to anonymity and classification of mixnets based on 
verifiability are shown in Figure 9.  The root of the tree anonymity is broken out as peer-
to-peer or a mixnet.  The peer-to-peer subtree was already discussed using Figure 8.  The 
mixnet topology expands to cascade and free-routes as covered above using Figure 6 and 
Figure 7.  The free-route is either synchronous or asynchronous.  The asynchronous 
subtree branches to remailers and low latency onion routing.  Both are reviewed in more 
detail in the next section.  The cascade subtree subdivides mixes by cryptographic 
function of decryption, hybrids, and reencryption.  Decryption mixnets [Cha81] require 
the sender to encrypt the message with the keys of each intermediate mix, called a onion, 
and may use the RSA [RiS78] or  
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Figure 9: Overall Classification on Anonymity and Mixnets [SaP06] 
 
ElGamal public key cryptosystem.  As the number of intermediate mixes or onion size 
increases, public key operations become expensive.    
A more efficient variant of the decryption mixnet is the hybrid mixnet [GoR96, JaJ01, 
Mol03].  It uses symmetric as well as public key operations to achieve efficiency and is 
RSA-based.  However, RSA-based decrypt and hybrid mixnets have weaknesses: a 
sender traceable onion, a sender must encrypt for each intermediate mix, the sender onion 
size decreases as it traverses the network, and a fixed decryption sequence.  The 
ElGamal-based reencryption mixnet overcomes these weaknesses.  The leaves of the 
cascade subtree are identified with appropriate classifications as explained above using 
Figure 7.  The anonymous communication networks are reviewed next. 
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2.3 Anonymous Networks 
Anonymous networks may be divided into wired and wireless protocols.  They 
typically vary in routing scheme, transmission medium, topology, and protocol 
implementation which affect the adversarial threat.  Hence, providing anonymity in each 
network requires a different approach particularly when mobility is involved.   
Wired or fixed anonymous networks have been thoroughly studied [Cha81, Cha88, 
PaM86, PfP91, RaS93, ReS98, RmR98].  These networks consist of a set of 
uncompromised nodes with distinctive identities called the anonymity set.  The items of 
interest are predominantly network transmissions.  Many anonymous schemes assume the 
network topology is fixed, while others assume the entire topology is known a priori 
[KoH05].  These assumptions do not hold in mobile wireless networks.   
Wireless anonymous mobile networks research [BeS03, DeH04, GrG03] examines 
protecting privacy or location information in stationary sensor networks but does not 
consider mobility’s impact on anonymity.  Other research [AtH99, HqW04, SaM95] 
focuses only on protecting anonymity for mobile users in last-hop wireless networks 
which degenerates to analyzing wired network anonymity.   
In both Wired and Wireless networks, the network routing scheme is a major factor 
affecting anonymity [LhM04].  Four generic network routing schemes are shown in 
Figure 10.  There is a single sender node on the far left.  The nodes incident or near the 
lines on the right are the receiver node(s). 
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     (a) Unicast               (b) Multicast                 (c) Broadcast         (d) Anycast  
Figure 10: Network Routing Schemes [Wik07] 
 
In Figure 10(a) unicast, a one-to-one relationship exists between sender and receiver.  
A single receiver is uniquely identified.  In Figure 10(b) multicast and Figure 10(c) 
broadcast, a one-to-many relationship exits exists between sender and receivers.  Each 
uniquely identified receiver gets all information from the sender.  In Figure 10(d) 
anycast, a one-to-many relationship also exists between sender and receivers.   However, 
only one uniquely identified receiver gets the information from any given sender at any 
given time.  Anycast is used for connectionless or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) based 
protocols.   
For Wired networks, practically all in-depth research on anonymity assumes a unicast 
routing strategy.  Exceptions include the Dining Cryptographers Network (DC-Net) 
[Cha88], P5 [ShB02], Hordes [LeS02], MAM [XiL06], and Cashmere [ZhZ05].  For 
Wireless networks, a mobile wireless node typically broadcasts to neighboring nodes.   
2.3.1 Wired Networks. 
This section introduces the myriad of implemented or proposed wired anonymous 
networks.  Each protocol is summarized and major advantages and/or disadvantages 
highlighted.   
2.3.1.1  Anonymizer. 
Anonymizer [Boy97] is a Hyper-Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) proxy that filters 
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out identifying headers and sender addresses from the Web browser [GuF04].  This is a 
fast way for users to surf anonymously without revealing their identity to Web servers 
and provides sender anonymity.   The mix topology and path consist of a single node, the 
Anonymizer-Server.  The strengths are low-latency, easy implementation, and increase of 
anonymity set compared to non-anonymous systems.  However, security is weak since no 
chaining, encryption, log safeguarding, or forward secrecy is offered.  Furthermore, with 
only one node, a DoS attack is easy and an adversary monitoring requests can quickly 
link sender and receiver. 
2.3.1.2    Java Anon Proxy. 
Java Anon Proxy (JAP) or WebMIX [Egg05] is a working anonymous web surfing 
network over the Internet.  A single address is shared by many users so sender and 
communication anonymity are protected from both the adversary and receiver (website).  
The client interacts with cascade mixes and uses a predetermined sequence of mixes (i.e., 
a fixed path).  Users connect with encryption through intermediary mixes to the web 
server.   Its strength is users may choose between different mix cascades and multiple 
users traversing the same mix increases the anonymity set and mix dummy traffic inhibits 
traffic analysis. 
2.3.1.3    PipeNet. 
PipeNet [Dai98] is a simple theoretical model for web surfing over the Internet.  It is 
a low-latency Internet Protocol (IP)-level cousin of a Type II remailer network such as 
Mixmaster, with extra dummy traffic to defend against timing attacks.  All users send a 
legitimate or dummy message each time unit to the identical cascade mix using virtual 
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link encryption.  The cascade consists of a sequence of pre-established (fixed) 3 to 4 node 
path.  The strengths of strong anonymity and traffic analysis protection are offset by the 
weaknesses of impracticality, DoS vulnerability, and inefficiency.  The model is idealistic 
not practical.  Although a very influential early anonymous communication network 
proposal, PipeNet has not been designed much less implemented and is not a serious 
candidate for practical development.  The DoS vulnerability stems from a malicious 
user’s ability to not send a message thereby bringing the entire system down.  The 
efficiency problem is due to the constant-bandwidth long-lived encrypted links incurring 
serious performance costs to provide security against a strong adversarial model of 
pervasive eavesdropping on the network.   
2.3.1.4     Onion Routing (Tor). 
Onion Routing [DiM04, ReS98] is a mature research anonymous communications 
network for interactive anonymous Internet traffic such as the Web, Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) and Secure Shell (SSH).  Onion Routing establishes circuits with layered 
asymmetric keys (hence, the onion nomenclature) and hides the sender and receiver 
address.  It is implemented at the application or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
layer and offers sender, receiver and communication anonymity.  Onion Routing relies on 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide forward secrecy and dummy messages. The 
first generation (type I) mix topology is cascade mixes called Onion Routers with a fixed 
five (5) onion router path selection strategy.  The second generation (type II) mix 
topology is free-route with variable, random hop and cyclic path selection of up to 50 
onion routers [GuF04].  Each mix station is independent and randomly chooses the next 
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mix in the path.  The strengths are application independent connections and wrapped 
encryption to established circuits which is an excellent deterrent against traffic analysis 
attacks.  The main weakness is no attempt is made to protect against a global, active 
adversary.  Hence it is vulnerable to attackers who can control (or monitor) many diverse 
portions of the network simultaneously.  
2.3.1.5     Freedom Network. 
Freedom Network [GoS99] provides an anonymous Internet connection that is similar 
to Onion Routing; however, it is implemented at the IP layer rather than the application 
level.  It provides sender anonymity for Web browsing but may also be used for IRC, 
SSH, Telnet and E-mail.   The topology is a cascade mix, random path length and acyclic.  
The sender may randomly choose the no cycle path, but the path length is fixed at three 
intermediate nodes [GuF04].  The strengths are efficiency and reasonably secure against 
DoS attacks.  The weaknesses are application-dependence and vulnerability to generic 
traffic attacks.  
2.3.1.6      Cyberpunk (Type I remailer). 
Cypherpunk [Pas00] is a type I remailer using layered asymmetric encryption for 
messages with a proper Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) key but does not mix messages.  It 
provides communication anonymity only.  The path is a sequence of remailers.  The 
strength is strong anonymity.  First, no pseudonyms are supported; no secret identity 
table is maintained, and no mail logs are kept to identify users.  This diminishes the risk 
of "after-the-fact" tracing.  Second, remailers accept encrypted e-mail, decrypt it, and 
remail the resulting message.  This prevents an eavesdropping adversary from linking 
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incoming and outgoing messages.  Third, remailers use chaining to achieve more robust 
security.  Chaining sends a message through several anonymous remailers.  The 
weakness is messages are not mixed and when message size gets smaller a link between 
sender and receiver is possible if the adversary monitors requests. 
2.3.1.7    Mixmaster (Type II remailer). 
Mixmaster [Cot01] is a type II remailer enhances protection against eavesdropping 
attacks and uses Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) by adding sender anonymity.  
The path is still a fixed sequence of remailers.  Strengths are the use of message padding 
and mixing to reduce the vulnerability to content or timing attacks.  Another is the use of 
unique identifier and timestamps to mitigate replay attacks.  Weaknesses are messages 
are unicast only and no reply message capability exists. 
2.3.1.8  Mixminion (Type III remailer). 
Mixminion [DaR03] is a type III remailer that improves upon Mixmaster.  The added 
improvements include replies, integrated directory servers, dummy traffic, forward 
anonymity, replay prevention using key rotation, and exit policies. For instance, 
Mixminion batches message-based free-route mixes with secure single-use reply blocks.  
It also uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP and adds receiver anonymity.  The 
path is a free-route mix.  A strength is replies are allowed.  Another is mix nodes cannot 
distinguish forward messages from reply messages, so forward and reply messages share 
the same anonymity set which provides forward anonymity.  Other strengths are it runs in 
a real-world Internet environment, requires minimal node synchronization, and defends 
against known anonymity-breaking attacks such as replay attacks. 
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2.3.1.9  DC-Net. 
The Dining Cryptographer Network (DC-Net [Cha88]) is the 1st P2P approach to 
achieve perfect sender and receiver anonymity and allows a single sender to broadcast a 
message to multiple receivers [Cha88, Wai90].  It is the only known non-rerouting 
protocol.   A strength is perfect sender anonymity.  The receiver gets the message under 
certain circumstances (odd parity) that prevents anyone but the sender from knowing who 
sent the message.  The strength over rerouting protocols is lower overhead due to shorter 
delays and no re-routing traffic [GuF04].  A weakness is due to the broadcast medium, 
only a single sender may send a message.  Another weakness is sharing secret coin flips 
with other parties requires significant coordination and synchronization between nodes 
which is inefficient on larger scales.  In fact, it requires O(n3) protocol messages per 
anonymous message in a network of n agents [WaN07].  This makes DC-Net impractical 
and un-scalable. 
2.3.1.10 Herbivore. 
Herbivore [GoR03] is used for anonymous Web surfing and other Internet 
applications.  It addresses the practical issues DC-Net does not like who sends when and 
the joining and leaving of a network by dividing the communication of the shared secret 
into three steps [Jon04].  It uses a star-topology instead of broadcasting to reduce the 
communication requirements to preserve anonymity.  The strengths are a more efficient 
and scalable design.  A weakness is network nodes may crash and depart the network at 
any time and degrade anonymity to a small degree. 
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2.3.1.11 Crowds. 
Crowds [ReR98] is for anonymous Web surfing and extends the Anonymizer 
protocol.  A sequence of mixes (jondos) with random hop selection per hop with cycles 
replaces the single node point of failure.  This achieves sender anonymity.  As long as the 
sender does not reveal identifying information in the request [Jon04], communication 
anonymity is also achieved. The strengths are users blend into a crowd and the unicast 
probabilistic routing.  However, since the last jondo contacts the end server directly 
[Jon04], no receiver anonymity is achieved.  This is a weakness. 
2.3.1.12 Hordes. 
Hordes [LeS02] improves Crowds.  Jondos are User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
proxies instead of HTTP proxies.  Also, a multicast instead of reverse path return is used, 
thus sender anonymity is achieved.  As with Crowds, if the sender does not reveal 
identifying information to the receiver, communication anonymity is achieved.  However, 
receiver anonymity is not achieved as the last jondo still contacts the receiver directly.  
The multicast return and UDP proxies achieve the strength of low-latency.  Similar to 
Crowds, Hordes allows cycles on the forwarding path. 
2.3.1.13 P5. 
P5 [ShB02] is for anonymous Internet applications.  Users are placed into anonymity 
groups and messages are broadcast in a hierarchical tree structure.  Using broadcast 
ensures receiver anonymity.  To achieve sender and communication anonymity, nodes 
send uniformly distributed constant noise [Jon04] to ensure the impossibility of 
distinguishing between noise and real traffic.   This makes for an efficient and scalable 
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system.  A weakness is P5 requires the most bits to send one anonymous bit compared to 
the other protocols.  However, P5 message dropping algorithm mitigates this somewhat 
[Jon04] by allowing bandwidth or processing constrained nodes to drop packets in a 
uniform or non-uniform manner as necessary; thereby, reducing the number of bits 
traversing the network. 
2.3.1.14 Tarzan. 
Tarzan [FrM02] is a peer-to-peer anonymous IP network overlay that uses layered 
encryption and multi-hop routing.  The sender pre-selects the relay node path, creates 
static tunnels through these nodes, and generates dummy traffic to provide anonymity.  It 
achieves sender, receiver and communication anonymity for Web surfing and has the 
strength of using less processor intensive symmetric keys.  A tunnel failure incurs both 
significant computation overhead and delay [ZhZ05]. 
2.3.1.15 WonGoo. 
WonGoo [LuF04] is based on mix and Crowds and is a scalable P2P system for low-
latency anonymous communication resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis.  
Layered encryption and random forwarding result in strong anonymity and high 
efficiency.  A detailed comparison  of WonGoo, Crowds and mix in [LuF05] shows its 
efficiency and anonymity. 
2.3.1.16 Cashmere. 
Cashmere [ZhZ05] is a resilient anonymous layer built on a structured P2P overlay.  
Instead of relaying traffic through fragile single-node Chaum-mixes to achieve 
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anonymity, Cashmere relays traffic through more robust relay groups of mix nodes 
thereby lowering the chance of a path failure and increasing the success of end-to-end 
message delivery.  When an agent of the relay group receives a message, it anycasts the 
message to the next relay group as well as broadcasts the decrypted contents to all relay 
group agents.  Cashmere provides sender and communication anonymity and can be 
extended to provide receiver anonymity.  However, issues of key management and key 
revocation still must be resolved. 
2.3.1.17 MAM. 
MAM [XiL06] is a self-organizing and distributed mutual anonymous multicast and 
unicast protocol for applications such as video conferencing, distance learning and 
software updates.   It is designed for high mutual anonymity degree, efficient message 
delivery, distributed and dynamic behavior and self-optimization [XiL06].  Two 
challenges are managing group agent memberships and group keys.  MAM works best 
with smaller networks as the protocol is sub-optimal if the vast majority or all agents in 
the network want to hide their identity. 
2.3.2 Wireless Networks. 
The dynamic topology of wireless networks due to mobility, routes failures, and 
nodes entering/leaving makes proactively maintaining topology knowledge very costly 
and divulges private node knowledge to adversaries.  The wireless IEEE 802.11 standard 
specifies particular topologies supporting transparent to allow node mobility to higher 
protocol layers [IEE99].  These topologies include Basic Service Set (BSS) networks, 
Extended Service Set (ESS) networks and Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS) 
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networks.  Figure 11 illustrates the two basic networks. 
A BSS network has mobile nodes within the same area which communicate via a 
single access point.  Each mobile node transmits all frames to the access point, who 
forwards them within the same area or over the backbone distribution system.  An ESS 
comprises one or more BSS networks where each access point acts as an Ethernet bridge 
and communicates over the distribution system.  These topologies can achieve the same 
anonymity as Wired anonymous networks. 
  
 
Figure 11: BSS and IBSS Networks 
 
In contrast, IBSS or ad-hoc network nodes within the same area communicate directly 
with each other.  The dotted line indicates one or more nodes might still have access to 
the backbone distribution system.  This requires a different approach to achieve 
anonymity.  Ad hoc networks self-organize, deploy quickly and lack infrastructure.  
Nodes may be highly mobile or stationary and have a wide range of capabilities 
[KoV98].  A few researchers have offered anonymous solutions for Mobile IPv6 [HaJ01, 
HqW04] and personal areas networks (PANs) [HqW04, Sch02].  Numerous protocols 
address the routing problem this poses.  Each protocol is summarized and major 
advantages and/or disadvantages highlighted.    
 
Mobile Node 
Access 
Point 
IBSS BSS 
Distribution System  
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 44 - 
2.3.2.1  SDAR. 
SDAR [BoE04] is a non-source-based routing, proactive neighbor detect, Mix-net 
onion, and path hijacking resistant protocol for MANETs deployed in hostile 
environments.  Sender nodes initiate path establishment by broadcasting a path discovery 
message with specific trust requirements to neighboring nodes to ensure only trustworthy 
nodes construct routing paths to preserve node anonymity.   It uses a public key 
cryptography trapdoor.  However, it has a trapdoor, scalability and security issue 
[SoK05].  The long private decryption key results in very high computational complexity 
when the number of route request (RREQ) packets gets large for forwarding nodes.  The 
long private key results in high computational complexity when forwarding nodes create 
encrypted signature routing messages during path discovery.  Finally, part of the routing 
message may be deleted and modified by a forwarding node or adversary. 
2.3.2.2  AnonDSR. 
AnonDSR [SoK05] is a purely on-demand, MIX-net onion, no neighbor exposure, 
and crypto-protected receiver protocol [KoH07] for MANETs.  It is composed of the 
security parameter route establishment, anonymous source-receiver route discovery, and 
anonymous cryptographic onion data transfer protocols.  In route establishment, an 
adversary performing an active modification or reply attack or executing the passive 
eavesdropping attack cannot succeed.  In route discovery, an adversary cannot modify the 
public key, trapdoor or onion and a replay attack is detectable.  In data transfer, the onion 
protects all data communications.  As path length increase, AnonDSR scales better than 
SDAR especially for anonymous route establishment. 
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2.3.2.3  MASK. 
MASK [ZhL06] is a proactive neighbor detect, virtual circuit data delivery, no 
neighbor exposure, and broken destination (receiver) anonymity protocol [KoH07].  It is 
capable of MAC-layer and network-layer communications and offers sender, receiver, 
location and communication anonymity under a passive adversary model for large-scale 
theater-wide communications (multiple MANETs) or small-scale tactical 
communications in Urban Terrain Military Operations.  It establishes source-destination 
virtual circuits and uses dynamic pseudonyms for path presentations [ZaW05].  It is 
resistant to message coding, flow recognition, replay and timing attacks, and offers high 
routing efficiency compared to classical AODV [PeB03].  Unlike ANODR, MASK is not 
sensitive to node mobility and allows anonymous MAC-layer communications.  Two 
weaknesses are the final destination is contained within every RREQ message plaintext 
thereby breaking destination anonymity and reliance on a tight synchronization of 
neighbor keys and pseudonyms [SeP06]. 
2.3.2.4  ARM. 
      ARM [SeP06] is an anonymous on-demand routing protocol for MANETs that is 
secure against two assumed adversaries: cooperating nodes inside the network and an 
external, global, passive adversary that monitors all network traffic.  It offers sender, 
receiver, and communication anonymity in both static and dynamic networks.  It assumes 
every node has a permanent identity known by other nodes, source and destination share 
a secret key and pseudonym, every node establishes a broadcast key with its 1-hop 
neighborhood, and symmetric wireless links.  Both random padding and time-to-live 
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values are applied to RREQ and RREP messages.  The main advantages are higher 
efficiency than ASR, ANODR and SDAR, improved receiver anonymity over SDAR and 
MASK, and preserved communication anonymity against a powerful adversary unlike 
ANDOR, ASR, SDAR and MASK [SeP06]. 
2.3.2.5  ODAR. 
ODAR [SyC06] uses Bloom filters for storage-, processing- and communication-
efficiency, is based on asymmetric cryptosystems, and provides sender, receiver, 
communications and location anonymity.  A Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic 
bit-vector data structure for storing the elements of a set, and testing whether or not any 
given element is a member [Blo70].  A key management mechanism for distributing keys 
during source route construction provides strong end-to-end communication anonymity. 
2.3.2.6  AMUR. 
Anonymous MUlticast Routing Protocol (AMUR) [BaL07] uses Bloom filters and 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols to provide efficient anonymity in ad hoc network 
environments.  It is an extension of the unicast routing approach in ODAR to a multicast 
environment and augments the trapdoor approaches used in SDAR, AnonDSR and 
SDDR.  The filters encode a source multicast tree in every multicast packet to provide an 
efficient means to preserve sender, receiver, and communication anonymity.  However, 
the protocol offers no protection against a globally omniscient and active adversary and 
subsequent insertion and denial of service attacks.  
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2.3.2.7  HANOR. 
HANOR [LiH06] is based on a hierarchical MANET architecture with multi-hop 
clustering, called groups, found in some military communication networks.  It leverages 
the inherited group management security features to reduce the prohibitive computation 
and communication limitations of flat routing schemes such as AnonDSR, ASR, MASK 
and SDAR in larger-scale MANETs while preserving anonymity and providing 
additional intra-group and inter-group communication anonymity.  However, the protocol 
was designed assuming a local, passive, and solitary adversary threat model instead of a 
much stronger global, active and multiple adversarial threat model. 
2.3.2.8   ANODR. 
ANODR [KoH03] is based on a “broadcast with trapdoor information” concept to 
achieve an untraceable and intrusion tolerant protocol for MANETs deployed in a hostile 
environment.  It is an on-demand, first contact flood, virtual circuit data delivery, no 
neighbor exposure, and crypto-protected receiver anonymity protocol [KoH07].  It uses a 
route pseudonym approach and a symmetric key boomerang type onion, a layered 
cryptographic structure on which appending and peeling off are performed by the same 
forwarding nodes.  It prevents strong adversaries from tracing a packet flow back to its 
source or destination (communication anonymity) and ensures that adversaries are unable 
to identify local message-forwarding nodes (location privacy).  However, it has a 
trapdoor and anonymity issue [SoK05].  First, each forwarding node must impractically 
try all known shared secret keys.  Second, how to establish shared session keys during the 
RREQ and route reply (RREP) phases is unspecified. 
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2.3.2.9  SDDR. 
SDDR [ElK03] is based on a distributed route construction algorithm used for 
establishing anonymous routing paths in ad hoc networks such as wireless battlefield, on-
the-fly conference, or emergency/rescue environments.  The goal is to allow intermediate 
nodes to build paths without putting the communicating nodes anonymity at risk.   SDDR 
does not require a global view of the network topology, is resilient against path hijacking, 
and provides protection against replay and modification attacks.  Its limitations are an 
inability to change routes if under attack, constrained path lengths and non-minimal node 
computation power and storage requirements.  Hence, it is very vulnerable to DoS 
attacks.  It also ignores sender and receiver anonymity and does not provide strong 
location privacy  [RaM06]. 
2.3.2.10 ASR. 
ASR [ZhW04] is based on asymmetric cryptosystems and is designed to ensure the 
security of discovered routes and preserve sender, receiver, communications and location 
anonymity against known passive and active attacks.  Unlike SDDR, it offers forwarding 
node, strong location, and communication anonymity.  Unlike ANDOR, it offers sender, 
receiver, and strong location anonymity.   However, it has the disadvantages of large 
computational latency, key size, and power consumption and an inability to dynamically 
repair failed routes.  For instance, every forwarding node must generate a fresh 
public/secret key pair for every RREQ message it forwards and decrypt each RREP with 
every private key in its routing table [SeP06]. 
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2.3.2.11 ZAP. 
ZAP [WuB05] is a zone-based anonymous protocol designed to achieve destination 
k-anonymity in positioning routing algorithms.  In this group-based approach, it uses 
wireless broadcast to give “false” positions near the destination and is based on a 
“crowd” of nodes so that anonymity depends on crowd size.  It assumes uniformly 
distributed nodes, robust flooding, always-available GPS and public keys, symmetric 
radio channels, equal probability of being a source or destination node, and a global, 
passive, adaptive adversary.  k-anonymity is preserved by initially choosing a large fixed 
zone or dynamically maintaining a k-sized zone based on node density and mobility. 
2.3.2.12 AODPR. 
AODPR [RaM06] uses a dynamic handshake mechanism to achieve sender, receiver, 
communication, and location anonymity for an ad hoc network of any node density.  It 
uses a Virtual Home Region (VHR [Wux05])-based DIstributed Secure POsition 
SERvice (DISPOSER[Wux04]) where nodes stay in one VHR to obtain and report 
position information.  A node varies density by being connected to neighbors in all four 
directions (quad placement), in a line of intermediate nodes (line placement), or to just 
one neighbor node (least placement).  The source estimates the minimum number of hops 
to the destination and forwarding nodes also calculate distance to the destination.  It 
computes a time variant temporary identifier from node time and position to circumvent a 
traffic analysis attack, thwart a wormhole attack, and protect against a DoS attack. 
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2.3.2.13 AO2P. 
AO2P [WxB05] is based on asymmetric cryptosystems, uses a receiver contention 
scheme for route discovery (an anycast approach), uses pseudonyms and temporary MAC 
addresses for data delivery, and is designed for high density networks.   It offers sender, 
forwarding node, communications and location anonymity but not receiver anonymity.  A 
modified protocol R-AO2P [WuB05a] does improve receiver anonymity.  However, 
Ao2P also has the disadvantage of large computational latency, key size, and power 
consumption.  Hence, it may not scale well for larger networks. 
2.3.2.14 SAS. 
SAS [MiX06] is a simple and efficient scheme for establishing anonymity during 
node discovery and routing in clustered wireless sensor networks (CWSN).  Neighboring 
nodes share pairwise symmetric keys and are assigned non-contiguous, uniformly 
distributed dynamic pseudonyms.  This guarantees complete anonymity even in the 
presence of malicious and colluding neighboring nodes.  It assumes the algorithm HEED 
[YoF04] is used to form clusters and that sensor network nodes are static thereafter.  
Therefore, the true dynamic nature of ad hoc networks is not captured.  
2.3.2.15 ASC. 
ASC [KaM07] is connection-oriented, based on a symmetric cryptosystem, and uses 
path and link encryption, and virtual circuit identifiers.  It does not rely on any trusted 
agent or centralized mechanism and preserves sender, receiver, communications and 
location anonymity for video and audio streaming applications in MANETs.   Compared 
to ANODR and AO2P, it may be the first anonymous routing protocol fast enough to 
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route real-time traffic while preserving anonymity and uses an adaptive transmission 
power scheme to improve network security and performance. 
2.3.2.16 ASRPAKE. 
Anonymous Secure Routing Protocol with Authenticated Key Exchange (ASRPAKE) 
[XiR07] is a proposed elliptic curve cryptosystem-based ring signature scheme designed 
to achieve anonymous authentication key agreement in MANETs.  ASRPAKE augments 
the other MANET-based anonymous protocols of AnonDSR, MASK, SDAR, and ASR.  
As long as the entire routing path is not compromised, it offers end-to-end anonymity 
from the original sender to the intended receiver.  Also, its embedded suite of 
authenticated key exchange mechanism ensures the security of the shared session key 
between sender and receiver.  Quantifying anonymity is discussed next. 
2.4 Quantifying Anonymity 
To achieve anonymity, actions should be separated from the agents who perform 
them for some adversary.    Anonymity in general as well as the anonymity of each 
particular agent or message is context dependent on the number of agents or messages, 
time frame, attributes, etc.  A good deal of research has investigated different ways to 
measure anonymity.  Typical analytical approaches to describe anonymous systems use 
simple quantifications and basic probabilistic models.  Other approaches, covered in the 
following sections, produce formal frameworks for the more general description of 
anonymous systems.  These formal approaches provide inspiration to search for future 
measures and methods for analyzing anonymous systems.  A variety of practical 
anonymity metrics include, but are not limited to, anonymity set size, individual 
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anonymity degree, entropy anonymity, effective anonymity set size, normalized entropy 
anonymity degree, negligibility-based identity-free anonymity, localized real-time 
anonymity, combinatorial anonymity degree, evidence theory anonymity, k-anonymity 
and multicast anonymity.  
2.4.1 Anonymity Set Size. 
Anonymity set size is a traditional way to measure anonymity in an ACS.  For 
example, the message sender is embedded in an anonymity set [Cha88, KeE98] of other 
honest, uncompromised senders.  The cardinality of this anonymity set provides a 
numerical measure of Sender Anonymity.  This metric has been used to evaluate the 
design of the Stop-n-Go MIXes [KeE98]. 
Informally, if the adversary knows the number of potential agents N prior to an attack 
and has compromised a number of agents C during the attack, then the anonymity set size 
n = N – C quantifies the level of anonymity achieved after the attack.  Formally, an 
equivalent derived definition is below. 
 
(Derived) Definition 1 [KeE98] Assume an adversary threat model E, set of all agents A 
where |A| < ∞, anonymity set AS ⊂  A, message M, and agent i є A.  Let O denote the role 
(either a sender or receiver) of agent i.  Further assume a priori anonymity set AS’ ⊂  A 
where N = |AS’| and comprised set of agents I ⊂  AS’ where C = |I| and 1 ≤  C ≤  N-1.  If 
the a priori probability Q > 0 that agent i has role O with respect to M with compromised 
agents I, then i є AS’– I with posterior probability P ≠ 0.  Any method to provide 
anonymity has an anonymity set size n = N – C. 
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The adversary’s chances of identifying the agent’s i role O increases (decreases) as 
the anonymity set size n decreases (increases).  The set of possible agents depends on the 
knowledge of the adversary.  Thus, anonymity is relative with respect to the adversary.  
In open environments, the anonymity set of a receiver changes over time.  Since the 
intersection of two different anonymity sets is likely to be smaller than either of the 
anonymity sets, different intersections of anonymity sets could be used to gain 
information about a specific agent or group of agents.   Effectively, this leads to an 
anonymity set whose size shrinks as the adversary observes additional acts of 
communication by the same agent.  The worst case is when an adversary reduces the 
anonymity set to size one or n = N – C = n – (n – 1) = 1.   If the probability distribution of 
an agent performing an action is not uniform, then the anonymity set size may be a poor 
measure of anonymity in any real anonymous system.  An individual anonymity degree 
metric is examined next. 
2.4.2 Individual Anonymity Degree. 
From the perspective of the adversary, the anonymity degree for each agent i in 
anonymity set AS at any point in time can be characterized by the scale in Figure 12.   
       
 
Figure 12: Individual Anonymity Degree Scale [ReR06] 
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The anonymity degrees range from absolute to none from left to right.  The scale 
qualitatively describes anonymity degree and was first introduced in the design of 
Crowds [ReR98].   
Consider an adversary trying to determine who the sender of a message is.  On the far 
left, absolute privacy means no agent ever sends any message in the ACS.  Beyond 
suspicion means agent i is no more likely to have sent the message than anyone else.  
This is the highest achievable level of anonymity for any set of agents and is also known 
as total anonymity or strongly probabilistic.  Probable Innocence means agent i is no 
more likely to have sent the message than not sent the message.  Possible Innocence 
means there is a non-trivial chance that an agent other than i sent the message.  Exposed 
means there is a non-trivial chance that agent i is the sender of the message.  Provably 
Exposed means agent i is the sender of the message.  This means the adversary is 
absolutely certain who the sender of the message is and no anonymity exists.  The next 
information theoretic entropy anonymity measure looks at the average uncertainty across 
the entire anonymity set. 
2.4.3 Entropy Anonymity. 
To overcome the limitations of the anonymity set metric, other researchers 
independently proposed information theoretic anonymity degree [DiC02, SeD02] based 
on information entropy [Sha48] that quantifies the level of uncertainty inherent in a set of 
data.  The information-theoretic metrics of entropy, conditional entropy, channel 
capacity, and effective anonymity set size measures how random the probability 
distribution is and considers the global anonymity of the communication system.  
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Intuitively, each can be used as a measure to describe the average degree of anonymity or 
uncertainty of a system against a specific attack.   The formal entropy definition based on 
[Kon05] follows, 
 
Definition 2 [Kon05] For an event space AS, let XAS be a discrete random variable with 
probability distribution Pri = Pr[XAS = i] where j є AS.  If the event space AS denotes an 
anonymity set, then XAS represents the identity (similar to assigning an anonymity degree 
probability for each identified agent i as covered in the previous section).  However, if 
the event space AS denotes the set of all items of interest or IOI (i.e., sender, receiver and 
messages), then XAS represents the end-to-end routing path (being eavesdropped) between 
any sender and any receiver.  The adversary’s a priori knowledge is measured by H(XAS) 
or entropy 
 
2( ) Pr( )*log Pr( ).
AS
AS
i X
H X i i
∈
= − ∑  
where AS is the anonymity set.  The adversary’s posteriori knowledge is measured by the 
conditional entropy 
  2
,
( | ) Pr( , )*log Pr( | )
AS
AS
i X j C
H X C i j i j
∈ ∈
= − ∑  
where C is the set of intercepted IOI (messages) or compromised IOI (agents), Pr(i,j) is 
the joint probability of agent i and intercepted IOI j and Pr(i|j) is the conditional 
probability that agent i is identified given the intercepted IOI j, where 
       ,
Pr( | ) Pr( | ) / Pr( , ).
ASi X j C
i j i j i j
∈ ∈
= ∑  
(4) 
(5) 
(3) 
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In terms of anonymous communications, the entropy H(XAS) of XAS is the amount of 
uncertainty about the anonymous events, before executing the protocol. The conditional 
entropy H(XAS| C) gives the uncertainty of the adversary about the anonymous events 
after performing the observation [ChP07].  The higher the entropies are, the more 
uncertain the adversary is about the outcome.  The communication channel capacity 
[ChP07] gives the maximum channel rate information is transmitted and measures 
anonymity loss or maxPr[H(XAS) - H(XAS| C)]. 
Consider an entropy example.  Let N be the number of agents and C be the number of 
compromised agents.  Combining the previous anonymity set size definition, n = N – C, 
with the entropy anonymity, H(XAS), the maximum entropy anonymity measure, Hmax, at 
any point in time is Hmax = log2(N – C) = log2(n).  Thus, entropy is also called effective 
anonymity set size [Dia05c].  For the Crowds protocol, effective anonymity set size is a 
function of N, C, and forwarding probability pf and is 
 
 
2.4.3.1  Effective Anonymity Set Size. 
The effective anonymity set size metric measures the degree of success for an 
adversary on mixes and must be computed for each individual message going through the 
mix [Dia05c].  The anonymity provided by a mix can be determined for incoming 
messages (sender anonymity) or outgoing messages (receiver anonymity).  For sender 
anonymity, the entropy of the probability distribution relating outgoing messages with all 
possible inputs is computed.  For receiver anonymity, the entropy of the probability 
2 2
( 1) 1( ) log log .
( 1)
f
AS f
f f
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distribution relating the chosen input with all possible outputs is computed.  For both, the 
anonymity measure applies equally to each output/input message for a given period of 
time called a round.  The actual anonymity metric computation depends on the type of 
mix the messages go through and if any dummy traffic is generated by the mix.   If 
dummy traffic is generated, it matters if the dummy messages are inserted with the output 
messages or in the pool of input messages within the mix. 
Let r be a round, ar be the number of input messages, nr be the number of messages in 
the pool, sr be the total number of sent/output messages, and P(nr) be the probability a 
message leaves as a function of the number nr of messages in the pool.  Also, let Pr(Ii,k) 
be the probability an output message matches the input message k of round i and Pr(Or,q) 
be the probability an input message matches the output message q of round r.   
First, assume no dummy traffic.  The sender anonymity HS and receiver anonymity 
HR metrics for a deterministic and binomial mix are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Sender and Receiver Anonymity Metrics without Dummy Traffic [Dia05c]  
Mix Type Sender (Hs) Receiver (HR) 
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Sender anonymity HS is computed using the number of input messages ar and the 
probability distribution of the output message matching the input messages Pr(Ii,k) in the 
familiar entropy formula.  The message probability distribution Pr(Ii,k) depends on the 
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mix type.  For a deterministic mix, the probability is the product of the probability the 
output message matches an input message from the current round 1/nr and the probability 
the output message matches an input message still in the pool from a previous round 
1
(1 ( ))
r
j
j i
P n
−
=
−∏ .  For a binomial mix, the probability is the product of the probability the 
output message matches an input message from the current round 1/nr and the probability 
the output message matches an input message not previously sent out 
1
(1 )
r
j
j i j
s
n
−
=
−∏  where 
j
j
s
n
 is the percent of sent messages to total messages in the mix from prior rounds.  
Receiver anonymity HR is computed using the number of sent messages sr and the 
probability distribution of the input message matching the output messages Pr(Or,q) in the 
familiar entropy formula.  Theoretically, the adversary has to wait forever to compute 
receiver anonymity for any particular input message; however, practically, the adversary 
estimates receiver anonymity after waiting only a few rounds after the input message 
arrived at the mix.  The message probability distribution Pr(Or,q) depends on the mix 
type.  For a deterministic mix, the probability is the product of the probability the input 
message matches an output message 
( )j
j
P n
s
which only makes sense if a message has been 
output in the current round or 0js >  and the probability the input message matches an 
output message from a previous round 
1
(1 ( ))
r
j
j i
P n
−
=
−∏ .  For a binomial mix, the 
computation is the same as sender anonymity.  
Next, assume dummy traffic is generated.  The sender anonymity HDS metrics for 
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Table 4: Sender Anonymity with Dummy Traffic [Dia05c]  
Sender Anonymity with dummy traffic (HDS) 
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output and pool insertion are shown in Table 4.   
The sender anonymity metric HDS is a function of the probability the output message 
is a dummy message pd and sender anonymity without dummy traffic HS.  The 
probability the output message is a dummy message depends on where the dummy 
message is inserted.  If the mix inserts the dummy messages on the output, then this 
probability is simply the ratio of inserted dummy messages dk to total messages sent sk in 
round k or pd = dk/sk.  If the mix inserts the messages in the pool, this probability is the 
ratio of average dummy messages inserted in the pool Dr to messages in the pool nr in 
round r or pd = Dr/nr.  Of course, Dr is the number of dummy messages inserted this 
round dr and in previous rounds 
11
1
(1 )
rr
j
i
i j i j
s
d
n
−−
= =
−∑ ∏ . 
2.4.4 Normalized Entropy Anonymity Degree. 
Normalized entropy anonymity degree d is a relative entropy measure and is 
 
 
 
( | ) / ( )= AS ASd H X C H X (7) 
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An anonymous communication scheme has either perfect or preserved anonymity when d 
= 1.  Perfect anonymity holds if H(XAS) is the maximum entropy measure where Hmax = – 
log2Pr(i) where Pr(i)=1/n, n=|AS|,∀ i є AS or when all agents in the anonymity set are 
Beyond Suspicion.  Otherwise, anonymity is preserved if H(XAS) <  HMax or when agents 
have a non-uniform probability distribution.  Any anonymity change may be measured by 
computing d after an attack and elapsed amount of time.  Preserving anonymity is the 
“holy grail” of anonymous systems.  Realistically, however, anonymity tends to degrade 
over time at a rate related to the increase of adversary knowledge. Hence, anonymity 
degree is characteristically bounded between [0,1].   
Assume an adversary intercepts C during the attack and gains additional knowledge.  
This knowledge is reflected by the adversary adjusting the probability distribution for the 
receiver anonymity set.  For instance, removing r agents from anonymity set AS such that 
Pr(r)=0,∀ r є AS and/or changing k agent probabilities such that Pr(k) ≠ Pr(i), i=k, k є AS.  
This decreases the adversary’s uncertainty or H(XAS|C) < H(XAS).  In the best case, the 
adversary may only be able to reassign a uniform probability distribution across the 
reduced sized anonymity set size n – r such that Pr(i’)i’=1/(n-r),∀ i’ є AS, i’=1…n-r.  
Obviously, the closer d is to one, the less the system is compromised and the closer d is to 
zero, the more the system is compromised.  Hence, ACS’s may be quantitatively 
compared based on how much or how quickly anonymity is degraded.  This entropy 
measure is not always practical so a negligibility-based anonymity measure [KoH07] is 
next. 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 61 - 
2.4.5 Negligibility-based Identity-free Anonymity. 
The negligibility-based anonymity probability metric assumes the adversary is a 
polynomial time algorithm (i.e., has limited resources) in terms of the number of 
participating nodes N in the anonymous network.  Due to identity-free routing, the 
adversary cannot identify any mobile node’s routing identity (e.g., IP address, MAC 
address).  The goal is to achieve a negligible (indistinguishable) difference between true-
randomness and pseudo-randomness, which is asymptotically less than the reciprocal of 
any polynomial of input x where x is the number of nodes, not cryptographic key length.   
The formal definition is 
 
Definition 3 (Negligible [KoH07]). A function :µ →  is negligible if, for every 
positive integer c and all sufficiently large x’s (i.e., 
1), ( )c c cN x N x x
µ∃ ∀ > < . 
 
It shall be shown that the probability of no anonymity is negligible (e.g., decreasing 
exponentially toward 0) when the number of mobile network nodes N increases linearly.  
A venue is the smallest area the adversary is able to pinpoint the mobile agent in radius R 
without differentiating two or more identity-free agents in a venue 2A Rπ=  as shown in 
Figure 13.   
The bounded network has a spatial agent distribution expressed as the probability 
density function = ( )XYρ f x,y .  The probability a given agent is located in a subarea A1 of 
the system area A or Pr[node in A1] is computed by integrating ρ over this subarea A1.  
The metric is extendable to k agents and the venue area may be any bounded shape.  
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Figure 13: Negligibility-based Anonymity Metric (Pr[node in A1]) given agent Spatial Distribution (ρ) 
 
 
The probability a given node is located in a subarea A1 of the system area A is 
computed by integrating ρ over this subarea 
   
1
1Pr[ ] ( , )= ∫∫ XYAnode in A f x y dA  
which is universally applicable to any mobility pattern.   
An example random waypoint mobility model is
2 2
2 2
6
36( , ) ( )( )
4 4XY
a af x y x y
a
ρ = ≈ − −  
[BeR03].  With N agents, 1
N
N i iρ ρ== ∑ , where iρ  is agent i’s probability density function 
and N Nρ ρ= if roaming agents are independently and identically distributed.   Let x be a 
random variable of the number of nodes in the area, then the probability of exactly k 
nodes in area A1 is 
1
Pr[ ] ( ) .
!
N
k
N
A
x k e dA
k
ρρ −= = ∫∫  
The probability a venue is empty is  
       
2
1
Pr[ 0] ( )ρ ρ
π
− −= = = =∫∫ N Nempty RP x e dA O e  
Circle Bounded Mobile Ad-hoc
Anonymous Network
D
E
F
B A
C
A1= πR12 A= πR
2
R
Pr [node in A1] =
Spatial Distribution
ρ = fXY (x,y)
R1
Messageρ∫∫A dA1
y
x
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
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since Ne ρ− remains an exponential in differential and integral calculus.  Thus, as the 
number of nodes N increases linearly, emptyP  approaches zero. 
If all nodes are moving, the adversary needs at least one empty venue to trace the 
identity-free node v.   The probability the adversary traces node v along a sequence of m 
empty venues is 
_ ( ) ( )
ρ−= =m N mtrace motion emptyP P O e  
This is the negligible-based, identity-free anonymity metric with respect to network size 
N.  Localized anonymity for real-time systems is explored next. 
2.4.6 Localized Real-time Anonymity. 
To measure local anonymity in a non-adaptive, real-time system, source-hiding and 
destination-hiding properties in a formal PROB-channel model are analyzed and 
quantified [TgH04].  Assume a system has senders ( s ) transmitting encrypted sent 
messages (α ) to the anonymous system.  After transforming and delaying the sent 
messages, the delivered messages ( β ) reach the receivers ( r ).  The passive adversary 
attempts to break sender anonymity by computing ( , )P sβ  and receiver anonymity by 
computing ( , )P rα , respectively.  A system is source-hiding with parameter θ  if the 
adversary cannot assign a sender to any delivered message with a probability greater than
θ , i.e., if 
    ( ( , ) ).s P sβ β θ∀ ∀ ≤  
This is also called source or sender anonymity [PfK00].    
Similarly, a system is destination-hiding with parameter Ω if the adversary cannot 
assign a receiver to any sent message with a probability greater than Ω, i.e., if 
(12) 
(11) 
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( ( , ) ).r P rα α∀ ∀ ≤ Ω  
This is also called destination, receiver or recipient anonymity [PfK00]. 
However, it is essential to give a theoretically based but also practically usable 
objective numerical measure for local anonymity. An analysis of the previous global 
entropy-based metrics [TgH04a] on the anonymous message transmission, continuous 
time PROB-channel model [TgH04] reveals shortcomings like an anonymous system 
appears near-optimal yet the adversary still is able to guess the sender of some messages 
with high probability.  Also, the exponential computational complexity of the adversary 
globally tracking and assigning sender probabilities is impractical.  Thus, an argument is 
made to use the maximum probability that an attacker can assign to a sender or receiver 
with respect to a particular message as a measure.  This amounts to the sender specifying 
a Quality-of-Service (QoS) threshold for anonymity services depending on underlying 
frequency parameters (τmin and τmax) and channel delay characteristics (f(δ)).  Such a 
measure may be of more interest to individual users of the system to better capture the 
local aspects of anonymity. 
For instance, if no sender sends more than one message within a minimum time 
interval τmin and all senders send at least one message in a maximum time interval τmax, 
then a practical upper limit
^
( , )P sβ  and guaranteed localized source-hiding measure is 
 
           
min
min min
max
max max
^ 1 ( 1)
1 ( 1)
max ( )
min ( )
( , )
| |
τ τ
τ τ
δ
δ
β
∆
= − ≤ ≤ −
∆
= − ≤ ≤ −
=
⋅
∑
∑
i i q i
i i q i
f
f
P s
S
 (14) 
(13) 
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where f(δ) is a message and time-invariant channel delay distribution function,              
∆max = 
max min
max
δ δ
τ
− 
  
 and ∆min = max min
min
δ δ
τ
− 
  
 , δmax and δmin are predefined, message and 
time-invariant maximal and minimal channel delays, and S is the set of senders.    
Simplifying this equation demonstrates how this localized sender anonymity measure 
reduces to an optimal global anonymity measure of perfect sender anonymity.  Assuming 
the channel delay distribution function f(δ) is uniform (f(δ) = fmax = 
max min
1
δ δ−
) and 
MIN/MAX properties hold (τmin ≤ τmax ≤ [ max minδ δ− ]), the upper limit
^
( , )P sβ  and 
guaranteed localized source-hiding measure becomes 
^ min max
max min
( , ) .
| | | |
P s
S S
τβ
τ
∆
= ≈
⋅∆ ⋅
 
Furthermore, if each sender sends messages with the same periodicity (τmin = τmax), 
perfect anonymity is achieved as the adversary ascribes a uniform probability distribution 
for all senders S 
  
^ 1( , ) .
| |
P s
S
β ≈  
Hence, specifying the message sender frequency with the parameters τmin and τmax allows 
three different ways to measure localized sender anonymity including 
 
1) Message sender frequency is constrained (τmin ≤ τmax), 
2) Uniform distributed channel delay (f(δ) = 
max min
1
δ δ−
) and  
MIN/MAX property hold (τmax ≤ [ max minδ δ− ]) 
3) Message sender frequency is periodic (τmin = τmax) 
 
(15) 
(16) 
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Unfortunately, a similar destination-hiding measure is not realizable due to the 
limitations of the PROB-channel model [TgH04, TgH04a].  Specifying the message 
frequency of receivers would either require the difficult task of coordinating the senders 
in a distributed environment or injecting dummy traffic on the channel, implying an 
active adversary.  A combinatorial anonymity degree follows. 
2.4.7 Combinatorial Anonymity Degree. 
The anonymity set size, effective anonymity set size, entropy anonymity, and 
normalized entropy anonymity measures primarily determine the anonymity degree from 
the perspective of a single agent or message.  The combinatorial anonymity degree 
[EdS07] is a combination of the individual agent anonymity levels and is a 
complementary system-wide measure based on the permanent of a matrix.  The measure 
reveals the whole communication pattern between senders and receivers in a minimally 
(∇min) and maximally (∇max) delay-bounded real-time anonymous mix network. 
Given a set of n senders (si ∈ S) and n receivers (rj ∈ R) of an anonymous network 
and a set of possible mappings between the inputs and outputs (E), a bipartite graph G = 
(S, R, E) represents the anonymous mix network.  The timestamps of the entering and 
exiting messages are the only observable information.  If n = 3, then S = 1 2 3{ , , }s s s and R 
= 1 2 3{ , , }r r r  and an example anonymous three mix network and bipartite graph is shown 
in Figure 14. 
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             (a) Observed Entry and Exit Times  (b) Corresponding Bipartite Graph 
Figure 14: Sample Mix Network and Graph (∇min = 1, ∇max = 4) 
 
In Figure 14(a), if ∇min ≤ rj - si  ≤ ∇max, then the input si maps to output rj and is an 
edge in graph G or (si, rj) ∈ E.  For example, if ∇min = 1 and ∇max = 4, then r1 – s1 = 3 – 1 
= 2 and ∇min ≤ 2 ≤ ∇max so (s1, r1) ∈ E but r1 – s3 = 3 – 3 = 0 and 0 < ∇min so (s3, r1) ∉ E.  
In Figure 14(b), the corresponding bipartite graph is shown. 
From these observed input-output timestamp correlations, the global adversary forms 
probability distributions on links and constructs a special doubly-stochastic n x n matrix 
P.  An anonymous mix network is shown in Figure 15. 
                 
  
Figure 15: Example Mix Network with Probabilities 
M
Anonymity Network
M
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s 1=1
r1=3
r2=4
r3=5
s 2=2
s 3=3
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S2 
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Three messages enter and exit the system, and each message entering a mix is equally 
likely to follow any outgoing link.  The probabilities represent the likelihood of messages 
being on a particular link.  The resulting matrix P is in Figure 16. 
 
1 1
0
2 2
1 1 1
4 4 2
1 1 1
4 4 2
P
 
 
 
 =  
 
  
 
 
Figure 16: Corresponding Doubly-Stochastic Matrix 
 
 
The permanent of the matrix per(P) is computed as follows:  
 
 
1
( ) ( , ( ))
n
i
per P P i i
π
π
=
=∑∏  
 
 
where ( )iπ is the a priori probability per(P) and is bounded by the inequality n!/nn ≤ 
per(P) ≤ 1 via the proven Van der Waerden conjecture [Egr81, Fal81].  Referencing the 
doubly-stochastic n x n matrix example in Figure 16 where n = 3, per(P) = (½)(½)(0) + 
2(¼)(¼)(½) = 1
4
 and the a priori lower bound is n!/n n  = 3!/33 = 6/27 = 2
9
.   
The combinatorial anonymity degree d(P) represents the system-wide strength of the 
anonymous network and is 
.


0  =1
log(per( )) >1!log( )
d( ) = 
n
P nn
P
nn
 
 
(17) 
(18) 
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Clearly, with only one sender and receiver (n=1), no anonymity exists (d(P)=0).  With 
more than one sender and receiver (n>1), anonymity degree is quantified as the ratio of 
the log of the matrix permanent over the log of the lower bound of the a priori 
probability.  When per(P) = n!/nn or the matrix permanent equals the lower bound, 
perfect anonymity is achieved (d(P)=1) otherwise a lower level of anonymity is achieved 
(d(P)<1).  Continuing with the example mix network where n = 3, d(P) =  
log(per(P))/log(n!/nn) = log( 1
4
)/log( 2
9
) = 0.92.  Hence, the system-wide combinatorial 
anonymity degree is strong but not perfect.  Another anonymity measure is based on 
evidence theory.  
2.4.8 Evidence Theory Anonymity. 
The evidence theory based approach measures communication anonymity in wireless 
mobile ad-hoc networks [Dij06].  Evidence theory represents the belief-based epistemic 
knowledge of the adversary.  Evidence is measured by the number of detected packets 
within a given time period.  Basic probability assignments for all packet delivery paths 
are assigned and evidence theory quantifies anonymity in the number of bits.  This 
approach is more general and practical than the entropy based metrics where the 
probability assignments are predefined [Dij06].   
A captured packet is evidence that proves communication between two or more 
mobile nodes.   The quantity of evidence, w(V), for two communicating mobile nodes is 
 
( ) min { ( )}, | | 2U Vw V w U V⊆= ≥          (19) 
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where X is the set of all mobile nodes within the system, P (X) is the power set of X,  
V∈P (X) is the packet-sequenced ordered set and U ⊆ V.  The normalized value m(V) is 
the ratio for an acting communications relation defined in P (X) for each V∈P (X) or 
 
      m(V) = w(V) / Σ U∈P (X) w(U).          
  
From evidence theory (a.k.a., Dempster-Shafer theory [Sen02, Sha76]), the basic 
probability assignment function is m : P (X) → [0,1]  such that m(∅ ) = 0 and Σ V∈P (X) 
m(V) = 1.   Every set V∈P (X) for which m(V) ≠  0 is a focal element.  A focal element is 
a sender and receiver pair v V∈ the adversary believes is communicating indicated by an 
assignment of a non-zero probability measure m.  <F, m> is the set of all focal elements 
induced by m called a body of evidence.  Given this assignment, the upper and lower 
bounds of the anonymity measure are defined.  The lower bound belief measure is a 
function Bel: P (X) → [0,1] and combined with a basic probability assignment m is 
Bel(V) = Σ U|U⊆V m(U).  The upper bound plausibility measure is Pl(V) = Σ U|U∩V>0 m(U) 
and Pl(V) ≥ Bel(V).   
To measure uncertainty, the entropy-like measures E(m) = Σ V∈F  m(V) log2 Pl(V) and 
C(m) = Σ V∈F  m(V) log2 Bel(V) based on the plausibility [Hoh82] and belief [Yag83] are 
proposed.  Because too many irrelevant sets are considered, E(m) is not a satisfactory 
upper bound anonymity measure in wireless environments.  Hence, the discord function 
D(m) is the generalized anonymity measure in number of bits [Dij06] 
(20) 
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2
| |( ) ( ) log (1 ( ) ).
| |V F U F
U VD m m V m U
U∈ ∈
−
= − −∑ ∑               
 
The | |( )
| |U F
U Vm U
U∈
−∑  term factors out any irrelevant or conflicting evidence.  D(m) is 
a weighted version of belief measure C(m) where E(m) ≤ D(m) ≤ C(m)  holds.  D(m) 
measures average anonymity for any given communication scenarios without probability 
pre-assignment to each individual node. 
A wireless ad-hoc networking system with seven nodes, { , , , , , , }X A B C D E F G= , and 
eleven possible communicating pairs is shown in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17: Example 7 Node MANET [Dij06] 
 
 
A sophisticated adversary knows the exact location of each mobile node and can detect 
the transmitted packet source within the communication range of each mobile node.  So 
the adversary partitions the MANET into multiple hexagon zones with at most one node 
per zone as shown in Figure 18.   
A
B
C
G
E
D F
(21) 
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Figure 18: Communication Area Partitions 
 
The adversary is able to monitor packets to/from these zones h1 – h8 and learn the 
topology in Figure 17.  For instance, with a time period ∆t, the adversary detects exactly 
one sent packet from the hexagon zones h1, h2, and h4 corresponding to nodes A, B, and 
F, respectively.  The adversary computes w(V), m(V), Bel(V), and Pl(V) where V∈P (X) 
as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Body of Evidence 
# F w(V) m(V) Bel(V) Pl(V) 
1 <A, B> 1 1/11 1/11 8/11 
2 <A, D> 1 1/11 1/11 6/11 
3 <A, E> 1 1/11 1/11 8/11 
4 <B, A> 1 1/11 1/11 8/11 
5 <B, C> 1 1/11 1/11 7/11 
6 <B, E> 1 1/11 1/11 8/11 
7 <F, E> 1 1/11 1/11 6/11 
8 <F, C> 1 1/11 1/11 5/11 
9 <F, G> 1 1/11 1/11 3/11 
10 <A, B, C> 1 1/11 1/11 9/11 
11 <A, B, F> 1 1/11 1/11 9/11 
                 ∑ 11 1  
A
B
C
GE
D F
h1
h2
h3
h4
h5
h6
h7 h8
H1
H2
H3
H4
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The w-values in lines 1-9 are derived directly from observing the wireless system; the 
w-values in line 10 and line 11 are derived by applying (19) and using (20), each focal 
element such as <A, B> and <A, B, E> has a non-zero m-value of 1/11th.  Based on the 
lower bound E(m), upper bound C(m), and discord D(m) equations above, the adversary 
computes the anonymity measures E(m) = 0.76 bits, C(m) = 1.74 bits, and D(m) = 3.17 
bits.  The maximum entropy is log2 | X | = log2 11 = 3.46 bits.  Therefore, the anonymity 
measure of the mobile ad-hoc network ranges from 0.76 to 3.17 bits and is, on average, 
1.74 bits within the time period ∆t. 
2.4.9 k-Anonymity.  
In general, k-anonymity is a privacy preservation method to ensure an adversary is 
unable to distinguish an identity/item of interest among at least k-1 other identities/items 
of interest and is a NP-hard problem [AgF05, MaW04].  Many research efforts have 
proposed approaches to achieve k-anonymity and preserve data privacy [AgF05, KiG06, 
LeD06, MaW04, MwX06, NeC06, SaS98, Swe02] or location privacy [GeL04, GeL05, 
GeL07, GhK06, KaG06, Liu07, WuB05].  Some research efforts recommend multi-
dimensional anonymization measures of l-diversity [MaG06], m-invariant [Liu07] and t-
closeness [LiL07] which go beyond the typical k-anonymity approaches [Iye02] to 
improve data or location privacy under specific adversary attacks.  This section describes 
three measures:  data privacy k-anonymity, destination k-anonymity zone, and 
personalized location k-anonymity. 
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2.4.9.1   Data Privacy k-Anonymity. 
The first k-anonymity measure [Swe02] addresses data privacy protection of 
releasable person-specific table-based information to third party organizations.  The 
assumption is that the data holder can accurately identify quasi-identifiers [Dal86], 
namely a set of private data attributes that also appear in external information.  These 
quasi-identifiers include explicit identifiers such as name, address, and phone number, as 
well as attributes such as birth date and gender which may uniquely identify an 
individual.  The goal is to limit an adversary’s ability to link released person-specific data 
to other information.  This formal definition of k-anonymity follows. 
 
Definition 3 (k-Anonymity [Swe02]).  Let 1( ,..., )nRT A A  be a releasable table RT with 
attributes 1{ ,..., }nA A  and QIRT be the associated quasi-identifier set { ,..., }i jA A ⊆
1{ ,..., }nA A .  The releasable table RT satisfies k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of 
values in RT[QIRT] appears with at least k occurrences in RT[QIRT].  An example of an RT 
table that adheres to k-anonymity is in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: k-anonymity example, where k=2 and QI= { , , , }Race Birth Gender Zip [Swe02] 
Tuple Race Birth Gender Zip Problem 
t1 Black 1965 M 0214* Short breath 
t2 Black 1965 M 0214* Chest pain 
t3 Black 1965 F 0213* Hypertension 
t4 Black 1965 F 0213* Hypertension 
t5 Black 1964 F 0213* Obesity 
t6 Black 1964 F 0213* Chest pain 
t7 White 1964 M 0213* Chest pain 
t8 White 1964 M 0213* Obesity 
t9 White 1964 M 0213* Short breath 
t10 White 1967 M 0213* Chest pain 
t11 White 1967 M 0213* Chest pain 
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The quasi-identifier is QIRT = { , , , }Race Birth Gender Zip  and k=2.  For each tuple, the 
values that make up the quasi-identifier appear at least twice in RT.  In other words, each 
sequence of values in RT[QIRT] has at least 2 occurrences of those values in RT[QIRT].  
Specifically, t1[QIRT] = t2[QIRT], t3[QIRT] = t4[QIRT], t5[QIRT] = t6[QIRT], t7[QIRT] = 
t8[QIRT] = t9[QIRT], and t10[QIRT] = t11[QIRT].  So data privacy is preserved. 
2.4.9.2  Destination k-Anonymity Zone. 
       This zone-based k-anonymity measure [XiB05] addresses destination location 
privacy protection in positioning routing protocols in mobile ad-hoc networks.  The 
assumptions are uniformly distributed nodes, high node density, globally available 
position information and public keys, and symmetric communication channels.  Also, the 
adversary is assumed to trace node behavior and obtain location updates but is unable to 
identify the sender or location position requesting nodes.  An anonymity zone is 
generated for each destination called the D-AZ as shown in Figure 19.   
 
Figure 19: k-anonymity Based Private Positioning Routing [XiB05] 
 
Source 
Destination 
Node 1 
(2nd hop) 
Node 2 
Node 3 Node 4 
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The source node generates the D-AZ by specifying the adversary observable center x and 
radius RAZ information in the route request (RREQ) packet.  The RREQ also carries 
destination challenge information to keep the destination private.  The problem is node 
mobility degrades destination anonymity, especially with an intersection attack [XiB05].  
A fixed D-AZ and adaptive D-AZ are approaches to preserving location privacy and 
achieving destination k-anonymity.   For the fixed D-AZ, the source node originally uses 
a large-sized D-AZ (n0>>k) where n0 is the initial number of nodes in the zone and as 
time passes and nodes move out the source aims to keep k or more nodes in the zone.  A 
fixed D-AZ scenario is depicted in Figure 20. 
 
 
    (a) Node inside D-AZ       (b) Node outside D-AZ 
Figure 20: Fixed D-AZ k-anonymity 
 
In Figure 20(a), the destination zone has radius RAZ in meters (m), area A in square 
meters (m2), circumference C in meters (m), node density ρ in nodes per square kilometer 
(nodes/km2) and initial nodes n0.  Assuming RAZ = 200 m and density ρ = 50 nodes/km2, 
 
Node 
RAZ 
E[v] 
A = πRAZ2 C = 2πRAZ 
n0 = ρA 
 
 
 
 
 
Node 
RAZ 
td 
 
 
 
 
 
E[v] 
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then n0 = ρA = ρπ(RAZ)2 = (50π nodes/km2)((200m) (
1
1000
 km/m))2 = (50π nodes/km2)(
1
25
km2) = 2π nodes = 6 nodes.  As indicated, n0 = 6 nodes is the initial number of nodes 
in the D-AZ.  In Figure 20(b), after a period of time td in seconds (sec) a node exits the D-
AZ with constant velocity E[v] in meters per second (m/sec).  The probability of 
preserving destination k-anonymity is 
 
where p is the probability the destination node stays in D-AZ and { }P n i=  is the 
probability that i nodes (k-1 other nodes) stay in the D-AZ.  Assume 2-anonymity, k = 2, 
is the goal, then i = k-1 = 1 so { 1} (1 { 1})P n p P n≥ = − = .  { }P n i=  is further defined as 
 
 
 
where i is the number of nodes in the D-AZ, n0 is the initial number of nodes, and p is the 
probability a node stays in the D-AZ.  In the example, n0 = 6 and i = 1 so (23) is 
( )
1 6 1 1(6 1)!{ 1} (1 )
1! 6 1 1 !
P n p p − −−= = −
− −
45! (1 )
4!
p p= −  = 45 (1 )p p− .  Substituting { 1}P n =  
into (22) yields 4{ 1} (1 5 (1 ) )P n p p p≥ = − − .  Now p is further defined as 
 
 
 
 
1
1
{ 1} (1 { })
K
i
P n K p P n i
−
=
≥ − = − =∑
( )
0 10
0
( 1)!{ } (1 )
! 1 !
n iinP n i p p
i n i
− −−= = −
− −
1
1
/
1{ } ( )
d
d
t t
d t d d
t
p p t t f t dt e
∞
−= > = =∫
(22) 
(24) 
(23) 
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where dt  is the time the destination node stays in the D-AZ in seconds (sec), ( )dt df t is the 
probability density function of the destination staying in the D-AZ (exponential in this 
case), dt
−
is the mean node time in the D-AZ in seconds (sec), and p is the probability the 
destination node stays in the D-AZ beyond time t1.  Finally, dt
−
is 
 
 
where A is the area of D-AZ, C is the circumference of D-AZ, RAZ is the zone radius, and 
E[v] is the node velocity.   Assuming mobile nodes move at a velocity of E[v] = 1 m/sec 
and the same radius RAZ = 200 m as before, then (25) simplifies to 200 / 2dt π=  sec = 
100π sec.  Plugging into (24) yields 1 / dt tp e−= = 1 /100te π− .  After waiting t1 = 60 sec, the 
probability the destination node stays in the D-AZ is 60/100 3/5 0.826p e eπ π− −= = = .   Since 
p = 0.826, the probability of preserving destination 2-anonymity after one minute using 
the Fixed D-AZ method is 4{ 1} (1 5 (1 ) )P n p p p≥ = − − = 4(0.826)(1 5(0.826)(1 0.826) )− −  
= 0.823.  After waiting t1 = 300 sec, the probability the destination node stays in the D-
AZ is 300/100 3/ 0.385p e eπ π− −= = = .  The probability of preserving destination 2-
anonymity after only five minutes drops to { 1}P n ≥ = 4(0.385)(1 5(0.385)(1 0.385) )− −  = 
0.279.  Since anonymity degrades rapidly after only a few minutes, an adaptive D-AZ 
approach is considered. 
For adaptive D-AZ, the source determines the size of D-AZ (=k nodes) based on node 
density and as time passes expands D-AZ based on mobility to encompass nodes moving 
outside the D-AZ.  An adaptive D-AZ scenario is depicted in Figure 21.  In Figure 21(a), 
/ [ ] / 2 [ ]d AZt A E v C R E vπ π= = (25) 
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the destination zone has initial radius R0 and k-anonymity where k = 6.  In Figure 21(b), 
after a period of time a node exits the D-AZ and the radius RAZ is updated to 
 
(a) Node inside D-AZ     (b) Node outside D-AZ 
Figure 21: Adaptive D-AZ k-anonymity 
 
ensure k-anonymity after time t1.  Preserving k-anonymity requires the source to linearly 
expand the radius as 
 
where R0 = 
k
πρ
is the initial radius, t0 = ln( ) /d kt P k
−
−  is the time when achieving k-
anonymity is low (defined as Pk(t) ≤ threshold probability p0), t1 is the time when the 
radius is expanded, c is the constant R0/t0, and RAZ (t1) is the expanded radius at time t1.  
Again, ρ is node density and dt  is the mean node time in the D-AZ.  Additionally, Pk(t ) 
= / dkt te−  is the probability that k nodes are in the D-AZ after time t.  If the goal is again k 
= 2 with node density ρ = 50 nodes/km2, then the initial radius R0 = 
22 *1000 /
50
km m km
π
= 
Node
R0
Node
R0
RAZ
E[v]
E[v]
1 1 0 0( ) ( )AZR t c t t R= + − (26) 
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11000 113
25
m m
π
= .  Also, if the mean time in the zone is dt
−
=100π sec and the threshold 
probability is p0 = 0.8, then t0 = 0ln( ) /dt p k
−
− = 100 ln(0.8) / 2π−  = 50 ln(0.8)π− = 35 sec.   
Thus, the initial radius of 113 meters must be expanded after 35 seconds.  With R0 = 
113m and t0 = 35 sec, c = R0/t0 = (113/35)m/sec = 3.23 m/sec.   Finally, RAZ(t1) = c(t1 + 
t0) – R0 = 3.23m/sec(t1 + 35sec) – 113m = (3.23(t1 + 35) – 113)m.  In other words, at time 
t1 the radius is linearly expanded to RAZ(t1) to preserve 2-anonymity. 
2.4.9.3  Personalized Location k-Anonymity. 
The third k-anonymity model protects against various privacy threats through sharing 
location information.  When requesting k-anonymity, each mobile agent specifies an 
acceptable minimum k-anonymity level and maximum temporal and spatial resolution.  A 
scaleable and efficient CliqueCloak algorithm, which perturbs location information in 
messages, provides high quality personalized location k-anonymity for forwarding 
agents.  An agent is location k-anonymous if and only if the location information sent 
from a mobile agent is indistinguishable from the location information of k-1 other 
agents.   The location-based service (LBS) system consists of anonymity servers, mobile 
agents, a wireless network, and LBS servers.   The two location k-anonymity techniques 
are spatial expansion and temporal cloaking.  
Let S be the set of received messages from the mobile agents.  Each received message 
sm S∈  has a unique identifier idu  and a three dimensional spatio-temporal point of 
timestamp t and coordinates (x, y).  Let T be the set of anonymized messages and 
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( )t sm R m T= ∈ be the anonymized version of message sm .  The function R: S →T is 
bijective.   If ( )t sm R m= , then the message identifiers are the same . .t id s idm u m u= .    If 
( )sR m =∅ , message sm  is not anonymized.  The spatio-temporal cloaking box of 
anonymized message tm is denoted as ( )cl tB m .    
Let M = 
1 2
{ , ,..., }
ls s s
m m m be a set of messages in S.  The formal definition of location 
k-anonymity states that for a message sm S∈  and its anonymized message ,tm T∈  the 
following conditions must hold 
 
Definition 4 (Location k-anonymity [GeL04, GeL05]) 
{ , } '
'
' , s.t. ',| ' | . ,
, . . and
, ( ) ( ).
t t i ji j
t ii
t s
m m T t id t id
m T cl t cl t
T T m T T m k
m u m u
B m B m
⊂
∈
∃ ⊂ ∈ ≥
∀ ≠
∀ =
 
This location k-anonymity means for each anonymized message ( )t sm R m= there exist 
at least . 1sm k −  other anonymized messages ( ' ,s.t. ',| ' | .t sT T m T T m k∃ ⊂ ∈ ≥ ) from different 
nodes ( { , } ' , . . ,t t i ji jm m T t id t idm u m u⊂∀ ≠ ) within the same spatio-temporal cloak box (
' , ( ) ( )t iim T cl t cl tB m B m∈∀ = ).  These conditions form a constraint graph mG .  
The challenge is to find a set of messages ( ) 't sm R m T= ∈  within a minimal spatio-
temporal cloaking box to satisfy the above definition.  Another challenge is given the 
message sm S∈ , finding the set M containing sm and the k-1 group of messages that can 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 82 - 
be anonymized with sm .   The Clique-Cloak local k-anonymity search algorithm in Figure 
22 solves the latter problem.  
The first parameter of the LOCAL-k_SEARCH procedure is the agent’s desired 
minimum k-anonymity level, the second parameter is the received message 
cs
m , and the 
third is the constrained subgraph 'mG .  This algorithm detects a suitable clique in the 
 
'
'
'
_ ( , , )
(1) { | ( , ) and . }
(2) | | 1
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(4) 0
(5) | |
(6) | |
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Figure 22: ClickCloak Local-k Search Algorithm [GeL07] 
 
subgraph 'mG , which contains csm  and its neighbors in graph mG , denoted as 
'( , )
cs m
nbr m G .  
The goal is to find a k-sized clique that satisfies the location k-anonymity definition.  In 
line 1, before searching, a set U of cliques is constructed.  In lines 2-3, if no k-sized 
cliques are found, the algorithm exits.  In lines 4-9, the set U is filtered until no more 
modifications are required.  Each message sm U∈  is verified to have at least k-2 
neighbors in line 8.  If not, sm  is removed in line 9.  In lines 10-11, the subset of k-1 
cliques are returned. 
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Two metrics measure anonymity effectiveness: anonymization success rate and 
relative anonymity level [GeL05].  The success rate is the rate at which anonymized 
messages meet the anonymization constraint or 
1
|{ | ( ), , } | , .
100 | |
t t s t sm m R m m T m S'Anonymization Success Rate S' S
S'−
= ∈ ∈
= ⊂  
The number of anonymized messages is in the numerator and the number of received 
messages in the denominator.  A higher percentage is preferable.  The relative anonymity 
is the amount of anonymous messages in the cloak box normalized by the required 
message level ( 1
| |T'
) or 
 
   ( )
|{ | ( ) ( )} |1 , .
| ' | .t s
cl t cl
'
s
m R m T
m m T B m B mRelative Anonymity T' T
T m k= ∈
∈ ∧ =
= ⊂∑  
 
This measure does not go below 1.   
In summary, the first k-anonymity preserves data privacy and both zone-based 
destination k-anonymity and personalized k-anonymity preserve location privacy in 
mobile ad-hoc networks. 
2.4.10 Multicast Anonymity. 
Multicast services are required by various applications such as video 
teleconferencing, Internet-based education, NASA TV, and software updates.  
Anonymity degree metrics in unicast communications are not directly applicable in 
multicast environments [XiL06].  The fundamental difference is the multicast group.  
(27) 
(28) 
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This one-to-many relationship may be represented as a tree structure between senders and 
receivers.  The typical unicast one-to-one relationship is simply a single path in this tree 
structure.  In [XiL06],  a k-ary incomplete tree structure with L+1 layers and a Layer 0 
root node is assumed.  The three types of nodes in a multicast network are anonymous 
agents (AA), non-anonymous agents (NA) and middle outsiders (MO).   Only AA nodes 
require their identities to be hidden from all agent/non-agent nodes.  MO nodes only 
provide packet forwarding services.  
The metric used to analyze sender anonymity degree in this multicast environment is 
the probability the identity of the AA node is revealed or Preveal.  If the AA node identity 
is broken, Preveal = 1; otherwise, the probability is computed according to a weight.  The 
weight for each node is the probability the adversary believes the node’s parent or one of 
the children is an AA node.  Assuming the adversary randomly chooses nodes to 
compromise, the probability of each node in the tree being broken is 
 
,0 1
/ L kbroken i ji jP N q= == ∑ ∑         
   
where qi,j is a value given to each node in the tree, L is tree depth,  k is tree degree, and N 
is the number of nodes the adversary already broke.  If the root node is broken, the 
adversary already has all the necessary information.  Otherwise, the probability Pattack that 
the real root or sender will be identified and subject to attack next time is computed.  The 
overall probability that the root identity is revealed Preveal is 
 
(29) 
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      (1 ) ,reveal broken broken attackP P P P and= + −            
     1, ,1 0 1( / )
k L k
attack j i jj i j
P w w
= = =
=∑ ∑ ∑           
 
where wi,j is the weight given to the broken tree head node or the jth node in the ith layer.  
The weight formula is not shown but is correlated to adversary ability (Pbroken) and sender 
multicast tree structure (k, L). 
Receiver anonymity degree in this multicast environment is the probability the 
identity of the AA node as a receiver is revealed P’reveal.  Again, the probability P’attack 
that the real receiver will be identified and subject to attack is 
 
 2 2' (1 (1 )) (1 ) ' ,reveal broken broken attackP P P P and= − − + −         
1,[ / ] ,1 1 1
' ( / ) / , 1k L kattack u t k u tj u tP w w k u−= = == >∑ ∑ ∑          
 
where wu,t is the weight of the AA node and wu-1,[t/k] is the weight of its parent node.  The 
weight formula is not shown but is correlated to adversary ability (Pbroken) and receiver 
multicast tree structure (k, L). 
The two probabilistic formulas of sender anonymity degree, Preveal, and receiver 
anonymity degree, P’reveal, for multicast communications are defined above.  These 
anonymity degree formulas depend on adversary ability (Pbroken), tree degree (k), and tree 
depth (L).  Overall, anonymity degree improves when Pbroken decreases, k increases, and L 
increases [XiL06].   
(32) 
(33)
(30) 
(31) 
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For example, assume agent A multicasts a message to receiver E.  The adversary 
constructs a binary, incomplete tree (L=2, k=2) and computes PSreveal and PRreveal as 
illustrated in Figure 23(a), (b) and (c), respectively. 
 
 
Figure 23: Example of Adversary Multicast Tree and Anonymity Degree Computations (L=k=2). 
 
 
Assume C = 1 and qi,j = 1 so Pbroken = 1/5.  Also, assume PSattack = 3/8 and PRattack = 
13/27.  Sender anonymity is PAreveal= 1/5 + (4/5)(3/8) = 2/10 + 3/10 = ½.  Receiver 
anonymity is PEreveal= (1-(1-1/5))2 + (1 – 1/5)2*(13/27) = 1/25 + (16/25)(13/27) = ⅓. 
2.5 Formalizing Anonymity 
Formal methods provide a rigorous approach to defining and modeling security 
concepts and aid in the analysis, design and evaluation of secure systems.  Using 
mathematical notation to describe a system, these methods increase reliability and 
verifiability in software from the requirements phase onwards.  Several formal methods 
for analyzing anonymity have been developed in the literature.  These characteristically 
fall under approaches based on epistemic logic [EiO07, GaH05, HaO03, SyG95, SyS99], 
process-calculi [AdD03, BhP05, DeP06, HuS04, RyS01, ScS96], functional views 
[HaO03, HuS04], or automata [KaM06].  Conceptually, these formal approaches use an 
A
Level 2 ED
FLevel 1
Level 0 A
ED
F
PAreveal= ½ A
ED
F
PEreveal= ⅓
(a) Sample Multicast Tree (L=k=2) (b) Compute PSreveal for Sender A (c) Compute PRreveal for Receiver E
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adversary-defender modeling (ADM [Mer06]) process to model anonymous protocols as 
shown in Figure 24.  This simply entails a refinement from a general to application 
specific system model. 
 
      
Figure 24: Universal Adversary-Defender Modeling Process [Mer06] 
 
Starting with a general system model defined in the formal method of choice, an 
adversary is selected.  Since anonymous communications take place with a specific 
adversary in mind, this is an essential first step.  As mentioned earlier, the adversary may 
be weak to strong and have varying anonymity levels which results in a tailored system 
model.  Next, additional environmental and agent restrictions are assumed.  
Environmental factors may be globally/neighborly available location information, 
uniform/non-uniform and dense/sparse node densities, noiseless/noisy communication 
channels, or delay sensitive/insensitive traffic.  Agent choice and behavior may be 
probabilistic/unpredictable, adaptive/non-adaptive, or finite/infinite when sending, 
receiver or forwarding anonymous messages.  These extra limitations produce an 
General System Model
Tailored System Model
Application Specific System Model
Choose 
Adversary
Additional 
Restrictions
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application specific system model for analyzing comparable anonymous communication 
systems.  Then an explicit anonymity property can be verified to be preserved or 
degraded for the particular application specific model. 
For instance, one study formally and quantitatively analyzes sender anonymity in a 
message-based anonymous communications system under various routing strategies 
[GuF04].  The general system model is a collaborating set of n agents { : 0 }iA a i n= ≤ <  
to achieve anonymity as shown in Figure 25.  
 
 
Figure 25: General System Model [GuF04] 
 
The sender sends a message to the receiver through the anonymous communication 
system consisting of sixteen agents and to preserve its identity.  A passive adversary 
threat model with a fixed number of compromised nodes is chosen.  Figure 26 displays 
the tailored system model with this threat model in mind.   
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The adversary has already compromised six agents 1, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 15 as well as the 
receiver R and collects information from these agents.  The system anonymity metric is 
the adversary’s probability of identifying the message sender.   
 
 
Figure 26: Tailored System Model [GuF04] 
 
The adversary’s behavior is framed algorithmically in four steps as indicated in 
Figure 27.  Every message the receiver receives affords the adversary an opportunity to 
collect key information (Steps 1 and 2), eliminate possible sender nodes (Step 3), and 
 
 
Figure 27: Algorithmic Adversary Framework [GuF04] 
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update probabilities of the remaining nodes (Step 4).  Additional restrictions include 
agents using a cascade or free-route topology, a probabilistic geometric or uniform 
variable path length, and cyclic or acyclic path type which defines the agent’s behavior.  
The sender has no knowledge of compromised agents while the adversary has full 
knowledge of path selection algorithm, and the adversary collects all information from 
compromised agents to reveal sender identity and correlate received messages.  
Depending on the agent selections, several application specific system models of a 
message-based system may be defined either graphically or algorithmically.  These are 
the internal mechanisms of the agents and the adversary and are not shown.  Hence, the 
universal adversary-defender model applies to this as well as other studies.  The rest of 
this section reviews the use of approaches in security, with a focus on applications for the 
design or description of anonymity systems. 
2.5.1 Conceptual Framework. 
     Before meticulously exploring anonymity mathematical frameworks, it is useful to 
first cover a more holistic and intuitive anonymity framework or taxonomy.  Such a 
conceptual approach complements the formal framework by accentuating the significance 
and subtlety of anonymity, acting as a state-of-the-art model for theoretical theorem-
proving and model checking and empirical statistical investigations into anonymity, and 
contributing to future anonymous protocol design and development across one or more 
application domains.   Unfortunately, there is a dearth of literature for such intuitive 
taxonomies.  Three conceptual frameworks for anonymity are known to have been 
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developed:  one for group support systems (GSS) [VaD92], another for collaborative peer 
groups [SuP03], and another for connection anonymity [TiO05]. 
2.5.1.1  Group Support System Framework. 
     Anonymity is important in group support systems because it offers a low-threat 
communicative environment to reduce evaluation apprehension, encourage open and 
honest contributions without the fear of direct reprisals, and depersonalize contributions 
to allow valuing based on merit not authorship for both individuals and groups [VaD92].  
The group support conceptual framework is displayed in Figure 28.  The four main parts 
include the anonymity factors, the anonymity types, individual anonymity and group 
process/outcome.  The arrows represent the influence each left part has on the subsequent 
right part and indicate a natural flow from the anonymity factors to the eventual group 
outcome.   
 
 
 
Figure 28: Conceptual Framework for the Study of GSS Anonymity [VaD92] 
 
The anonymity factors are system characteristics, group history and composition, 
group size, and group agent proximity.  Each factor results in either process and/or 
content anonymity types.  Process anonymity is the ability of a group agent to know who 
the contributing agents are.  Content anonymity is the ability of a group agent to know 
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what information was contributed by which group agent.   Both determine the level of 
individual receiver and sender anonymity preserved.  The subsequent perceived or known 
degree of anonymity, not simply the presence or lack thereof, has direct implications on 
the group process that either negatively or positively affects group outcome.  For 
example, a system which only allows instantaneous concurrent contributions of a group 
size of four individuals in close proximity (residing in the same room) would have a 
lower degree of anonymity than a system which allows delayed contributions of a group 
size of ten individuals in disperse proximity (sitting at their own computers in different 
rooms). 
2.5.1.2  Collaborative Peer Group Framework. 
A lower level collaborative peer group conceptual framework, the Janus architecture 
[SuP03], was also proposed.  This P2P network is a middleware architecture and software 
toolkit to facilitate the development and deployment of applications where self-
organizing peers aggregate in a controlled manner and new types of communication 
primitives achieve collective goals.  Janus peer groups do not possess identities.  Each 
peer holds a template that defines group specific capabilities and other information.  A 
new peer, such as Node 1 in Figure 29, scans to discover peer groups with matching 
templates.  If no match is found, Node 1 becomes a group of one like Peer 7.  If a match 
is found with, say, Peer 3 and/or Peer 6, a communication channel is open and Node 1 
joins the group.  As Figure 29 shows, these actions may merge previously disjoint peer 
groups; or upon leaving, split groups.   Each peer maintains a table of its neighbors, 
called a local view, and a next neighbor table as revealed in Figure 30.  
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Figure 29: Formation of Janus Groups [SuP03] 
 
  
Figure 30: Peer Neighbor Information Tables [SuP03] 
 
For instance, the local view of Peer 1 includes the peer neighbors 2, 3, and 4 and the 
next hop neighbors [1,5], [1,6,7], and [1], respectively.  The multicast primitive transmits 
messages to a group of at least k identity-less peers and the message is either delivered or 
an error returned.  The proximal cast primitive allows a subset of groups to disseminate 
messages to neighbors collectively.   The collect cast primitive enables subset of groups 
Node(i) Local view (v) Next neighbor (v')
1 2,3,4 [1,5],[1,6,7],[1]
2 1,5 [2,3,4],[2]
3 1,6,7 [2,3,4],[3],[3]
4 1 [2,3,4]
5 2 [1,5]
6 3 [1,6,7]
7 3 [1,6,7]
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 94 - 
to gather messages from neighbors collectively.   Stable peer groups are easy to handle, 
but dynamic peer groups may cause more errors if peers suddenly enter or leave groups.  
Thus, this model works well for hundreds to thousands of nodes of small degree only or 
low density networks.   
2.5.1.3  Connection Anonymity Framework. 
Anonymity is important for protecting the communications channel between sender 
and receiver.  With the evolution of anonymous technologies from simple proxies to 
complex systems, a more structured meta-level approach to designing and comparing 
current anonymity strategies and techniques is desirable.  A connection anonymity 
conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: A Conceptual Framework for Connection Anonymity [TiO05] 
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The three main components are the design factors, the connection anonymity 
functions, and the objectives.  To easily identify individual framework items, each 
specific item is numbered.  The design factors are heuristic measures useful in the design 
and evaluation of connection anonymity services.  The four design factors consist of 
unlinkability, the application domain, the threat model and the external factors.  Listed 
under each are its sub-components.   Unlinkability (A.) means two or more items of 
interest such as agents, messages, events or actions are no more or no less related 
afterwards than they were before given a priori knowledge.  Unlinkability consists of 
sender (A.1) and receiver (A.2) anonymity.  The application domains (B.) include store- 
and-forward applications such as e-mail, interactive applications such Internet Relay 
Chat, and real-time applications such as Voice-over-IP (VoIP) or video conferencing.  
Each has distinct latency (B.1) and volume (B.2) requirements.  Each application 
technology may be classified as push (B.3.1) or pull (B.3.2).  The threat model (C.) 
highlights adversary capabilities of an individual, large corporation or national entity with 
legal powers.  The adversary may be local-global (C.1), active-passive (C.2) and/or 
internal-external (C.3).  Adversaries are usually adaptive, but the system itself may be 
either static or adaptive (C.4) when recovering from an attack.   Since attacks are design 
or implementation specific and directly affect anonymity degree, attack techniques are 
excluded from this abstract framework.  The two external factors (D.) physical network 
(D.1) and the user (D.2) indirectly affect anonymity degree and technology effectiveness.  
Each design factor influences connection anonymity functions. 
The fundamental functions of connection anonymity are routing strategies (E.) and 
obfuscation techniques (F.).  For routing strategies, the route selections (E.1) are either 
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cascades (E.1.1) which chains multiple mixes together, free-route (E.1.2) which permits 
the sender to choose the route, random (E.1.3) which enables plausible deniability, 
restricted (E.1.4) which combines cascades and free-route or structured peer-to-peer 
(E.1.5) which boost scalability and resiliency.  Path lengths (E.2) are fixed (E.2.1) in 
cascade and free-routes and variable (E.2.2.) in random and P2P routing.  For obfuscation 
techniques, the delay strategies (F.1) are threshold (F.1.1) mixes which collect a fixed 
number of messages, timed (F.1.2) mixes which flush messages periodically, and 
continuous (F.1.3) mixes which do not batch messages.  Release strategies (F.2) include 
batch (F.2.1) where all messages are simultaneously released, pool (F.2.2) mixes which 
flush a random number of messages, and continuous (F.2.3) mixes that cyclically delay 
messages.   The remaining obfuscation techniques include cryptographic (F.3) and sizing 
(F.4) transformations to circumvent certain attacks and resource-intensive cover traffic 
(F.5) to enhance anonymity.    
The anonymity functions determine the overall objectives of the anonymity system.  
The objectives are anonymity degree which quantifies the level of anonymity, scalability 
which defines allowable system sizes, efficiency which emphasizes acceptable anonymity 
levels, availability, reliability and recoverability. 
2.5.1.4  Summary. 
These three meta-level frameworks for group support systems, collaborative groups 
and connection anonymity delineate the factors and issues in their respective areas.  They 
are useful abstract formalisms for classifying and clarifying a variety of different 
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approaches to anonymous technologies and may eventually lead to a more 
comprehensive and discerning taxonomy and formal framework for anonymity.  
2.5.2 Probabilistic and Nondeterministic Systems. 
Anonymity may be formally modeled in probabilistic or nondeterministic systems.  
Most research focuses on individual agent anonymity, not group anonymity.  The 
anonymous communications protocols such as DC-net, Crowds and Onion Routing use 
random mechanisms that may be described probabilistically.  Agent or adversary choice 
and behaviors may be probabilistic or nondeterministic.  The formal frameworks 
typically employed to model anonymity are process calculi, epistemic logic, and 
functional views and are described later in this chapter.  Hence, a formal method’s 
approach to anonymity may be purely nondeterministic, purely probabilistic or both 
probabilistic and nondeterministic. 
A purely nondeterministic (a.k.a. possibilistic) approach to anonymity has been 
studied [RyS01, ScS96].  For nondeterministic anonymity, the actions of a system S are 
anonymous (A), known (B), or hidden (C) to the adversary.  The anonymous set of 
abstract actions A = {a.i | i∈I} indicates that action a may be performed by identifiable 
agent i in the anonymity set of identities I.  For instance, the process calculi may model 
anonymity as a non-unique observable trace in a purely nondeterministic manner.  A 
limitation of this approach is the inability to differentiate between fair and unfair coins.  
However, fairness is essential to ensure anonymity and the ability to only express 
possible/impossible nature of a trace and not the probability of a trace is insufficient for 
some application domains. 
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A purely probabilistic approach factors out all nondeterministic influences and 
focuses either on agent probability or observable effects on agent probability [Pal05].  If 
agent probability is the focus, then anonymity may be defined as strong probabilistic 
anonymity, beyond suspicion, probable innocence, possible innocence, or probabilistic α-
anonymity.  If observable effects on agent probabilities are the focus, then conditional 
probabilistic anonymity is used as the definition of anonymity where probabilities are 
dynamically updated.  In one purely probabilistic approach [HaO03], the agents are 
probabilistic with possibly unknown probabilities.  Anonymity is proven to hold for any 
agent probability distribution.  The formal method is epistemic logic but an equivalent 
function view approach is suggested.   
A combined probabilistic and nondeterministic approach [BhP05, Pal05] is the most 
general.  The agents are nondeterministic (unpredictable) and the anonymity internal 
system mechanism (protocol) is probabilistic (coin toss).  The protocol is proven to not 
leak probability information to the adversary.  The formal method is typically process 
algebra.  For instance, the notion of anonymity may be observables for processes in 
probabilistic π–calculus with probabilistic automata semantics [BhP05].  Perfect 
anonymity means no information is deduced from observables about the possible agent.  
The probabilistic automata model of computation is chosen since nondeterministic agent 
behavior does not equate to unknown agent probabilities.  However, repeated 
experiments on random mechanisms allow the adversary to infer probability between 
agents and observables [BhP05].  
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2.5.3 Group Principals. 
In this section, a group principal (agent) approach [SyS99] to formally reason about 
anonymity systems based on epistemic logic is described.  This approach focuses on 
group anonymity instead of individual agent anonymity.  This shift from individual 
agents to groups of agents is appropriate for modeling anonymity systems, which 
intrinsically rely on the interaction of groups of agents to preserve anonymity.  
The logic defines four group principals [SyS99] to express group-based knowledge.  
These principals (agents) are the collective group (*G), and-group (&G), or-group (⊕G) 
and threshold-group (n - G).  The collective group is knowledge gained from combining 
individual agent knowledge in group G.  The and-group is knowledge known by every 
agent in the group G.  The or-group is knowledge known by at least one agent of group 
G.  The threshold-group is collective knowledge of any subgroup of G with cardinality of 
n.  Alternatively, an n-threshold group is an or-group of collective groups, each with 
cardinality of at least n.   
Each agent in the set 1 2{ , ,..., }nP P P P=  of principals uses a local clock to track the 
observed time-order of events.  In the model agents have a history of performed actions, 
log of time-stamped actions, a set of predefined or deduced environmental facts, and a set 
of recent actions performed by the agent.  Each agent has a unique local state si 
represented by <state_id, history, log, facts, recent> where state_id is the sequence of 
previous states. 
This framework models send and receive actions that are performed within a run of 
the system and are entered into or purged from the log of any agent that observes the 
action.  For the formal language, if Pi and Pj are agents, and M is a message, then 
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send(M, Pi, Pj) and receive(M, Pj, Pi) are the primary actions and Pi said M, Pi 
received M, Pi said to Pj M, and Pj received from Pi M are the corresponding logical 
formulas.  If ϕ  is any formula,  Pi ϕ  means agent Pi knows ϕ  and ◊ Pi ϕ  means agent Pi 
possibly knows ϕ .  A set of axioms based on group principals allows agents to gain 
knowledge from the system as each action is performed.  The use of deduction rules 
expresses the knowledge that a particular agent may gain, and thus the potential of an 
adversary compromising the anonymity of an agent in a group in the system. 
Let A be the adversary, P be the agent or group to remain anonymous and ϕ (P) be 
the fact to hide from the adversary.  Seven anonymity definitions, logical expressions and 
meanings are shown in Table 7.  These anonymity definitions are purely nondeterministic 
(possibilistic).  The unknown definition is impossible since the logic and language 
ensures that every agent is always a suspect.  The (≥ N)-anonymizable definition says if 
agent P is suspect, then at least N-1 other agents are also suspect.   If the adversary is  
 
Table 7: Group Principals Anonymity Definitions [SyS99] 
Definition Formula Meaning 
Unknown ¬ (◊ A ϕ (P)) Adversary does not know that P 
possibly performed action.   
(≥N)-anonymizable ◊ A ϕ (P) ⇒ (◊ A ϕ (P1) ∧  ... ∧  ◊ A ϕ (Pn-1)) If P is a suspect, then at least N-
1 other agents are suspect. 
Possible Anonymity ◊ A ϕ (P) ∧  ◊ A ¬ ϕ (P) Adversary has no knowledge 
about P’s actions. 
(≤ N)-suspected  A(ϕ (P) ∨ ϕ ( P1) ∨ ... ∨  ϕ (Pn-1)) Adversary suspects N or fewer 
agents including P. 
(≥ N)-anonymous ◊ A ϕ (P) ∧ ◊ A ϕ (P1) ∧  ... ∧  ◊ A ϕ (Pn-1) Adversary suspects N or more 
agents including P. 
(≤M)-suspected ⇒ 
(≥N)-anonymous 
 A(ϕ (P) ∨ ϕ ( P1) ∨ ... ∨  ϕ (Pm-1)) ⇒ (◊ A 
ϕ (P) ∧ ◊ A ϕ (P1) ∧  ... ∧  ◊ A ϕ (Pn-1))  
Adversary suspects N to M 
agents, N ≤ M 
Exposed  Aϕ (P) Adversary knows P performed 
action. 
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unable to rule out the possibility or impossibility of agent P performing the action, then 
no knowledge about agent P exists and P has possible anonymity.  With N or fewer 
suspects, the (≤ N)-suspected definition is equivalent to up-to |I| anonymity [HaO03].  
With N or more suspects, the (≥ N)-anonymous definition is equivalent to k-anonymity 
where N=k.   The definition (≤ M)-suspected ⇒ (≥ N)-anonymous bounds the adversary 
to suspecting from M to N agents.  Finally, when the adversary knows who performed the 
action, agent P is exposed.  Another framework based on knowledge-based logic and 
deductive reasoning is discussed next. 
2.5.4 Multi-agent Systems. 
In this section, a multi-agent system [HaO02, HaO03, Wei99] framework is reviewed.  
This framework mathematically represents an anonymous system based on epistemic 
logic.  This approach is compatible with many other standard approaches for representing 
and reasoning about systems and is rich enough to accommodate a variety of system 
representations [HaO02, HaO03].  However, first the concept of the abstract agent 
architecture is explored as shown in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32: Abstract Agent Architecture [Wei99]. 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
see 
next 
action 
state 
AGENT 
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An abstract view of agents assumes that the agent’s environment may be represented 
as a set S = {s1, s2, …} of environmental states.  The environment is in one of these states 
si at any given instant.  The agent has a set I = {i1, i2, …} of internal states as well as a 
set P = {p1, p2, …} of precepts which are the agent’s interpretation of each environmental 
input.  The agent may perform the set A = {a1, a2, …} of actions.   
The agent has three decision functions: see, next, and action.  The perception function 
see captures the agent’s ability to observe its environment; the function next updates the 
internal state based on its own perceptions; and the action-selection function action 
selects the appropriate action and performs the action in the environment.  Each function 
maps the appropriate input(s) to a corresponding output.  The see function maps 
environmental states to precepts or see: S → P.   The next function maps an internal state 
and precept to an internal state or next: I ×  P → I.  The action function maps internal 
states to actions or action: I → A. 
This abstract agent architecture reveals the properties of state-based agents and 
models an agent’s abstract functions but fails to explain what the agent’s state might be 
or examine how the see, next and action functions are decided.   A concrete epistemic 
based agent architecture is proposed [HaO03] where anonymity is expressed and agent 
decisions are realized through logical deduction.  
A multi-agent system consists of n agents, each of which is in some local state at a 
given point in time.  An agent’s local state encapsulates all the information to which the 
agent has access. The local state of an agent might include initial information regarding 
keys, the messages sent and received, and a timestamp. The framework makes no 
assumptions about the precise nature of the local state; hence, high-level anonymity 
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properties do not depend on the local agent states.  This is a major disadvantage if an 
adversary with limited view of the system, i.e., a local adversary, needs to be modeled. 
The entire system may be in some global state, a tuple consisting of the environmental 
state and the local state of each agent.  Thus, a global state has the form (se, i1, …, in) 
where se is the environment state and ij is agent i’s state, for j = 1 … n. 
This approach is based on a run.  A run is a function that maps time to global states.  
Intuitively, a run is a complete description of what happens over time in one possible 
execution of the system.  The run is analogous to the concept of traces used in the CSP 
process calculus.  A point is a pair (r,m) consisting of a run r and a time m where both r, 
m ∈ Integers.  Logical deductions concerning the properties of agents are made based on 
these points.  At a point (r,m), the system is in global state r(m).  If r(m) = (se, i1, …, in), 
then ri(m) is user i’s local state at the point (r,m).   
An important advantage of the framework is that it is easy to formally define what an 
agent knows at a point in a system.  Formally, a system consists of a set of runs or 
executions.   Let Р(R) denote the points in system R.  Given a system R, Ki(r,m) is the set 
of points in P(R) that i  thinks are possible at (r,m), i.e.,  
 
Ki(r,m) = {(r’,m’) ∈ P(R): r’i(m’) = ri(m)}. 
 
Agent i knows a nontrivial fact φ at a point (r,m) if φ is true at all points in Ki(r,m).  
To be more precise, truth values must be assigned to basic formulas in a system.  Assume 
a set Φ of primitive propositions describes basic facts about the system.  In the context of 
anonymous protocols, a fact, φ, may be “Alice sent the message M to Bob”.  An 
(34) 
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interpreted system Ґ consists of a pair (R,π) where R is a system and π is an 
interpretation, which assigns to each primitive proposition in Φ  a truth value at each 
point (r,m).  Thus, for every primitive proposition p ∈ Φ and point (r,m) in R, (π(r,m))(p) 
∈{true, false}. 
Now,  a formula or fact φ (or ψ) is true at a point (r,m) in an interpreted system Ґ, 
written (Ґ,r,m)╞ φ (o r ψ) where╞ is logical entailment [Sik94], by induction using the 
following formulas 
 
(Ґ,r,m)╞ p iff (π(r,m))(p) = true           
   
(Ґ,r,m)╞ ¬φ iff (Ґ ,r,m) |≠ φ         
   
(Ґ,r,m)╞ φ^ψ iff (Ґ ,r,m)╞ φ and (Ґ ,r,m)╞ ψ       
   
(Ґ,r,m)╞ Kiφ iff (Ґ ,r’,m’)╞ φ for all (r’,m’) ∈ Ki(r,m)        
   
 
The formula Kiφ in (41) means “agent i knows fact φ”.  Conversely, the formula ¬Kiφ 
means “agent i does not know fact φ”.   Formal logic is reviewed next. 
2.6 Logics 
Formal logics are used as a mathematical model to internally specify a language of 
reasoning or action and externally design metalanguages to specify, design, and verify 
certain behavioral properties in a dynamic environment.  The three aspects of any logic 
are well-formed formulas, proof-theory, and model-theory [Wei99].  Well-formed 
formulas (wffs) are assertions made in the formal language of the underlying logic. Proof-
theory is the axioms and inference rules and state entailment [Sik94] relationships among 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
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wffs.  Model-theory interprets the formal meaning of the wffs.  The syntax is the language 
and proof-theory and semantics is the model-theory [Wei99].  Formal methods make 
extensive use of propositional, modal, deonetic, dynamic, and temporal logics.  
Propositional logic represents factual information, modal logic represents other meanings 
of formulas, deonetic logic specifies what ought to be or one is obligated to do, dynamic 
logic is modal logic of action, and temporal logic is the logic of time [Wei99]. 
Propositions are proved using inference rules from facts known to be true and basic 
axioms are assumed to be true.  The underlying rules differ between the various formal 
logics and express notions of belief, knowledge, uncertainty, or even ignorance, within 
specific domains. 
The application of formal logics to the analysis of anonymous protocols is an 
important way to verify anonymous systems and their anonymity properties [AdD03, 
GaH05, HaO03, HuS04, SyG95, SyS99].  Logics can detect various protocol problems 
and are reasonably easy to use.  However, logics are a high level abstraction for a system, 
and do not prevent lower-level protocol implementation flaws to pass undetected 
[Ker07].  The following is a review of two more prevalent modal logics in security 
proofs: epistemic and temporal logics.  
2.6.1 Modal Logics. 
Modal logics consider questions of necessity and possibility.  This family of logics is 
concerned with qualifiers that concern the state, or modality, of propositions based on 
sets of defining axioms.  The basic syntactic elements, or “modalities”, are the two 
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statements that represent possibility ◊ (diamond) and necessity   (box) operators of 
proposition p: 
◊p : it is possible that p 
 p : it is necessary that p 
 
However, each may be expressed in terms of the other using negation: 
◊p ≡ ¬ ¬p, “it is possible that p” ≡ “it is not necessary that not p” 
 p ≡ ¬◊¬p, “it is necessary that p” ≡ “it is not possible that not p” 
 
Many forms of modal logic rely on different sets of axioms. The most common axiom set 
is modal logic S5 [Lew18]: 
1.  (p → q) → ( p →  q) 
2.  p → p 
3. ◊p → ◊ p 
 
The first axiom expresses the distribution property of the necessitation operator   
over the implication operator → statement with two propositions p, q.  Specifically, if it 
is necessary that p implies q then if it is necessary that p then it is also necessary that q.  
The second axiom defines a reflexive relation property (called T for truth) that if p is 
necessary then p is true.  The third axiom describes a Euclidean relation property (called 
5) that if it is possible that p, then it is necessary that it is possible that p.  These S5 
axioms allow a wide range of expressive power, and provide a basis for more advanced 
forms of modal logic based on equivalence relations [Wik07a].  Numerous other sets of 
axioms also exist. 
Interestingly, the possible worlds concept is sometimes erroneously compared with 
the many-worlds [Ano02, EiR85] interpretation of quantum mechanics.  The many-
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worlds  concept provides an interpretation of nondeterministic processes (such as 
measurement) without positing the so-called collapse of the wave function [EiR85] which 
introduces a quantum superposition of a possibly infinite number of identical “parallel 
universes”, all of which actually exist, while the possible worlds concept provides an 
interpretation (in the sense of a formal semantics) for modal claims.   These concepts 
differ in two main aspects.  First, the states of quantum-theoretical many-worlds are 
mechanically entangled [EiR85] while entanglement for possible words is meaningless.  
Second, quantum-theoretical many-worlds are all physically possible while possible 
worlds are logically but not necessarily physically possible. 
Anonymous systems and properties may be expressed using the modal logic syntax 
and semantics mentioned above.  Modal concepts may prove useful in constructing a 
meaningful definition of anonymity for more advanced models.  The anonymity-relevant 
epistemic and temporal logics are reviewed next. 
2.6.2 Epistemic Logic. 
Epistemic logics are concerned with propositions of knowledge, uncertainty, and 
ignorance.  Seminal work on epistemic logic [BrA06, EiO07, GaH05, HaO03, SyG95, 
SyS99] abounds.  Knowledge refers to an agent’s justified beliefs based of observed 
facts.  In contrast, doxastic logics [GrT96] are concerned with agent beliefs only and are 
based on lower levels of justification.  Logics of knowledge add operators to express the 
knowledge held by a particular agent.  KT45n [HuR04] is an epistemic logic. 
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2.6.3 KT45n Logic. 
Modal logic systems are fragments of classical logics, which strike a balance between 
expressive power (of first order predicate logic or other formalisms) and computational 
simplicity (of prepositional logic) [BlV06].  The normal modal logic system KT45n has 
many modes of knowledge including Ki for each agent i A∈  where {1,2,..., }A n= and EG 
for everyone, CG for common, and DG for distributed knowledge of a group of agents 
G A⊆ .  In KT45n, the K emphasizes knowledge (or lack thereof) of n logically 
omniscient agents.  The T for truth, 4 for positive introspection and 5 for negative 
introspection imply reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean (i.e., equivalence relation) 
semantic properties, respectively [HuR04].  Intuitively, KT45n means n agents know 
things (K), only know true things (T), know what they know (4), and know what they do 
not know (5).   The syntax, inference rules, and semantics are briefly described next. 
2.6.3.1  KT45n Syntax. 
A KT45n formulaφ is defined by the Backus normal form (BNF) grammar [HuR04] 
      
:: | | | | | | | | | | |i G G GT p K E C Dφ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ=⊥ ¬ ∧ ∨ → ↔    
 
where p is any atomic formula and i∈ {1,2,..., }A n= and G ⊆ A.   The grammar in (39) 
specifies exactly the formulas φ of KT45n modal logic, given a set of atomic formulas p.  
The formula φ syntax consists of false (⊥ ), true (T), p, five propositional operators 
(¬,∧,∨,→,↔) and four knowledge modalities (Ki, EG, CG, DG).  Kiφ  means “agent i 
(39) 
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knows φ”.  EGφ  means “everyone in group G knows φ” or EGφ ≡ i G A∈ ⊆
∧ Kiφ.; however, 
not everyone may know that everyone knows.  Thus, the state of everyone knowledge 
may increase until it is common knowledge.  CGφ  means “φ is common knowledge 
among G” or CGφ ≡ EGφ  ∧ EGEGφ  ^ EGEGEGφ  ^ …   Hence, CG denotes an infinite 
conjunction of increasing knowledge [HuR04].  DGφ  means “knowledge of φ is 
distributed among G” although no one in G may know φ.   The various KT45n rules are 
covered next. 
2.6.3.2    KT45n Rules. 
The KT45n propositional inference rules are enumerated in Table 8.  These inference 
rules are used to prove the validity of anonymity formulas.  The KT45n introduction and 
elimination inference rules for the varying degrees of knowledge are enumerated in Table 
9.  The closed consequence rules are the “Modus Ponens” equivalents in KT45n.  
Substitution rules allow knowledge to traverse the various levels from an individual agent 
to common knowledge.  The introspection and truth knowledge rules for Kj, CG and DG 
are the formal representations of the “4”, “5” and “T” properties in KT45n.  The “4” rules 
are K4, C4 and D4.  The “5” rules are K5, C5, and D5.  The “T” rules are KT, CT and DT.  
The Ki dashed boxes mean the formulas are known to agent i.  The EG boxes mean the 
formulas are known to everyone in group G.  The CG boxes mean the formulas are 
common knowledge to those in group G.  The DG boxes mean the formulas are 
distributed, albeit not necessarily known to those in group G.   
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Table 8: KT45n Propositional Rules [Hal05, HuR04] 
Op Name Introduction Elimination 
⊥  False  
n/a 
φ
⊥
⊥ e 
¬ Negation φ
φ
⊥
¬
¬

i     
φ
φ
¬
⊥

PBC 
 
 
φ φ¬
¬
⊥
e 
¬ ¬ Double 
Negation φ
φ
¬ ¬
¬ ¬
i φ
φ
¬ ¬
¬ ¬ e 
∧ Conjunction φ ψ
φ ψ
∧
∧
i 
φ ψ
φ
∧
∧ e1        
φ ψ
ψ
∧
∧ e2 
∨ Disjunction  
φ
φ ψ
∨
∨
i1        
ψ
φ ψ
∨
∨
i2 
φ ψ
φ ψ
χ χ
χ
∨
∨
 
e 
→ Material 
Implication  
φ
ψ
φ ψ
→
→

i 
 
 
 
φ φ ψ
ψ
→
→ e    
ψ φ ψ
φ
¬ →
¬
MT 
↔ Equivalence  
φ ψ ψ φ
φ ψ
→ →
↔
↔ i1
φ ψ ψ φ
ψ φ
→ →
↔
↔ i2 
 
φ ψ
φ ψ
↔
→
↔ e1 
φ ψ
ψ φ
↔
→
↔ e2 
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Table 9: KT45n Modal Knowledge Rules [Hal05, HuR04] 
Op Name Introduction Elimination 
Ki Agent 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
i
i
K i
Kφ
 
i
i
K
K eφ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EG Everyone 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
G
G
E i
E φ
 
G
G
E eE φ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CG Common 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
G
G
C i
C φ
 
G
G
C eC φ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DG Distributed 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
G
G
D i
D φ
 
G
G
D eD φ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ordinary formula φ cannot be brought into such dashed boxes, because the mere 
truth of φ does not mean that agent i or group G knows it [HuR04].   Additional KT45n 
knowledge rules are enumerated in Table 10. 
 
iK
φ
  
GE
φ
  
GC
φ
  
GD
φ
  GD
φ


 
GC
φ


 
GE
φ


 
iK
φ


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Table 10: KT45n Derived Rules [Hal05, HuR04] 
Op Name Derived 
Ki  
Closed Consequence 
 
 
 
Substitution 
 
 
 
 
Introspection 
 
 
 
 
Truth 
( )i i
i
K E
K K
K
φ φ ψ
ψ
→
∧ →  
i
G
for each
KE
GiK
E
φ
φ
∈    G i
i
EK
GiE
K
φ
φ
∈  
 
4
i
i i
K
K
K K
φ
φ
        5i
i i
K
K
K K
φ
φ
¬
¬
 
 
i
KT
Kφ
φ
 
EG  
Closed Consequence ( )G G
G
E E
E E
E
φ φ ψ
ψ
→
∧ →  
CG  
Closed Consequence  
 
 
 
 
Substitution 
 
 
 
 
Introspection 
 
 
 
 
Truth 
( )G G
G
C E
C C
C
φ φ ψ
ψ
→
∧ →  
 
G
G G
CE
C
E E
φ
φ
      
1 k
G j
i i
CK
GiC
K K
φ
φ
∈

 
 
4
G
G G
C
C
C C
φ
φ
       5G
G G
C
C
C C
φ
φ
¬
¬
 
 
,
G
CT G
C φ
φ
≠ ∅  
DG  
Closed Consequence  
 
 
 
Introspection 
 
 
 
Truth 
( )G G
G
D E
D D
D
φ φ ψ
ψ
→
∧ →  
4
G
G G
D
D
D D
φ
φ
       5G
G G
D
D
D D
φ
φ
¬
¬
 
 
G
DT
D φ
φ
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2.6.3.3     KT45n Semantics. 
Epistemic logics consider the semantic possible worlds that can be constructed from 
the knowledge held within the system.  Thus, if an agent knows a fact p, it will not 
consider those worlds in which ¬p is true.  In expressing adversary models and agent 
behavior, knowledge that can be deduced by an agent from observed facts is of great 
importance to the anonymity the system provides.  From an anonymity perspective, the 
objective is to avoid revealing facts that would decrease the number in valid possible 
worlds. 
A model ( , ( ) , )i i AW R L∈=M of the multi-modal logic KT45n with the set A of n 
agents is specified by three things [HuR04]: 
 
1. Set of possible worlds W; 
2. Accessibility relations Ri for each i∈A; 
3. Labeling function L: W → P(Atoms). 
 
 
KT45n uses relational structures called Kripke models whose elements are thought of 
variously as being possible worlds, moments of time, evidential situations, or states of a 
computer [Gol05].  Kripke semantics focus on intuitive graphs and address the key ideas 
of time flow (discrete integer), computations state transitions (accessibility relations) and 
possible world networks (worlds labeled with atomic propositions). 
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2.6.4 Logical Posibilistic Anonymity. 
Logical possibilistic (a.k.a. purely nondeterministic) anonymity delineates what the 
adversary knows is possible or impossible in an anonymous system.  Table 11 lists four 
definitions of minimal anonymity, total anonymity, up-to anonymity and k-anonymity 
[HaO03].   The formula δi,a  means “agent i performed action a”.  IA is the anonymity set. 
 
Table 11: Possibilistic Anonymity Formulas [HaO03] 
DEFINITION FORMULA ADVERSARY j KNOWLEDGE 
Minimal Anonymity 
,j i aK δ¬  Action Hidden 
Total Anonymity 
',' j i ai j
P δ
≠
∧  Anybody Perform Action 
Up to |IA| Anonymity 
',' A
j i ai I
P δ
∈
∧  Up to |IA| Agents Perform Action 
k-Anonymity 
| |{ }AI k≥
∨ ',' A j i ai I
P δ
∈
∧  ≥k Agents Perform Action 
 
Minimal anonymity means the adversary does not know that an agent performed an 
action.  More precisely, the formula means adversary j does not know, represented by the 
negated modal unary operator ¬Kj, that agent i performed action a, represented by the 
atomic formula δi,a.   
Total anonymity means the adversary believes the action could have been performed 
by anybody in the system except the adversary.  Pjδi,a  is an abbreviation for ¬Kj¬δi,a  
meaning adversary j does not know that agent i did not perform action a.  Thus, the 
adversary j thinks it possible, Pj, that any agent i’∈A-{j} denoted as 'i j≠
∧  could have 
performed a or δi’,a where A is the set of agents in the system. 
Up to anonymity means the adversary believes the anonymous action could have been 
performed by up to |IA| agents in the system.  More precisely, adversary j believes it is 
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possible, Pj, that any anonymous agent i’∈IA performed action a, δi’,a. 
K-anonymity means the adversary believes the anonymous action may have been 
performed by at least k agents in the system.  More precisely, the formula means 
adversary j believes it is possible, Pj, that any anonymous agent i’∈IA could have 
performed action a and the size of all possible anonymity sets is at least k denoted by 
| |{ }AI k≥
∨ .   In [HaO03], this was denoted as 
| |{ }AI k=
∨ , but this only means equal to k, so 
| |{ }AI k≥
∨ is used herein instead. 
These represent varying degrees of anonymity with respect to the adversary j.  These 
logical possibilistic formulae mean the adversary only believes it is probable that a 
certain number of agents could have performed the anonymous action.   
The subset of germane grammar is 
 
    φ ::= p | ¬φ |φ ∧φ |φ ∨φ | Kjφ | Pjφ  
 
Hence, the anonymity definitions contain formula p, two binary operators and three unary 
operators (¬, Kj, Pj).  The negation (¬), conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨) operators 
correspond to their typical meanings in propositional calculus.  The Kj operator 
corresponds to the modal box operator (□) and non -variable predicate calculus universal 
quantifier (∀ ).  The Kj operator distributes over ∧, not ∨.  The Pjφ is short for ¬Kj¬φ
and means “adversary j thinksφ is possible”; however, exactly how possible is 
unspecified and not quantified.  The Pj operator corresponds to the diamond operator (◊) 
(64) 
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and non-variable predicate calculus existential quantifier (∃ ).  The Pj operator distributes 
over ∨, not ∧.   
2.6.5 Logical Probabilistic Anonymity. 
Logical probabilistic anonymity extends the possibilistic definition to quantify to 
what degree the adversary knows an anonymous action is possible in the system.  Table 
12 lists the four definitions of α-anonymous, strongly probabilistic anonymous, weakly 
probabilistic anonymous, and conditionally anonymous  [HaO03].  These definitions are 
of the form Pr ( )j ϕ α≤ where Pr j  is an adversary assigned posterior probability, ϕ  is 
any fact, and 1α ≤ .  The formula θi,a means “agent i performed action a” with the added 
implication that if the action was not performed then the adversary does not know about 
it (e.g., ¬θi,a → ¬Kj[θi,a]); hence, the adversary is unable to assign probabilities to 
unperformed actions.   
Table 12: Probabilistic Anonymity Formulas [HaO03] 
Definition Formula Action Probability 
α-anonymous ,Pr ( )j i aθ α<  Less than some probability 
threshold α ≤ 1. 
Strongly probabilistically anonymous , ',Pr ( ) Pr ( )j i a j i aθ θ=  Uniformly distributed (totally 
anonymous). 
Weakly probabilistically anonymous , ',Pr ( ) Pr ( )j i a j i aθ θ≤  Non-uniformly distributed (beyond 
suspicion). 
Conditionally anonymous  ,Pr ( )j i aθ β=  Unchanged after action 
(a priori = a posterior) 
 
Let ,( ( ) | ( ))r i a re eβ µ θ ϕ=  where ( )re ϕ  means action ϕ  has occurred,  ,( ) | ( )r i a re eθ ϕ  
means action ,i aθ  occurs after action ϕ  , and ,( ( ) | ( ))r i a re eµ θ ϕ  means assigning a 
probability that agent i performed action a  given the prior action ϕ .  Hence, β  is an a 
priori probability of θi,a. 
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α-anonymous means the adversary’s assigned posterior probability, ,Pr ( )j i aθ , must be 
less than one or some probability threshold α.  Strongly probabilistically anonymous 
means the adversary is only able to assign a uniform distribution to the anonymity set of 
agents so agent i‘s action has total anonymity.  More specifically, the posterior 
probability of agent i performing action a, ,Pr ( )j i aθ , is equal to the probability of any 
other anonymous agent i’ performing the same action a, ',Pr ( )j i aθ . 
Weakly probabilistically anonymous means the adversary is able to assign a non-
uniform distribution to the anonymity set of agents yet agent i is beyond suspicion or 
possible innocent.  More specifically, the posterior probability of agent i performing 
action a, ,Pr ( )j i aθ , is less than or equal to the probability of any other anonymous agent 
i’ performing the same action a, ',Pr ( )j i aθ .   
Conditionally anonymous means the adversary posterior probability, ,Pr ( )j i aθ , is the 
same as the a priori probability, β . Hence, the adversary is unable to learn anything new 
given θi,a.  This is equivalent to preserving anonymity or when normalized entropy 
anonymity degree is one (d=1).   
2.6.6 Temporal Logics. 
Temporal logics add time to propositions which allows logics to express not only the 
truth of propositions, but also when the truth holds.  This greatly enhances the expressive 
power of logic but at the cost of added complexity [WrS05].  Modal temporal logics may 
be able to express additional properties in anonymous systems.  For example, it may be 
desirable to prove that a certain fact concerning an agent is true at a particular moment in 
time, such as having a certain pseudonymous identity performing an action.  However, it 
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may be undesirable for an adversary to known this information for extended periods of 
time and discover the real identity.  Temporal logics allow propositions that are true at 
certain times, but not at others.  For example, one approach [Men05] views time as a 
sequence of events and defines four operators, two weak and two strong [WrS05] or 
alternatively two about the past and two about the future.  Let θ be an arbitrary event and 
define two operators: 
• Past Operators 
P θ  : θ has at some time been true. 
H θ : θ has always been true. 
 
•Future Operators 
F θ  : θ will at some time be true. 
G θ : θ will always be true. 
 
 
Similar to KT45n, the duality of operators hold so P θ = ¬H¬ θ is “θ has at some time 
been true” = “it is not always the case that θ has not been true”.  Also, F θ = ¬G¬ θ.     
Modal temporal logics are the most common [ChH04, Gol05, HuD01, Hui04, KoS04, 
MoS06, OrL06, SuK04].  The KARO logic [HuD01] offers ways to do automate 
reasoning about agent-based systems using an expressive combination of modal logics.  
One method uses branching-time temporal logic [JiK05] and a KT45n-like logic with a 
clausal resolution calculus.  The Typed Modal Logic (TML) combined with a temporal 
logic [OrL06] offers ways to model and reason about evolving trust and beliefs for multi-
agent systems.  Spatial Propositional Neighborhood Logic [MoS06]  is a semi-decidable, 
modal logic for spatial reasoning that can be polynomially reduced to a decidable 
temporal logic based on time intervals preserving, at least, valid formulas.  Another new 
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modal logic [ChH04] for the π-calculus, an extension of the modal µ-calculus with 
Boolean expressions over names, is introduced as an appropriate temporal logic for the π-
calculus to perform model checking.  
However, there has been little research into using temporal logics to express 
anonymity, or even security properties. This may be due to the complexity of temporal 
logics, combined with the ability to abstract away the temporal element of protocols 
[WrS05].  Few existing protocols use explicit timing information, relying instead on 
single-use values, cryptographic nonce [And01], which indicates an event took place 
without any reference to the time domain.  The alternative framework of process calculi 
is examined next. 
2.7 Process Calculi 
Process calculi provide a mathematical notation for describing communicating 
processes.  Computers are viewed as communicating agents in larger networks.  Since 
anonymous systems are concerned with communication between agents, process calculi 
is an excellent way to express anonymity.  
2.7.1 Communications Sequential Processes (CSP). 
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP [BrH84, Hoa04]) is a formal language for 
describing patterns of interaction in concurrent systems and is a member of the family of 
mathematical theories of concurrency.  CSP was initially introduced in 1978 but has 
evolved substantially to include real-time [ReR88], probabilistic [SeM96] and larger 
scale system expansions [Cre01].  CSP has the basic constructs of a typical programming 
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language such as choice operators and logical expressions.  The core concept is a process 
as a mathematical abstraction of the interactions between a system and its environment. 
2.7.1.1  System Model. 
A system is modeled in terms of events it can perform and is composed of a number 
of processes.  Processes are defined in terms of a sequence of possible events using the 
prefix operator (→).  For example, x → y → P means performing event x then event y 
acts like process P.  Intuitively, LIGHT = on → off → LIGHT means turning on then off 
acts like process LIGHT.  This is pictorially represented in Figure 33. 
The circles represent states of the process, and the arrows represent transitions 
between states.  The top circle is the starting state.  Each down arrow is labeled by the 
event which occurs on making that transition.  Arrows leading from the same node must 
have unique labels.  The unlabeled arrow from the bottom to the top circle is an 
immediate and imperceptible transition, making the process unbounded [Hoa04].   Hence, 
process LIGHT may turn on then off again continuously.  A traces(P) is a finite sequence 
of events that P may perform.  For instance, an empty trace 〈〉 or three-event trace 〈on, 
off, on〉 are two instantiations of traces(LIGHT).   
A process P is refined by a process Q, denoted as P  Q, if traces(Q) ⊆ traces(P).  
Two processes are equal P = Q if each refines the other, namely P  Q and Q  P.   The 
definition of anonymity requires processes to be equal in this manner.  An automated   
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Figure 33: Unbounded Process LIGHT = on → off → LIGHT 
 
model-checking tool is used to check for such equality.  For instance, let two concurrent 
processes (agents) be defined as P = x → P and Q = (x → Q | y → Q) where x and y are 
events of sending messages and | is a choice operator.  Hence, P may only send message 
x but Q may send both x and y messages.  The processes P and Q are depicted in Figure 
34. 
 
     
Figure 34: Two Processes (agents) P and Q 
 
If Q decides to send one x message, then traces(Q) = 〈x〉.  However, if P sends one x 
message, then traces(P) = 〈x〉.  Since traces(Q) ⊆ traces(P), then P  Q.  Also, Q  P so 
P = Q and the processes are equal.  In other words, if the adversary observes a single 
message x, then the traces are indistinguishable and sender anonymity is preserved.  
However, if Q decides to send any y messages, then the traces are distinguishable and no 
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anonymity exists.  Given the sequential execution of the two processes P and Q, the 
following operations may be performed.   
• Basic Operations 
P(n)   : Process P parameterized with value n. 
?x:E → P(x)  : Perform any event x ∈ P, then behave like P(x). 
P   Q   : Deterministically choose between the initial events  
         of P and Q, and then behave accordingly. 
b&P   : If (boolean) b then enable P else STOP. 
• Parallel Composition 
P||Q   : P and Q require full synchronization of events. 
P ||X Q   : P and Q require full synchronization of set of X events. 
P|||Q   : P and Q without synchronization. 
P\Q   : Hide set Q events from adversary. 
Pa/b   : Rename all variables a in P to b. 
• Primitive Processes 
STOP   : Deadlocked process. 
SKIP   : Successfully terminating process. 
 
CSP focuses on the simplest form of sets of observations of process traces, traces(P), 
and process equality, P  Q and Q  P.  Other more complex observations such as 
failures, divergences, and refusals contain additional information about system state and 
enhance the ability to reason about a process.  
2.7.1.2    Applications. 
CSP has been applied in industry as a practical tool for specifying and verifying 
concurrent aspects of a variety of different systems including the T9000 Transputer 
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[Bar95] and a secure ecommerce system [HaC02].  Anonymity has also been formalized 
in CSP [ScS96].   
The model draws an analogy between existing features of CSP and aspects of 
anonymity.  For example, hiding CSP events from the view of other processes models the 
anonymous sending of a message.  Parallel execution of processes models an anonymity 
set of processes that could have performed an action.  The anonymity property is the 
existence of indistinguishable traces, a sequence of actions observable to the adversary, 
for any sender.   By assuming a reliable broadcast channel and a passive adversary and 
analyzing the trace observations, process equivalence or, synonymously, sender 
anonymity is proven for the three-agent dining cryptographer network [Cha88].  The 
model is highly specialized and only has the broadest applicability to other anonymity 
systems.   
Nonetheless, this is one of the few examples of a formal methods proof of anonymity 
and provides inspiration for further work into proving anonymity properties with process 
calculi.  Adding the probabilistic aspect [ScS96] is essential to successfully modeling real 
anonymity-providing services. 
2.7.2 π-Calculus. 
The π − calculus is a derivative of Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS 
[Mil89]).  CCS and CSP describe communicating processes and offer the same level of 
expressive power.  However, the π − calculus extends the basic capabilities of CCS to 
include mobility: agents can form new and destroy old links with other agents.  An agent 
may therefore begin in one area of a system and, in the course of execution, relocate to an 
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entirely new portion of a system.  Processes send and receive messages along defined 
channels and these messages may include the name of a channel.  This powerful addition 
allows the dynamic creation of new topologies in the system.  The basic structure of the 
calculus is presented below. 
2.7.2.1  Syntax. 
The fundamental structure of π − calculus enumerates over a set of names and 
includes a prefix and process syntax.  Let N be a countable set of names, x, y, ….         
The set of prefixes, α, β, … syntax is 
_
:: ( ) | | .Prefixes x y x yα τ=  
The prefixes are basic process actions of input, output, and silent, respectively or  
1) x(y) is the input of the name y from channel x;  
2) 
_
x y  is the output of the name y on channel x;  
3) τ  is any silent action.   
 
The set of π − calculus processes syntax is 
     :: . | | | | ! | [ ] | [ ] .i i
i
Processes P P xP P P P x y P x y Pα ν= = ≠∑  
The processes are guarded choice, restriction, composition, replication, and if-then-else, 
respectively or 
1) .i i
i
Pα∑ x is guarded choice or execution of an action                                                                                   
where 0=inaction, .Pα =unary sum, P+Q=binary sum; 
2) xPν  is restriction;  
3) |P P  is composition; 
4) !P is replication; 
(40) 
(41) 
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5) [ ] | [ ]x y P x y Q= ≠  is if x=y then P else Q where P Q≠ . 
 
2.7.2.2  Semantics. 
Operational semantics is specified via a transition system labeled by Actions   µ,µ’, … 
given by the grammar 
_ _
:: | | ( ) | .Actions xy x y x yµ τ=  
The actions are input prefix ( xy ), free name output (
_
x y ), bound output (
_
( )x y ), and 
silent (τ ).  The bound name of an action µ, bn(µ), is defined as bn( xy ) = bn(
_
x y ) = bn(
τ ) = ∅; bn(
_
( )x y ) = { }y .  Names may be passed along channels.  Processes have the 
ability to run both sequentially and in parallel.  Replication can be expressed and the 
scope of names may be restricted to processes using the ν  operator. 
   
2.7.2.3    Variants and Applications. 
The π − calculus has spawned variants designed for the analysis of various 
interacting systems.  One variant is spi-calculus [AbG97] which adds cryptographic 
primitives.  Another is an extension of the modal μ-calculus [Alb02] with Boolean 
expressions over names, and primitives for name input and output as an appropriate 
temporal logic for the π − calculus [ChH04].  Other variants include Update Calculus 
[PaV97], Probabilistic Asynchronous π − calculus [HeP00], and probπ − calculus 
[ChP05].   The latter probπ − calculus is able to analyze probabilistic security protocols 
(42) 
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involving probabilistic choice in applications such as sending certified e-mail and 
protecting the anonymity of communicating agents.  Recently, pattern-matching spi-
calculus [HaJ06] has been introduced to provide a framework, methods and tools, to 
rigorously analyze security protocols.  Proving security protocols using the π − calculus 
and its variants uses observational equivalences between processes by comparing 
protocol models and abstract specification of security properties specifications.  Using the 
calculus, equivalence is established between the model of the protocol and the abstract 
properties.   
Executable languages based on π − calculus have been developed such as an 
executable specification for asynchronous π − calculus [ThS05].  The existence of 
languages in which π − calculus models can more easily be expressed would increase the 
utility of the calculus.  In [BhP05], the Dining Cryptographer anonymous system is 
modeled and the probabilistic extension πp- calculus is proposed.   The flexibility offered 
by the calculus is ideal for representing many of the network topologies used in modern 
anonymity systems.  The existing body of knowledge of π − calculus security proofs 
provides a source of techniques that may be fruitful in proving anonymity properties. 
2.7.3 Comparison. 
In theoretical computer science, CSP and π − calculus are the most common formal 
methods in security research.  Other existing process calculi include the International 
Organization for Standards (ISO) Language of Temporal Ordering Specification (LOTOS 
[EiV89]) for formal descriptions of systems, Algebra of Communicating Processes with 
Abstraction (ACP [BeK85]) for asynchronous process cooperation via synchronous 
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communication and many additional π − calculus variants. CSP and π − calculus differ 
in three important ways:  semantics, maturity, and mobility.  
First, both deal with the rigorous mathematical study of the semantics of 
programming languages and models of computation [WiK07c]; however, each uses a 
different, albeit possibly relatable [ZhH06] semantic approach.  CSP uses denotational 
semantics [Bou89, ScS71] whereas π − calculus uses algebraic semantics [GoT77, 
ZhN05].  Denotational semantics loosely deals with compilation and translates each 
language phrase into a mathematical formalism rather than another computer language.  
The computer program is interpreted as a function that maps inputs to outputs.  Algebraic 
semantics is a form of axiomatic semantics [Hoa69] based on mathematical logic to 
prove the correctness of computer programs.  Each language phrase is interpreted as a 
description of the relevant logical axioms or algebraic forms.  In both, semantically 
demonstrating description equivalences between systems is the method for proving 
anonymous communications.   
Second, π − calculus is a less mature language and formalism than CSP.  CSP is 
supported by mature proof tools such as logically embedded Higher Order Logic for Z 
specifications (HOL-Z) and special purpose Failure-Divergence Refinement (FDR 
[FDR97]) model-checker.  Ways to transform the CSP abstract language into executable 
forms have been proposed [Gar03, Pel05, Ste03].  The ability to efficiently execute 
abstract models and proofs is of immense practical value in addition to theoretical value 
for experimenting in real-world environments.  There have also been efforts to produce 
an executable form of π − calculus such as Nomadic Pict [UnS01], but these are not as 
well developed as in CSP.   
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Lastly, π − calculus, unlike CSP, is able to explicitly model mobility.  Channel 
names passed in data messages enable non-static links between agents in the system.  The 
ability to create and destroy links models of dynamic interactions between anonymous 
agents in mobile ad hoc networks.  Both CSP and the π − calculus can be extended to 
express cryptographic operations, asymmetric communications and probabilistic protocol 
behaviors; however, onlyπ − calculus is able to express mobility.  This is a key 
advantage even with CSP’s extensive mature tool support. 
2.8 Function Views 
Function views and opaqueness are other defined and succinct ways to formally 
express anonymity.  The main advantage of these are restrictions can be placed on 
relationships between agents and actions.  This functional relationship expression allows 
a local adversary to be modeled by limiting the adversary view of such relationships.  
Defining a function from a set of actions to a set of agents who performs those actions 
and by specifying the opaqueness of the function to the adversary, anonymity may be 
represented. 
2.8.1 Function Knowledge. 
An adversary’s uncertainty associated with a given function is modeled using 
function knowledge.  The aspects of knowledge about a function are its graph f, image im 
f and kernel ker f.  The graph f is the set of ordered pairs (x, f(x)), for all x in domain X.  
The im f is the function value at x, namely f(x) or y.  The ker f is a binary equivalence 
relation of the function domain X, is a subset of the Cartesian product X × X, and is 
symbolically  defined as ker f := {(x, x’) | f(x) = f(x’)} where x, x’ є X.  The function view 
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is a mathematical abstraction of partial knowledge of a function, namely a 
nondeterministic approximation of graph f, a subset of im f, and a ker f equivalence 
relation.  Functional knowledge of function f: X  Y is represented by the triple N = 
(F,I,K), where domain X is a set of actions, codomain Y is a set of agents, F⊆X × Y maps 
actions to agents, I ⊆  Y is the anonymity set, and K ~ X is an equivalence relation on the 
set of actions.  Intuitively, (F,I,K) represents what the adversary may know about 
function f.  Complete knowledge of function f is represented by (f, im f, ker f).  
2.8.2 Opaqueness. 
Anonymity is concerned with what an adversary does not know.  Opaqueness 
formalizes this lack of functional knowledge.  Given N = (F,I,K), N is k-value opaque if  
|F(x)| ≥ k ∀ x є X.  In other words, each action x is at least k-anonymous to the adversary.  
Also, N is Z-value opaque if Z ⊆F(x) ∀ x є X.  In other words, for each action x no agent 
in Z may be ruled-out as having performed that action.  Furthermore, N is absolutely 
value opaque if N is Y-value opaque.  In other words, for each action x any agent y є Y 
could have performed it.  Hence, opaqueness describes anonymity properties. 
Z-value opaqueness is more precisely defined below.  Intuitively, f(x) = y if agent y 
has performed action x and f(x) is undefined if no agent y has yet performed action x.  If 
f(r,m)(x) = y, agent y performed action x at point (r,m).  Let Ґ be an interpreted system that 
satisfies (Ґ,r,m)╞ f(x) = y whenever f(r,m)(x) = y [HaO03]. 
 
Definition 4 [HaO03]: In system Ґ, f is Z-value opaque for adversary j at point (r,m) iff 
(Ґ,r,m)╞ 
x X∈
∧
z Z∈
∧ Pj[f(x) = z]. 
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The adversary j believes |Z| agents may have performed each action x.  This function 
view opaqueness strongly resembles the previous definitions of anonymity.   Hence, 
function views and opaqueness are other valid methods to express and quantify 
anonymity. 
2.8.3 Modular Approach. 
A modular approach [HuS04] uses partial knowledge about the function f to model 
and quantify anonymity using epistemic logic and process calculi.  Epistemic logic 
models the system.  The system is all possible states of a Kripke structure [Kri63].  This 
structure represents the adversary’s view of the system and is a nondeterministic finite 
state machine with all states in the machine processing Boolean labels that express the 
evaluation of that state.  The key aspect of this formalism is that any Kripke structure 
results in function views [HuS04].  Observational equivalences from process calculi 
express the observable differences between system configurations.  As mentioned above, 
anonymity is defined in terms of opaqueness, the information an adversary may learn 
about a specific function within the function view framework.  Higher levels of 
opaqueness conceal larger amounts of information in the function and equate to higher 
levels of uncertainty about which aspects of a system are linked. 
One case study [HuS04] uses this framework to analyze an anonymity property of 
keeping communicating agent identities secret (sender/receiver anonymity) and a privacy 
property of keeping agent relationships secret (communication anonymity).  Proving 
these properties hold is demonstrated but is not a trivial task. 
This modular function view approach is an adaptable, intriguing approach to defining 
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and analyzing anonymity.  A comparison between conventional and modular approaches 
is highlighted in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: Modular Approach to Formalizing Information-Hiding Properties [HuS04] 
 
For the process calculi approach in Figure 35(a), system specification is easy but 
property specification is hard.  The particular process calculi may be CSP or π −
calculus.  For the epistemic approach in Figure 35(b), system specification is hard but 
property specification is easy.  The particular logic may be any modal logic such as 
KT45n.  For the modular function view approach in Figure 35(c), system and property 
specifications are easy.  The interface layer allows any epistemic and process calculi to 
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be selected.  This overall modular approach may provide keen insight into developing 
other frameworks for modeling, measuring, and analyzing anonymity. 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter provided a comprehensive coverage of state-of-the-art concepts in 
anonymous communications systems.  The background section succinctly recounted the 
societal pursuit of personal privacy and describes identity, anonymity, pseudonymity, and 
reputation.  The anonymity benefits of promoting freedom of expression and protecting 
user privacy and drawbacks of extreme abuse and illegal activity were discussed.  The 
nomenclature section was a synthesis of the essential elements of anonymous systems 
and summarizes the anonymity properties, the adversary, the attacks, and mix 
technology.  The three high-level anonymity properties of unidentifability, unlinkability, 
and unobservability were described.  The three adversary capabilities that determine the 
threat model were mentioned.  The goal of and defense for five active and nine passive 
attacks on anonymous systems were delineated.  The anonymous communications 
networks described seventeen wired and sixteen wireless protocols designed for 
preserving anonymity.  Over ten different ways to measure anonymity were illustrated in 
the quantifying anonymity section.  The anonymity set size, individual anonymity degree 
scale, and information-theoretic entropy metrics are the classical approaches but 
negligibility-based, localized real-time, combinatorial, evidence-based, and multicast 
metrics have also been proposed.  The remaining sections introduced formal methods for 
analyzing anonymity preservation in anonymous systems.  The formalizing anonymity 
section explored three conceptual frameworks, the probabilistic versus nondeterministic 
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approaches to modeling anonymous system, the notion of group instead of individual 
anonymity, and multi-agent systems.  Epistemic logic, such as KT45n, and temporal logic 
were discussed in the logics section.  The two most common process calculi, CSP and 
π − calculus, used in theoretical computer science for security research were described.  
Their semantic, maturity, and mobility differences were portrayed and some recent 
extensions are designated.  Finally, a modular approach that combines both a process 
calculi anonymous system specification and epistemic logic anonymity property 
specification formal approach was explained in the function views section.  This 
approach introduced function knowledge and opaqueness and requires the introduction of 
an interface between two different formal approaches. 
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III. Methodology 
 
3.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the methodology used in this research effort.  The research is in 
three areas.  First, an innovative anonymity network taxonomy is developed.  Second, an 
evaluation and aggregation of emerging anonymity metrics is conducted.  Lastly, a 
formal adversary anonymity reasoning framework is created.  These three phases 
constitute three underdeveloped yet mutually complementary subtopics of open and 
relevant anonymity research.  In Section 3.1, the motivation for exploring each of these 
phases is provided.  Each research and development phase is elaborated on in Section 3.2.  
Section 3.3 concludes this chapter.  
3.1 Motivation 
This section further explains the reasons for pursuing these three areas of research.  
Figure 36 shows anonymity publications by topic from 1980 to 2008 from the 
authoritative bibliography source of Freehaven [Fre09].  The topics of “Anonymous 
Communications” and “Traffic Analysis” clearly lead the field of anonymity research 
with 101 and 66 papers, respectively.  The anonymous communications topic is replete 
with theoretical and/or implemented wired and wireless anonymous protocols designed 
for particular applications such as e-mail, voice-over-IP, hostile military environments, 
video teleconferencing, and multicast services as described in Section 2.3.  The traffic 
analysis topic contains papers that analyze various cyber attacks against these anonymous 
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Figure 36: Freehaven’s Anonymity Publications by Topic (1980-2008) 
 
protocols.  Unfortunately, these combined topics result in a large and diverse set of 
anonymity metrics to compare one anonymous protocol with another as discussed in 
Section 2.4.  In contrast to these leading topics, the topic of “Formal Methods” has only 
nine published papers.  A formal treatment entails building an appropriate mathematical 
model for representing anonymous protocols, and formulating, within that model, a 
definition of anonymity that captures the requirements of a particular application domain.  
Hence, research for this topic has been limited.   
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This motivated further investigation into research subtopics of anonymity taxonomy, 
metric synthesis, and epistemic-based formal methods.  All known relevant anonymity 
publications by subtopic from 1980 to 2008 are displayed in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37: Anonymity Publications by Subtopic (1980-2008) 
 
With only four or six papers published per subtopic over the last nearly three decades, 
these subtopics are prime areas for contributing to the field of anonymity research.  Thus, 
this research extends the knowledge in the areas of anonymity taxonomy [Dia05c, DiP04, 
TiO05, VaD92], metrics synthesis [DcS02, Dij06, MuW08, NeM03, SeD02, TgH04a], 
and epistemic-based formal methods [GaH05, HaO03, HuS04, SyS99].   
The anonymous network taxonomy examines a representative set of implemented or 
proposed wired and wireless anonymous protocols in the “Anonymous Communications” 
topic but, more importantly, classifies recent wireless anonymous networks.  For these 
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anonymous protocols and “Traffic Analysis” performed, existing anonymity metrics are 
thoroughly examined.  Finally, a logical formal model is created to model how an 
adversary reasons while attempting to degrade anonymity. 
3.1.1 Develop Anonymous Network Taxonomy. 
No taxonomy classifies anonymity in the diverse set of both wired and wireless 
anonymous communications networks.  Current taxonomies are either for group support 
systems, low-density mobile ad hoc networks, fixed-connection-based networks, or 
cascade mixnets.  Thus, an intuitive anonymous network taxonomy is developed to 
encapsulate and generalize the key ideas in state-of-the-art anonymous communications 
systems in order to categorize anonymous networking protocols, assumed adversary 
threat models, required anonymity properties, external environmental factors, and 
inherent interrelationships.   This highlights the importance and intricacy of anonymity, 
serves as a modern model for theoretical and empirical investigations into anonymity, 
and fosters future anonymous protocol design and development across multiple 
application domains.   Furthermore, it updates and merges key aspects of existing 
taxonomies with location anonymity and multicast or anycast group anonymity.    
3.1.2 Evaluate Emerging Anonymity Metrics. 
Anonymization enables organizations to protect their data and systems from a diverse 
set of cyber attacks and preserve privacy; however, recent research indicates that many 
anonymization techniques leak at least some information.  Furthermore, there are 
confusing arrays of anonymity metrics and definitions for quantifying anonymity across a 
network.  The ability to confidently measure this information leakage and changes in 
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anonymity levels across a network plays a crucial role in facilitating the free-flow of 
cross-organizational information sharing and promotes wider adoption of anonyimzation 
techniques.  Although there are multiple methods of measuring analyzing anonymity, 
current research focuses on information theory, mobile ad hoc network, low-latency 
wired networks, or mixnet-specific metrics.  In other words, there is no “one-stop-shop” 
research that comprehensively surveys this area for candidate measures; therefore, this 
research explores the state-of-the-art of anonymity metrics to provide a macro-level view 
of the systematic analysis of anonymity preservation, degradation, or elimination in 
cyberspace.    
3.1.3 Create a Formal Model. 
While the first phase offers a holistic approach to anonymity and the second phase 
thoroughly examines how anonymity has been, is and can be measured, the third phase 
creates a mathematical framework for anonymity.  Rigorously demonstrating that a 
protocol meets expectations is an essential component of cryptographic protocol design.  
The same should hold for anonymous protocol design.  The formal model should be rich 
enough to represent a large variety of real-life adversarial behaviors, and the definition 
should guarantee that the intuitive notion of anonymity is captured for any adversarial 
behavior under consideration.  Thus, the goal is to expand upon existing epistemic-based 
formal anonymity methods and models.  A possibilistic (i.e., non-deterministic) approach 
to anonymous system and several anonymity properties are specified.  The primary step 
includes proving multiple anonymity definitions are satisfied given an epistemic syntactic 
specification and possible world’s semantic interpretation.  The contribution of this 
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research is the introduction of a formal adversary anonymity reasoning model to 
rigorously analyze how anonymity is preserved or degraded in an anonymous network.  
3.2 Summary 
This chapter presents the motivation and methodology for the development of an 
innovative taxonomy for the systematic analysis of anonymity properties and adversary 
knowledge in anonymous communications networks.  First, with the aim to preserve 
privacy over a communications network, many anonymous protocols have been proposed 
along with many empirical investigations into specific adversary attacks over those 
networks but no known taxonomy addresses anonymity in the diverse set of both wired 
and wireless anonymous communications networks.  Second, anonymization techniques 
still leak some information so an ability to confidently measure any changes in 
anonymity levels plays a crucial role in facilitating the free-flow of cross-organizational 
information sharing and promoting wider adoption of anonyimzation techniques.  Third, 
many empirical investigations lack a rigorous approach to defining and modeling 
anonymity concepts to ensure information assurance as is customary when formally 
proving other security aspects of a system.  An ability to comparatively and quantitatively 
analyze these anonymity protocols and anonymity services to better understand how 
anonymity is lost, maintained or improved during a cyber attack is an area of open 
research. 
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IV. Anonymous Network Taxonomy Analysis and Results 
4.0 Chapter Overview 
To preserve privacy over a communications network, numerous anonymous protocols 
have been proposed along with many empirical investigations into specific adversary 
attacks over those networks.  However, there are no known taxonomies that address 
anonymity in the diverse set of both wired and wireless anonymous communications 
networks.  This chapter describes a novel cubic taxonomy which explores the three key 
components of anonymity property, adversary capability, and network type.  A two 
dimensional (2D) tree-based taxonomy is provided for over thirty anonymous protocols.  
This taxonomy expands the definition of anonymity and advances the state-of-the-art 
technological privacy-preserving mechanisms in anonymous networks against any 
adversary.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.1 defines the anonymity 
property component.  The adversary capability component is delineated in Section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 details the network type component.  Section 4.4 demonstrates the utility of 
CT by classifying anonymous networks in 3D cubic and 2D tree taxonomies.  Section 4.5 
concludes the chapter. 
4.1 Anonymity Properties 
Anonymity properties are generally classified into unidentifiability, unlinkability, and 
unobservability; however, only the former two are included in this taxonomy since the 
latter automatically implies anonymity as explained in Section 2.2.1.  Unidentifiability 
means the adversary is unable to discern an agent’s or group’s identity, actions or other 
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items-of-interest (IOI) among a similar set of agents or groups.  Unlinkability means the 
adversary is unable to relate agents, messages, actions or other IOI by observing the 
system.   Moreover, an adversary’s a priori and a posteriori knowledge are the same even 
after observing the IOI.  The classical definition of anonymity is: 
 
Anonymity = Unidentifiability + Unlinkability.             
  
Each anonymity property may be defined by what information the anonymous system is 
designed to hide.  Table 13 lists each property, its subcomponent type and hidden 
information.  The next sections describe each property further. 
 
Table 13: Anonymity Property 
Property Type Hidden Information 
Unidentifiability Sender Anonymity (SA) Message sender identity 
 Receiver Anonymity (RA) Message receiver identity 
 Mutual Anonymity (MA) Message identities from each other 
 Group Anonymity (GA) Message group identity 
 Location Anonymity (LA) Position, motion, link, or topology 
information  
Unlinkability Communication Anonymity (CA) Sender-Receiver pair relationship 
from others 
  Group Communication Anonymity (GCA) Group-Group pair relationship from 
others 
 
4.1.1 Unidentifiability 
Unidentifiability is composed of sender anonymity (SA), receiver anonymity (RA), 
mutual anonymity (MA), group anonymity (GA), and location anonymity (LA) [PfK00].  
SA prevents a particular message from being linked to a particular sender identity.  RA 
prevents a particular message from being linked to a particular receiver identity.  MA 
(43) 
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hides the sender and receiver identities from each other.  GA limits the adversary to 
linking a particular message to a group of agents.  Agent identity is hidden among a 
group of indistinguishable agents.  At a higher level of abstraction, group anonymity 
prevents a particular message from being linked to a particular group of agents.   
However, no known group anonymous services yet exist.  The MAM aims to achieve 
both mutual and group anonymity.  LA means a particular message is not linkable to any 
sender or receiver location, motion, route or topology information.  The classic, current, 
and extended cubic unidentifiability property definitions are: 
 
    Classic Unidentifiability  = SA + RA             
   
    Current Unidentifiability = Classic Unidentifiability + LA      
   
     Cubic Unidentifiability  = Current Unidentifiability + MA + GA   
  
 
4.1.2 Unlinkability 
   Unlinkability consists of communication anonymity (CA) and group communication 
anonymity (GCA).  A particular message with CA cannot be linked to any sender-
receiver pair and no message is linkable to a particular sender-receiver pair.  CA is a 
weaker property than sender and receiver anonymity.  GCA means a particular message 
cannot be linked to any sender group-receiver group pair and no message is linkable to a 
particular group sender-group receiver pair.  All known anonymity research on the 
unlinkability property primarily deals with CA.  The classic and extended cubic 
unlinkability property definitions are: 
 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
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   Classic Unlinkability  = CA                  
   Cubic Unlinkability    = Classic Unlinkability + GCA      
 
Given these first two anonymity properties, the classic and expanded anonymity 
definitions are: 
 
   Classic Anonymity   = Classic Unidentifiability + Classic Unlinkability  
                  = SA+ RA + CA 
Expanded Anonymity  = Cubic Unidentifiability + Cubic Unlinkability - Classic Anonymity  
                           = LA + MA + GA + GCA 
 
Finally, the new cubic anonymity definition is: 
 
 Cubic Anonymity  = Cubic Unidentifiability + Cubic Unlinkability  
OR 
            = Classic Anonymity + Expanded Anonymity 
 
 
4.2 Adversary Capability 
An adversary is an agent or set of agents whose aim is to degrade or eliminate 
anonymity.  The adversary capabilities range from weak to strong and represent the 
assumed threat model.  Table 14 lists capabilities, their type and a brief description.  The 
next sections explain each capability further. 
Table 14: Adversary Capability 
Capability Type Description 
Reachability Global Omnipresent 
 Local Limited omnipresent 
Attackability Passive/External Compromise links 
 Active/Internal Compromise nodes 
Adaptability Static A priori knowledge 
 Dynamic Posterior knowledge 
 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
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4.2.1 Reachability. 
Reachability is either global or local.  A global adversary is omnipresent and has full 
access to the entire network of nodes and links.  A local adversary has limited 
omnipresence and has full access to only a portion of the network nodes and links.  This 
corresponds to the adversary possessing complete or restricted information or knowledge 
about the system.  It may also refer to the veracity of this information.  The adversary 
may either know things to be true or only believe things to be true. 
4.2.2 Attackability. 
Attackability is the combination of passive/external or active/internal.  The objective 
of any attack is to link sender and receiver, identify the sender or receiver for a particular 
message, trace a sender forward/receiver back to messages or disrupt the system.   
A passive/external adversary is an outsider that can only observe messages traversing 
the network and is typically invisible.  This adversary can only compromise 
communication channels between nodes.  In other words, it is a non-empty set of agents, 
part of the surrounding of the anonymous system and capable of compromising links.  
An active/internal adversary is an insider and may alter messages traversing the 
network but is visible.  This adversary controls nodes in the network.  In other words, this 
describes a non-empty set of agents which are part of the anonymous system and capable 
of participating in normal communications and controlling at least some nodes.   
4.2.3 Adaptability. 
Adaptability describes whether the adversary or the anonymous system is static or 
dynamic.  Typically, the adversary is dynamic and collects information about the path 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 145 - 
selection algorithm, its parameters and as much information as possible about network 
activities from compromised nodes and links.  The adversary uses all available facts to 
infer who sent or received which messages in a computationally bounded or even 
unbounded manner.  The adversary may behave deterministically with a scheduled plan 
of attack, probabilistically depending on the relative frequency of sequences of observed 
actions or events, or non-deterministically (unpredictably).  The adaptability of the 
anonymous system determines if or how much information is leaked to the adversary.  A 
static system keeps adversary knowledge about the network and agent targets constant 
during and after an attack.  The adversary retains only a priori knowledge.  A dynamic 
system may attempt to counter an adversary’s ongoing attack but may allow the 
adversary to learn additional information and update knowledge about the network and 
agent targets.  So the adversary’s a posterior knowledge may be greater than a priori 
knowledge.  The network types are described next. 
4.3 Network Types 
Anonymous networks exist as either wired or wireless.  Anonymous communications 
networks typically vary in routing scheme, transmission medium, topology, and protocol 
implementation which affect the adversarial threat.  Hence, providing anonymity in each 
network requires a different approach particularly when mobility is involved.  Table 15 
outlines each type, its subtypes, related routing, and a brief description. Wired 
anonymous network classification is examined first, followed by wireless anonymous 
network classification. 
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Table 15: Network Types 
Type Sub-type Routing Description 
Wired Path Topology Cascade Fixed path length 
  Free Variable path length 
  P2P Dynamic path length 
 Route Scheme Unicast One-to-one only 
  Multicast One-to-many 
  Broadcast One-to-all 
  Anycast One-to-one among possible many 
 Path Type Simple No cycles 
Wireless Topology-based Reactive Identity-based, on-demand, high mobility 
  Proactive Identity-based, table-based, low mobility 
  Hybrid Combined reactive/proactive 
 Position-based Reactive Identity-free, on-demand, high mobility 
  Proactive Identity-free, table-drives, low mobility 
   Hybrid Combined reactive/proactive 
 
4.3.1 Wired. 
Wired networks are decomposed into path topology, route scheme, and path type 
strategies.  Each strategy assumes static a priori topology knowledge of the anonymous 
network for the duration of an adversary’s attack. 
The Path Topology routing approaches are cascade and free route for mixnets 
[SaP06] or distributed for P2P networks as mentioned in Chapter 2.  In a cascade 
network, senders choose from a set of fixed paths through the anonymous network for 
message transfer.  Cascades are unicast and may provide greater anonymity against an 
adversary who has compromised many nodes but are more vulnerable to blending 
attacks.  Further, cascade networks have lower maximum anonymity [DaR03].  The 
anonymity set is limited to the number of messages the weakest node in the cascade can 
handle [DaR03].  In free route or P2P networks, senders may choose a route of variable 
length through the network for message transfer.  In free route or peer-to-peer networks, 
senders choose a route of variable length x through the anonymous network to transfer 
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the message to the receiver.  The path length L is a random variable conforming to a 
specific probability distribution.  For instance, one strategy might use a geometric path-
length distribution [GuF04].  Given the forwarding probability pf, the randomly chosen 
path length is a nonnegative number conforming to the geometric distribution 
        
Another strategy uses a uniform path-length distribution [GuF04].  Given the lower 
bound a and upper bound b, the randomly chosen path length is a nonnegative number 
between a and b following a uniform distribution 
     
1{ } ,= = ≤ ≤
−
P L x a x b
b a
 
Free-route networks have higher maximum anonymity up to a certain path length 
[DaR03].  The anonymity set is larger because no single node acts as a bottleneck; hence, 
many nodes handle traffic in parallel as messages traverse the network [DaR03].  Once 
path length is determined, the path is chosen by randomly selecting intermediate nodes. 
The Route Scheme is a major factor affecting anonymity.   Practically all in-depth 
research on wired anonymity networks assumes a unicast routing strategy.  Exceptions 
include the DC-Net, P5, Hordes [LeS02], MAM, and Cashmere [ZhZ05].  
Two Path Type approaches are simple and complex [GuF04].  In a simple path, no 
cycles are allowed.  Intermediate nodes may only appear once on the path.   In a complex 
path, cycles are allowed.   In one strategy, the cycles may be disjoint.  These cycles share 
no common nodes.  Only intermediate nodes at the starting and ending point of a cycle 
can appear exactly twice on the path.   In another, the cycles are arbitrary.  The path 
begins and ends with the same node but intermediate nodes appear arbitrarily. 
 { } (1 ) , 0.f f xP L x p p x= = − ≥
(53) 
(52) 
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4.3.2 Wireless. 
The Wireless Network Type is decomposed into topology-based and position-based.  
Topology-based protocols use information about links in the network to perform packet 
forwarding.  Position-based routing protocols use geographical node position information 
to make routing decisions.  A mobile wireless node typically broadcasts to neighboring 
nodes so no route scheme is strictly necessary when classifying anonymous wireless 
networks.  Either routing protocol may be classified as proactive, reactive, or hybrid.  
Proactive protocols periodically exchange control messages to make routing adaptations 
in the network.   The control messages may be sent locally to discover neighbor nodes or 
more distributed to obtain topology information from all network nodes.  Either way, a 
route is known in advance.  Reactive protocols do not discover routes in advance but 
rather attempt to find routes on-demand and routes request packet across the network 
prior to sending any data.  Hybrid or “zone” protocols use a mix of both proactive and 
reactive routing techniques at the network node.  No one routing protocol is universally 
applicable.   
4.4 Anonymous Network Taxonomy Results 
The cubic taxonomy (CT) can classify state-of-the-art anonymous network protocols.  
The utility of CT is demonstrated two ways.  First, using the three-dimensional (3D) 
cubic taxonomy, a select few anonymous protocols are compared with all three 
components.  Second, using a two-dimensional (2D) tree taxonomy, over thirty-three 
anonymous protocols are examined via the Anonymity Property and Network Type 
components only.  It is believed this is the most comprehensive classification of wired 
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protocol family relationships and first known to capture wireless protocol family 
relationships.  It is also the first graphical synthesized classification of both wired and 
wireless anonymous networks.   
4.4.1 3D Cubic Taxonomy. 
A novel 3D cubic taxonomy is developed to classify the desired anonymity 
properties, presumed adversary capabilities and selected network types inherent in an 
anonymous communications network.  This top-level cubic taxonomy (CT) is shown in 
Figure 38.   
         
Figure 38: 3D Cubic Taxonomy (Top-Level) 
 
The top-level contains three fundamental components: Anonymity Property, 
Adversary Capability, and Network Type.  Anonymity Property addresses “What 
information must be hidden?”  Hiding identity, relationship, location and/or other items 
of interest (IOI) from others in the anonymous network is typical.  Adversary Capability 
addresses “From whom do we hide it?” and defines who the assumed adversary is and 
how strong the threat to the anonymous system is.  Network Type addresses “How 
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hidden must it be?” by defining routing schemes, the transmission medium, network 
topology, and protocol interdependencies impact on anonymity.  These three components 
are further decomposed as shown in Figure 39.  
 
 
Figure 39: Cubic Taxonomy (CT) Components 
 
At this mid-level, the Anonymity Property is broken down into the abstract 
unidentifiability and unlinkability terms.  The Adversary Capabilities are broadly 
categorized as reachability, attackability, and adaptability.  Finally, Network Type is 
either wired or wireless.  These seven sub-components are further decomposed into their 
twenty-eight (28) “atomic” subcomponents.   
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The bottom-level consists of seven anonymity properties, six adversary capabilities 
and five network types decomposable into fifteen network sub-strategies.  This is the first 
known 3D synthesized graphical classification of both wired and wireless anonymous 
networks.   
The purpose of CT is to visually compare different anonymous network protocols and 
group them into identifiable protocol families.  The taxonomy is used to classify a variety 
of wired and wireless anonymous networks.  For instance, DC-Net, Crowds [DiM04, 
ReR98], and  Tor [DiM04, Fra06] anonymous networks are compared in Figure 40.  
For AP, each offers SA and RA against specific adversaries; in addition, Tor offers 
CA.  For AC, DC-net assumes a strong passive global threat model whereas Crowds and 
Tor assume a weaker local adversary threat model.  However, the latter two offer some 
degree of anonymity against an active, dynamic adversary who may control a limited 
number of collaborating jondos or compromised onion routers as well as selective passive 
traffic analysis attempts.  For NT, all three are wired networks; however Tor employs a 
free route path topology whereas DC-Net and Crowds are P2P.  DC-Net also uses a 
broadcast route scheme whereas Crowds and Tor use unicast and allow complex path 
types.  Hence, formally analyzing similar anonymous protocols such as Crowds and Tor 
which offer anonymous web-surfing may prove to be an intriguing investigation.  
However, if two protocols are conceptually very different such as DC-Net and Tor, then 
any comparison would be difficult or simply invalid.  
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Figure 40: Cubic Taxonomy of Wired Anonymous Protocols 
 
The Secure Distributed Anonymous Routing (SDAR) [BoE04] and Zone-based 
Anonymous Routing Protocol (ZAP) [WuB05] anonymous network protocols are 
compared in  Figure 41. 
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Figure 41: Cubic Taxonomy of Wireless Anonymous Protocols  
 
In terms of NT, both are wireless networks; however ZAP is a hybrid, position-based 
protocol that uses destination flooding where as SDAR is a hybrid, topology-based 
protocol that uses multicast.  In terms of AC, both assume a local, passive/external 
adversary; however, adaptability for ZAP may be static with a fixed receiver anonymous 
zone or dynamic with an adaptive receiver anonymous zone.  Attackability may be 
active/internal for SDAR, but only passive/external for ZAP.  In terms of AP, both offer 
SA and RA.  Hence, formally representing these two protocols and/or quantitatively 
comparing their anonymity preservation and degradation may prove to be fruitful.  In the 
end, a family of anonymous networking protocols may be more closely and rigorously 
analyzed. 
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4.4.2 2D Tree Taxonomy. 
 
The 2D tree-based taxonomy is shown in Figure 42.   
 
 
Figure 42: Tree Taxonomy with Anonymity Types 
 
The internal tree structure from the Anonymous Network root node down to Protocol 
Name and Protocol Acronym nodes correspond to the Network Type classification 
displayed in Table 15.  The leaf nodes represent the Anonymity Types specified in 
column 2 of Table 13.  The overall classification of seventeen wired anonymous network 
protocols is shown in Figure 43.   
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Figure 43: Classification of Wired Anonymous Networks 
 
This taxonomy classifies classic and state-of-the-art wired anonymous networks.  It 
adds path type and routing scheme classification and fills in the previously lacking P2P 
overall classification.  Referring to the specific wired protocols as described in Section 
2.3.1, Anonymizer, JAP, Onion-Routing I, PipeNet, and Freedom Network use cascade 
topologies.  Onion-Routing II, Cyberpunk, Mixmaster, and Mixminion free-route 
topologies.  Tarzan, Crowds, WonGoo, Hordes, MAM, DC-net, P5, Herbivore, and 
Cashmere are P2P protocols.  Herbivore uses a broadcast strategy whereas P5 employs a 
tree broadcast strategy.  Hordes and MAM use a multicast strategy.  Only Cashmere uses 
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an anycast strategy.  All but Onion Routing II, Crowds and WonGoo use a simple path 
type strategy.  Crowds and WonGoo allow a complex arbitrary cycle path type.  PipeNet, 
Freedom, Crowds, and WonGoo offer sender anonymity only.  Onion Routing II, 
Mixminion, Tarzan, and P5 offer classical anonymity of sender, receiver and 
communication anonymity.  Herbivore does also if the receiver is inside the anonymous 
network.  This 2D taxonomy is a valid classification of wired anonymous networks since 
Cyberpunk, Mixmaster, and Mixminion form a single protocol family under the 
Anonymity Network  Wired  FreeRoute  Unicast  Simple classification.  This 
matches the recent and complementary Anonymity  Mixnet  Freeroute  
Asynchronous  Remailer classification [SaP06].  However, this new taxonomy 
classifies more wired networks such as Cashmere, MAM and WonGoo and classifies P2P 
networks in addition to classical mixnets.   
The overall classification of sixteen wireless anonymous network protocols is shown 
in Figure 44.  This is the first known classification of wireless anonymous networks into 
protocol families.  Referring to Section 2.3.2, AnonDSR, ARM, ODAR, HANOR, 
AMUR, ASRPAKE, SDAR and MASK are topology-based protocols.  ANODR, SDDR, 
ASR, AODPR, AO2P, SAS, ASC, and ZAP are position-based protocols.  SDAR, 
MASK and ZAP use the hybrid approach whereas the others use a reactive approach.  All 
but SDAR, AnonDSR, ARM, HANOR, MASK, and ZAP offer location anonymity.  
ODAR, ASR, AODPR, MASK, and ASC claim to offer sender, receiver, 
communications and location anonymity.  Only HANOR offers group anonymity.   
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Figure 44: Classification of Wireless Anonymous Networks 
 
The wireless protocol family classification offers a high-level view of the state-of-the-art 
wireless anonymous networks and corresponding anonymity properties.   
4.5 Summary 
This chapter describes an innovative CT to facilitate the systematic definition and 
comprehensive classification of anonymity of wired and wireless anonymous 
communications networks.  The taxonomy considers seven desired anonymity properties, 
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six assumed adversary capabilities, and fifteen special network types.  An expanded cubic 
anonymity definition is proposed and an assumed adversary capability is described.  The 
wired and wireless network types are further refined.  Finally, the cubic and tree-based 
taxonomies with state-of-the-art existing or proposed anonymous networks is given.   
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V. Anonymous Metrics Analysis and Results 
5.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of a synthesized quantified approach on measuring 
the changes in anonymity levels for a large variety of wired and wireless anonymous 
networks.  This rest of this section is organized as follows.  Section 5.1 describes the 
basic concepts in network and data anonymity.  Four basic anonymity metrics used for 
data and/or network anonymity is covered in Section 5.2.   Section 5.3 describes two 
database and one network data anonymity metric.  In Section 5.4, three network-based 
metrics are explored.  A qualitative comparison of all the metrics with respect to 
applicability, complexity, and generality is described in Section 5.5.   Finally, Section 5.6 
concludes the chapter and emphasizes the need for more anonymity metrics. 
 
5.1 Anonymity Concepts 
The anonymity metrics herein rely on probability and other theories.  For clarity, 
pertinent concepts on network-based and data-based anonymity are reviewed and an 
intuitive example for each is provided.  To ensure continuity with previous work, 
particular notation for each metric has been preserved whenever possible.   
5.1.1 Network-based Metrics. 
     An example of message senders communicating with receivers over an anonymous 
network is shown in Figure 45.  The set of senders is = {A,B,C}S  and set of receivers is
= {D,E,F}R .  More abstractly, either set may be the anonymity set (AS) [PfK00] and both 
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Figure 45: Anonymous Network Example 
 
are sets of agents who perform some specific action.  The type of underlying anonymous 
network often determines which metric is used.  The anonymity properties measured in 
fixed networks include sender, receiver, and communication anonymity.  Sender 
anonymity prevents a particular message from being linked to a particular sender identity.  
If the attacker believes the message sent to receiver E may be from any sender, then 
sender anonymity is preserved.  Receiver anonymity prevents a particular message from 
being linked to a particular receiver identity.  If the attacker knows that E received the 
sent message, then receiver anonymity is eliminated.  Communication anonymity means 
a particular message cannot be linked to any sender-receiver pair and no message is 
linkable to a particular sender-receiver pair.  If the attacker does not know the message 
sender but knows E received the message, the message sender-receiver relationship 
cannot be definitely established.  However, communication anonymity is degraded since 
the attacker is able to exclude receivers D and F.  In this case, the AS is the set of sender-
receiver pairs (AS=SxR).  For mobile networks, the additional anonymity property of 
location anonymity is quantified to ensure sender, receiver, and communication 
anonymity.  Location anonymity means a particular message is not linkable to any sender 
or receiver location, motion, route or topology information.   
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5.1.2 Data-based Metrics. 
In privacy-preserving data publishing, sensitive attributes often lead to information 
leakage.  Let table T = {t1, t2, … tn} contain a subset B = {b1, b2, ... bj} of the set of all 
attributes A = {a1, a2, ... az}.  The value of attribute ai for tuple t is t[ai].  Table 16 
displays a sample network data table T that logs web search queries where  z = 7, j = 4 
and B = {IP Address, Date, Time, Query}.  The set of sensitive attributes, S, are values 
that must be protected from an attacker.  For instance, the Query attribute should be 
disassociated from the identifying IP Address attribute.  The other set of attributes 
 
Table 16: Original Network Data Table Example (T) 
 IP Address Date Time Query 
1 96.234.69.21 2008-10-21 2345 Aids medicine 
2 222.154.155.175 2008-10-21 2344 m-invariant 
3 96.234.68.25 2008-10-20 2342 Cook book 
4 96.234.69.21 2008-10-20 2341 Aids medicine 
5 222.154.155.175 2008-10-15 2333 l-diversity 
6 96.234.68.25 2008-10-13 2329 Cook book 
7 96.234.68.25 2008-10-09 2327 t-closeness 
 
are non-sensitive attributes, NS = {Date, Time}.  A set of non-sensitive attributes that can 
be linked with external information to de-anonymize one or more agents in the table T 
constitute a quasi-identifier set such as QI = {IP Address}.  Thus, an anonymizing 
algorithm sanitizes table T to an anonymized table T* to prevent the attacker from 
discovering identifying information or relationships.   A set of indistinguishable tuples 
with respect to specific identifying attributes is called an equivalence class, E, and 
corresponds with the anonymity set, AS, in the previous anonymous network example. 
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5.2 Basic Metrics 
An anonymity metric quantifies how well the anonymization technique hides agent’s 
identities or relationships against a specific attacker.  Many of the metrics in the literature 
expand upon one or more of these four basic metrics.   
5.2.1 Anonymity Set Size (ASS). 
 Anonymity set size (or analogously, equivalence class set size for data privacy) is a 
simple way to measure anonymity in an anonymized table or anonymous network.  If the 
attacker knows the number of agents N prior to an attack (prior to release of the published 
network data and using background knowledge only) and compromises or eliminates C 
agents during the attack (after receiving the anonymized table T*), the anonymity set size 
n = N – C quantifies the level of anonymity achieved.  Figure 46 depicts this metric in 
terms of sender anonymity. 
 
Figure 46: Anonymity Set Size Metric (n).  N = 6, C = 3, n = 3. 
 
The attacker’s chances of identifying the agent’s role of sender or receiver increases 
(decreases) as n decreases (increases).  The attacker is often assumed to be able to 
distinguish between sender and receiver agents; thus, N may refer to the set of potential 
senders, receivers, or sender-receiver pairs, instead of the entire set of agents.  This 
metric's levels of anonymity are in Table 17.   
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Table 17: Anonymity Set Size Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved n = N C = 0 
Degraded 1 < n < N 1 ≤ C < N – 1 
Eliminated n = 1 C = N - 1 
 
  
 If no agents are compromised or eliminated (C = 0), then n is unchanged (n = N) and 
anonymity is preserved.  If at least one agent is compromised or eliminated (1 ≤ C < N-
1), then AS decreases (n < N) and anonymity is degraded.  The worst case is if n = N - C 
= 1 and anonymity is eliminated. 
5.2.2 k-anonymity. 
If only a minimal set size (k) is required, then the k-anonymity metric is used.  k-
anonymity refers to a minimum number of agents or agent pairs the attacker is required to 
keep in AS to preserve anonymity as illustrated in Figure 47.  If the attacker believes at 
least two senders (e.g., A or B) sent the message, then 2-anonymity is achieved. 
 
 
 
Figure 47: k-Anonymity Metric (k) 
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Analogously in the data publishing arena, k-anonymity [Swe02] for a table means that 
for each tuple there are at least k -1 other indistinguishable tuples with respect to a certain 
set of quasi-identifiers.  The resulting generalized anonymity table T* is in Table 18. 
Table 18: Generalized 2-Anonymity Network Data Table (T*) 
 IP Address Date Time Query 
1 96.234.69.** 2008-10-2* 234* Aids medicine 
2 96.234.69.** 2008-10-2* 234* Aids medicine 
3 222.154.155.*** 2008-10-** 23** m-invariant 
4 222.154.155.*** 2008-10-** 23** l-diversity 
5 96.234.68.2* 2008-10-** 23** Cook book 
6 96.234.68.2* 2008-10-** 23** Cook book 
7 96.234.68.2* 2008-10-** 23** t-closeness  
 
This attempts to unlink agent identifying information between the released and external 
tables.  If the attacker believes two or more agents could have made the query for each of 
the three equivalence classes, then 2-anonymity is achieved.  In this example, three 
equivalence classes exist with at least two tuples per class.  However, the equivalence 
class with generalized IP address 96.234.69.** has identical Query attribute values of 
“Aids medicine,” thereby potentially leaking sensitive information.  Hence, it lacks the 
diversity [MaG06] of the other two.  The anonymity levels are indicated in Table 19. 
Table 19: k-Anonymity Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved ≥ k 
Degraded < k 
Eliminated k = 1 
 
 
If AS meets the minimum requirement (≥ k) for all messages or equivalence classes, 
then anonymity is preserved.  If it is below the minimum (< k) for any given message or 
in any equivalence class, then anonymity is degraded.  If the agent identity or relationship 
is identified (k = 1), then anonymity is eliminated.   
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5.2.3 Individual Anonymity Degree (IAD). 
The individual anonymity degree for each agent i in AS at any point in time assigned 
by the attacker is characterized by the scale in Figure 48.   
 
 
Figure 48: Individual Anonymity Degree Scale 
 
The anonymity degrees range from absolute to none.  The top half quantitatively 
expresses anonymity where min(Prj) is the minimum probability for all agents, max(Prj) 
is maximum probability for all agents, and 0θ  is some threshold probability.  The bottom 
have qualitatively describes anonymity degree as mentioned in Section 2.4.2. 
Consider sender anonymity where AS = S, n = 3, and i є AS as shown in Figure 49.   
 
 
Figure 49: Individual Anonymity Degree Metric ( 1
AS∈
=∑ i
i
Pr ) 
 
For each agent i, the attacker assigns a probability Pri such that Pri ≠ 0.  The probabilities 
determine where each agent falls on the anonymity degree scale. 
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On the far left of the scale, absolute privacy means agent i either never sends any 
messages or is not in AS so Prj = 0.  The next four anonymity levels are depicted in 
Figure 50.  The black arrows indicate which sending agents satisfy the corresponding 
anonymity definition. 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Individual Agent Anonymity Degrees 
 
Beyond suspicion means agent i is no more likely to have sent the message than 
anyone else.  In Figure 50(a), this is true of agents A, B, and C since Pri = min(Prj) = ⅓,∀
j є AS.  This is also known as total, perfect, or strongly probabilistic anonymity. 
Probable Innocence means agent i is no more likely to have sent the message than not 
sent the message.  In Figure 50(b), agent A and B are this since PrA = PrB = 0.45 but C is 
beyond suspicion since PrC = min(Prj) = 0.10. 
Possible Innocence means there is a non-trivial chance that an agent other than i sent 
the message.  In Figure 50(c), PrA = max(Prj) > ½ and Prj < PrA.  Both agents B and C are 
possible innocent.  By strict definition, agent C may also be considered beyond suspicion. 
Exposed means there is a significant chance that agent i is the sender of the message 
or Pri = max(Prj) ≥ 0θ , ∀ j є AS.  As Figure 50(d) shows, agent A is exposed. 
Provably Exposed means the attacker knows agent i sent the message or Pri = 1 and 
Prj = 0, ∀ j є AS, i ≠ j.  This metric’s anonymity levels are summarized in Table 20. 
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Table 20: Individual Anonymity Degree Levels 
Level Metric Name Metric Value 
Preserved Beyond Suspicion ∀ i,j (Pri = Prj), i ≠ j 
Degraded Probable/Possible Innocence ∃ i,j ((Pri > Prj) ∧  (Pri < 0θ )), i ≠ j 
Eliminated (Provably) Exposed ∃ i ( 0θ ≤ Pri ≤ 1) 
 
Anonymity is preserved if all agents have equal probability (∀ i,j (Pri = Prj), i ≠  j) or are 
Beyond Suspicion. If agent probabilities differ ( ∃ i,j ((Pri > Prj) ∧  (Pri < 0θ )), i ≠  j) or one or 
more agents are deemed innocent, then anonymity is degraded.  If any agent ever 
becomes Exposed ( ∃ i ( 0θ ≤ Pri ≤ 1)), then anonymity is eliminated. 
5.2.4 Entropy Anonymity Degree. 
 Entropy anonymity degree [DiC02, SeD02] quantifies the level of uncertainty 
inherent in a set of data in units of bits.  The information-theoretic metric(s) measure how 
random the probability distribution is and considers the global anonymity of the system 
or table. 
Entropy H(X) involves an aggregation of the individual probabilities Pri.  The 
attacker’s a priori knowledge is H(X) as shown in Section 2.4.3, (1).   The attacker’s 
posterior knowledge is measured by the conditional entropy H(X|C) as shown in Section 
2.4.3, (2).   
The higher the entropy, the more uncertain the attacker is about agent identity or 
relations.  On an absolute scale, combining the anonymity set size n with entropy at any 
point in time yields the maximum entropy Hmax = log2(N – C) = log2(n).  The lower 
bound of H(X) is zero, but anonymity may be unacceptable at some minimum value Hmin 
> 0.  For example, if agent A is exposed (PrA = 0θ ) and agents B and C are not (PrB = PrC 
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= 01
2
θ− ), then Hmin = 00 0 02( )
θθ θ θ2 2
1--(( 1- log ) + ( log )) .  On a relative scale, H0 = H(X) is any 
initial acceptable entropy value prior to a cyber attack (H0 ≤ Hmax) and H1 = H(X|C) is the 
entropy value after a cyber attack.  Table 21 shows entropy anonymity levels. 
Table 21: Entropy Anonymity Degree Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved  H0 ≤ H1 ≤ Hmax 
Degraded Hmin< H1 < H0 
Eliminated 0 ≤ H1 ≤ Hmin 
 
Anonymity is preserved if the attacker’s posterior knowledge falls within the 
acceptable range (H0 ≤ H1 ≤ Hmax).  Anonymity is degraded if the attacker’s posterior 
knowledge is lower than the a priori knowledge but above acceptable levels (Hmin< H1 < 
H0).  Finally, anonymity is eliminated if H1 falls below acceptable levels (H1 ≤ Hmin).  An 
extension of entropy is called normalized entropy anonymity degree where .1
0
= H
H
d   The 
anonymity levels for d are shown in Table 22.   
 
Table 22: Normalized Entropy Anonymity Degree Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved d  ≥ 1 
Degraded 0 < d < 1 
Eliminated d ≈ 0 
 
 
If d  ≥ 1, anonymity is preserved, otherwise anonymity is degraded. If d ≈ 0, anonymity is 
eliminated.   
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5.3 Network-based Metrics 
Network anonymity metrics measure the change in anonymity of communicating 
agent’s identities or relationships against a specific attacker.  Besides the more common 
anonymity set size and entropy network metrics, other specialized metrics are geared 
toward specific anonymous communications protocols.  Three of these metrics are 
described next.  
5.3.1 Combinatorial Anonymity Degree (CAD). 
The combinatorial anonymity degree [EdS07] is a complementary system-wide 
measure based on the permanent of a matrix.  The measure reveals the whole 
communication pattern between senders and receivers in a delay-bounded real-time 
anonymous mix network and measures communication anonymity shown in Figure 51. 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Combinatorial Anonymity Degree Metric (d(P)) 
 
 
Instead of assigning individual agent probabilities to sending or receiving agents, link 
probabilities Pri,j where i є S and j є R are evaluated for the entire anonymous mix 
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network.  The matrix P of link probabilities for the sample anonymous network is shown 
in Figure 52.   
A,D A,E A,F
B,D B,E B,F
C,D C,E C,F
Pr Pr Pr
Pr Pr Pr
Pr Pr Pr
 
 
  
 
=P
 
Figure 52: Attacker Constructed Doubly-Stochastic Matrix P 
 
 
The permanent of the matrix per(P) is 
1
( ) ( , ( ))
n
i
per P P i i
π
π
=
=∑∏
                       
 
where ( )iπ  is the a priori probability and per(P) is bounded by the inequality n!/nn ≤ 
per(P) ≤ 1 [Fal05].  The system-wide strength of the anonymous network is     
.


0  =1
log(per( )) >1!log( )
d( ) = 
n
P nn
P
nn                            
 
Thus, anonymity degree is the ratio of the log of the matrix permanent over the log of the 
lower bound of the a priori probability.  The anonymity levels are displayed in Table 23.   
Table 23: Combinatorial Anonymity Degree Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved d(P) = 1 
Degraded 0 < d(P) < 1 
Eliminated d(P) = 0 
 
When per(P) = n!/nn, perfect anonymity is achieved (d(P) = 1) otherwise a lower 
level of anonymity is achieved (d(P) < 1).  With only one sender and receiver pair (n = 1) 
in AS, no anonymity exists (d(P) = 0).   
 (54) 
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5.3.2 Zone-based Receiver k-anonymity (ZRK). 
The zone-based receiver k-anonymity metric [XiB05] addresses receiver location 
protection in positioning routing protocols.  A sender generates an anonymity zone (AZ) 
with center x and radius RAZ for each receiver as shown in Figure 53.  The forwarding 
 
 
Figure 53: Zone-based Receiver k-Anonymity Metrics (Pr[n ≥ k-1], Pk(t)) 
 
agents in the network deliver the message to a proxy, in this case agent D, who 
broadcasts the message to all agents in the AZ.   
Fixed and adaptive AZ solutions achieve receiver k-anonymity.   For the fixed AZ, the 
sending agent uses an initial large-sized AZ (n0 >> k) where n0 is the initial number of 
agents in the zone.  As time passes, agents move out of the zone and the sender wants to 
keep k or more agents in the zone.  For the adaptive AZ, the sender determines the size of 
AZ (i.e., k nodes) based on agent density and expands AZ based on agent mobility.    The 
fixed zone-based probability metric level uses a binomial formula to determine the 
probability of exactly i nodes in the AZ.  The probability of preserving receiver k-
anonymity is 
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where p is the probability the receiver agent stays in AZ and { = }P n i  is the probability 
that i agents (k-1 other agents) stay in the AZ.  The adaptive zone-based probability 
metric has initial radius R0 and updates the radius to RAZ to ensure k-anonymity after time 
t1.  Preserving k-anonymity requires the sender to linearly expand the radius as 
AZ 1 1 0 0( ) = ( + ) -R t c t t R     
where R0 = 
π
k
ρ
is the initial radius, t0 = d
-
- ln( )/kt P k  is the time when achieving k-anonymity 
is low (Pk(t) ≤ µ ), 1t  is the time when the radius is expanded, c is the constant R0/t0, RAZ 
(t1) is the expanded radius at time t1, ρ is agent density, and dt
−  is the mean agent time in 
the AZ.  Additionally, Pk(t) is the probability that k agents are in AZ after time t.  Given 
pre-defined probability thresholds µ  and 0µ , anonymity levels for these metrics are in 
Table 24. 
 
Table 24: Zone-based Receiver k-Anonymity Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Fixed Adaptive 
Preserved Pr[n  ≥  k-1]  > µ  if Pk(t) > µ , keep RAZ 
Degraded µ  ≥  Pr[n  ≥  k-1] > 0µ  if Pk(t) ≤ µ , expand RAZ 
Eliminated 
0µ  ≥  Pr[n  ≥  k-1] n/a 
 
5.3.3 Evidence Theory Anonymity (ETA). 
Evidence theory anonymity measures communication anonymity in wireless mobile 
ad-hoc networks.  Evidence is measured by the number of detected packets within a 
given time period.  Probability assignments for all packet delivery paths are generated 
dynamically and overall anonymity quantified in the number of bits.  Figure 54 illustrates 
this metric.  
(57) 
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Figure 54: Evidence Theory Anonymity Metric (D(m)) 
 
 
The attacker can monitor packets to/from zones h1, h2 and h3 and learn the network 
topology.  For instance, with a time period ∆t, the attacker detects exactly one sent packet 
from the hexagon zone h2 corresponding to agent B.  A captured packet is evidence that 
proves communication between two or more mobile nodes.  The attacker computes w(V), 
m(V), Bel(V), and Pl(V) where U and V are ordered sets of agent communicating paths, 
w(V) is the quantity of evidence for two communicating mobile agents, m(V) is the 
probability of an acting communications relation, Bel(V) = Σ U|U⊆V m(U) is a belief 
measure, and Pl(V) = Σ U|U∩V>0 m(U) is a plausibility measure such that Pl(V) ≥ Bel(V). 
To measure uncertainty, the entropy-like measures E(m) = Σ V∈F  m(V) log2 Pl(V) and 
C(m) = Σ V∈F  m(V) log2 Bel(V) are proposed where F is a focal element such that m(V) > 
0.  E(m) is not a satisfactory upper bound anonymity measure since it includes irrelevant 
or conflicting evidence. Instead, the discord function D(m) is used as a generalized 
anonymity measure [Dij06] 
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∑ ∑
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∑  term factors out any irrelevant or conflicting evidence.  D(m) is a 
weighted version of belief measure C(m) where E(m) ≤ D(m) ≤ C(m) holds and measures 
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average anonymity.  Given pre-defined bit thresholds δ  and 0δ , evidence theory 
anonymity levels are listed in Table 25.    
Table 25: Evidence Theory Anonymity Metric Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved D(m)  > δ  
Degraded δ  ≥  D(m)  > 0δ  
Eliminated 
0δ   ≥  D(m) 
 
If D(m) exceeds threshold ,δ  then communication anonymity is preserved.  
Anonymity is degraded if D(m) is bounded between δ  and 0δ .  If it falls at or below 0δ , 
anonymity is eliminated. 
5.4 Data-based Metrics 
The data anonymity metrics provide privacy protection of releasable table-based 
information to third party organizations.  The first two address database anonymity and 
third addresses network data anonymity. All three extend beyond k-anonymity and/or 
entropy anonymity degree. 
5.4.1 l-diversity. 
The l-diversity [MaG06] principle is an extension of entropy with the goal of 
resolving the attribute disclosure limitations of k-anonymity.  Intuitively, for each 
equivalence class E, the sensitive attribute(s) must have l or more well-represented 
values.  Table 26 illustrates a 2-diverse anonymized table.   The {96.243.6*.**, 2008-10-
**, 23**} equivalence class has diversity of three in the sensitive Query attribute with 
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“Aids medicine”, “Cook book” and “t-Closeness”.  The {222.154.155.***, 2008-10-**, 
23**} has two diversity with “m-invariant” and “l-diversity”.   
Table 26: 2-diverse Network Data Table T* 
 IP Address Date Time Query 
1 96.234.6*.** 2008-10-** 23** Aids medicine 
2 96.234.6*.** 2008-10-** 23** Aids medicine 
3 96.234.6*.** 2008-10-** 23** Cook book 
4 96.234.6*.** 2008-10-** 23** Cook book 
5 96.234.6*.** 2008-10-** 23** t-closeness 
6 222.154.155.*** 2008-10-** 23** m-invariant 
7 222.154.155.*** 2008-10-** 23** l-diversity 
 
The three metrics are Distinct l-diversity, Entropy l-diversity, and Recursive (c, l)-
diversity as summarized in Table 27.  Like k-anonymity, distinct l-diversity requires at 
least l-1 different sensitive attribute values in each E.   
 
 
Table 27: l-Diversity Levels for Entire T* Table 
Level Metric Value 
 Distinct Entropy Recursive 
Preserved ≥ l  Hmin(E) ≥  log2l  r1 <  c(rl  + … + rm)  
Degraded < l  n/a n/a 
Eliminated = 1 Hmin(E)  <  log2l  r1 ≥  c(rl  + … + rm)  
 
  
The entropy l-diversity metric H(E) is: 
( , ) ( , )2( ) = - * logH E
∈
∑
s S
p E s p E s
                   
where S is the domain of the sensitive attribute and p(E,s) is the percentage of tuples in E 
with sensitive value s.  Let Hmin(E) denote the minimum entropy for all E, this measures 
the diversity of the entire table T*.  If Hmin(E) ≥ log2l then diversity is preserved, 
otherwise diversity is eliminated.  However, entropy l-diversity is an inadequate measure 
if attribute values occur too frequently.  As an alternative, Recursive (c, l)-diversity 
places an upper limit on the occurrences of the most frequent sensitive attributes value, 
(59) 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 176 - 
r1, within each E.  This limit is a c multiple of the sum of the less frequent values or c(rl + 
rl+1 + … + rm) where m is the number of values in E and ri is the number of occurrences 
of the ith value.  For example, if c = 1 and l = 2 for the first equivalence class in Table 26, 
then m=3 since Query takes on three values.  If the sensitive attribute value is “Aids 
medicine”, then r1=2 and the other occurrences are r2=2 (“Cook book”) and r3=1 (“t-
Closeness”); hence, (1,2)-diversity is preserved since 2 < 6.  However, if “Aids 
medicine” replaced the “Cook book” values, then m=2, r1=4, and r2=1. Since 4 < 1 is 
false, (1,2)-diversity would not be preserved.    The entire T* table is recursive if each 
and every E is recursive. 
5.4.2 t-Closeness. 
To overcome attribute disclosure issues in l-diversity, the t-closeness data privacy 
metric [LiL07] takes into account the semantic relationships among the attributes values.  
In particular, it constrains the difference between sensitive attribute distributions in each 
E and entire table T* to be no more the threshold t.   This makes it more difficult for the 
attacker to gain knowledge from the released anonymized table T*.  
This measure is derived from the well-researched transportation problem of 
transforming one distribution to another with the least amount of total work.   Given two 
discrete distributions P = {p1, p2, …, pm} and Q = {q1, q2, …, qm}, the distance, D, 
between the distributions is: 
1 1
D[ , ]
= =
=∑ ∑
m m
ij ij
i j
d fP Q
 
(60) 
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where dij is the distance between pi and qj and fij is the minimal work flow of mass from 
pi to qj.  The metric differs depending on whether the sensitive attribute is numerical or 
categorical.  If numerical, then ri =  pi – qi and distance metric is: 
1 1
1D[ , ]
1
| |.j ii m j
i j
r
m
==
= =
=
− ∑ ∑P Q  
If categorical, the equal distance metric is:
 
D[ , ] ( ).
i i
i i
p q
p q
<
= − −∑P Q
 
Whichever metric is used, Table 28 shows t-closeness levels. 
Table 28: t-Closeness Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) Levels 
Level Metric Value 
Preserved 0 ≤ D[P,Q]  ≤ t  
Degraded n/a 
Eliminated t  < D[P,Q]  ≤ 1 
 
t-closeness is preserved if the attacker’s posterior knowledge falls within the 
acceptable range ( D[ , ]P Q ≤ t) and is eliminated if D[ , ]P Q
 
goes above t.  The main 
advantage of t-closeness is, unlike l-diversity, it can measure anonymization techniques 
other than generalization and suppression.  Another metric related to t-closeness but 
which further constraints the variability of the sensitive attribute values to be m or greater 
is m-invariance [XiT07].  It accounts for the anonymity of dynamic and re-releasable 
datasets as opposed to static, one-time releasable datasets.  
5.4.3 L1 Similarity. 
L1 Similarity [CoW08] quantifies anonymity by computing the difference between an 
anonymized object, X, and unanonymized object, Y.  Both objects X and Y have 
(61) 
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extractable distributional features.  For example, object X may be a k-anonymous,            
l-diverse, or t-closeness network table T* and object Y is the known universe of all 
network data tables.  The attacker wants to compare feature distributions and reveal the 
identity of the anonymized object.  This information theoretic metric, sim(X,Y), is the 
maximum L1 distance minus the sum of the absolute differences or 
 
.
z X Y
P P
∈ ∪
∑( ) = 2 - | ( = ) - ( = ) |sim X,Y X z Y z  
   
The anonymity levels of the metrics are summarized in Table 29.  
Table 29: L1 Similarity Levels 
Level Metric Value Distributions 
Preserved  sim(X,Y) = 2 Identical 
Degraded simmin < sim(X,Y) < 2 Different 
Eliminated 0 ≤ sim(X,Y)  ≤ simmin Disjoint 
 
Anonymity is preserved if the objects have identical distributions and the maximum 
value is obtained, sim(X,Y) = 2.  Hence, the attacker is unable to gain additional 
knowledge from the released anonymized network data table.  Anonymity is eliminated if 
the objects have nearly disjoint distributions and the attacker gains complete or 
substantial knowledge of identities and relationships beyond some acceptable threshold 
simmin.  More realistically, the two distributions are likely to be different allowing the 
attacker to gain some additional knowledge.  And this similarity metric quantifies exactly 
how similar or anonymous the network data table is and allows the comparison of various 
anonymization techniques on the same original network data table. 
 
(63) 
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5.5 Metric Comparison 
This section provides a high-level comparison of the metrics in terms of applicability, 
complexity, and generality.  The definitions of each of the terms are reviewed and the 
metrics are evaluated. 
The metric applicability may be data, network, or any.  A data metric measures 
content privacy in one-time or repeated releasable datasets.  The anonymization 
technique is usually an algorithmic sanitization of data through generalization and/or 
suppression.  A network metric focuses on communications privacy over wired or 
wireless networks.  Randomization is the most common technique employed to make 
traffic patterns more indistinguishable.  Some metrics may apply to both data and 
communications privacy and use a variety of anonymity techniques.  Table 30 lists the 
applicability definition. 
Table 30: Applicability Definition 
Value Privacy Protected Anonymity Technique 
Data Data Privacy for network/other domain 
releasble datasets 
Generalization 
(Algorithmic Sanitization) 
Network Communciations  Privacy over fixed or 
wireless networks 
Randomization 
(Network Routing Perturbation) 
Any Data/Communications Privacy Generalization/Supression/Randomization 
 
The metric complexity may be low, medium, or high.  If low, the metric is a simple 
integer value.  If medium, individual or aggregated probabilities are computed.  If high, 
one or more functions are computed to arrive at the anonymity measure.  Table 31 lists 
the complexity definition. 
 
Table 31: Complexity Definition 
Value Description 
Low An integer-valued metric 
Medium Involves assigning multiple probabilities and/or calculating an overall anonymity value 
High Requires computation of multiple functions 
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The metric generality is low, medium, or high.  If low, the metric either is or has been 
efficiently applied to real data or network anonymity research.  However, it may be 
protocol dependent and not be useful elsewhere.  If high, it is abstract enough to be used 
across multiple domains.  If medium, a trade-off between utility and mathematical rigor 
has been made.   The generality definition is revealed in Table 32. 
 
Table 32: Generality Definition 
Value Description 
Low Practical and efficient but limited to specific network logs or anonymous protocols 
Medium Balanced trade-off between practicality and mathematical rigor 
High Theoretically sound and useful for both data and communications privacy across multiple 
domains 
 
A high-level qualitative assessment of the applicability, complexity, and generality of 
the anonymity metrics is in Table 33.   
 
Table 33: Comparison of Anonymity Metrics 
Metric Applicability Complexity Generality 
ASS Any Low High 
k-Anonymity Any Low High 
Entropy Any Medium High 
l-Diversity Data Medium Medium 
t-Closeness Data High Medium 
L1 Similarity Data Medium High 
IAG Network Medium Medium 
CAD Network High Medium 
ZRK Network High Medium 
ETA Network High High 
 
This table should spark much discussion among researchers and organizations 
interested in measuring anonymity levels in their own networks and protocols.  Metrics 
with “any” applicability are anonymity set size, k-anonymity, and entropy.   Only one 
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metric, L1 similarity, focused exclusively on network data applicability.  With high 
generality, this may be a good candidate metric for further exploration and comparison of 
network data anonymization techniques.  Interestingly, the metrics with a high 
computational complexity tend to also decrease in generality.  What this may suggest is a 
more precise metric for each specific network data anonymization technique may be 
required.  This underscores the fact that more network anonymity metrics are required. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter comprehensively looks at ways to quantify anonymity.  It conveyed, in a 
creative and consistent manner, state-of-the-art metrics to analyze the preservation, 
degradation, and elimination of anonymity relevant in discovering more network data 
anonymization specific metrics.  First, the terminology and instructive examples were 
given for both data and network anonymity.   Second, four common anonymity metrics of 
anonymity set size, k-anonymity, individual anonymity degree, and entropy anonymity 
were discussed.  Third, the l-diversity, t-closeness, and L1 similarity data anonymization 
metrics were highlighted.  It is believe that, the latter similarity metric is the only known 
network data specific measure.  Fourth, the specialized network anonymity metrics of 
combinatorial degree, zone-based receiver k-anonymity, and evidence theory anonymity 
were covered.    Last but not least, a macro-level comparison of the applicability, 
complexity, and generality of each metric was given.  The most prevalent metrics used 
for both data and network anonymization techniques are low in complexity and high in 
generality.  It may possible that multiple metrics are necessary for different network data 
anonymization techniques to give assurances of preserving privacy; thus, the search for 
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an elusive general, practical metric to compare various techniques continues.  
Nonetheless, knowing the available metrics and understanding the subtle changes in 
anonymity levels is essential for any organization determined to better defend against 
data and network attacks through cross-organizational network data sharing and message 
communications.  
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VI. Formal Anonymity Framework Analysis and Results 
 
6.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents an innovative, intuitive Possibilistic Anonymity Logical Model 
(PALM) to rigorously reason about how an adversary can lower the information 
assurance of a system by degrading anonymity.  The model is sufficiently expressive to 
allow a variety of anonymity definitions or anonymity properties to be expressed and 
proved for an anonymous network example.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  The proposed PALM model is 
explained in Section 6.1.  Section 6.2 demonstrates the utility of the PALM model with a 
simple and expanded sender anonymity example.  Model limitations are highlighted in 
Section 6.3.  Finally, Section 6.4 concludes the chapter.  
6.1 Created Mathematical Model 
With the aim to preserve privacy over a communications network, a plethora of 
anonymous protocols have been proposed along with many empirical investigations into 
specific adversarial attacks over those networks.  However, few formal methods have 
been developed and applied to anonymous systems with the goal of modeling how an 
adversary reasons about anonymity.  Indeed, many analyses assume a passive, global 
adversary but fail to provide a rigorous approach for defining and modeling anonymity 
concepts to ensure information and data assurance as is customary when formally proving 
other security aspects of a system.  Hence, this research proposes the Possibilistic 
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Anonymity Logical Model (PALM) for capturing the knowledge and reasoning ability of 
an adversary in an anonymous network.   
Anonymous systems and properties may be expressed using the modal logic syntax 
and semantics as mentioned in Sections 2.5 through 2.8.  For instance, if a passive, global 
adversary attempts to degrade anonymity in a multi-agent system, determining the 
possibility that a particular agent in a set of agents could have performed an action, such 
as sending a message, is of interest.  The adversary wants to reduce the set of possible 
senders to the fewest number while the anonymous system wants to thwart the adversary 
from doing so.  Modal concepts may prove useful in constructing a meaningful definition 
of anonymity for more advanced models.  
6.1.1 PALM Model 
The Possibilistic Anonymity Logical Model (PALM) is a formalism for capturing the 
knowledge and reasoning ability of an adversary in an anonymous network.  PALM 
focuses on the four Halpern and O’Neill logical possibilistic anonymity definitions 
(minimal, up to, total and k-anonymity) in Table 11.  Syntactically, PALM adds a unary 
possible operator, Pj, to KT45n modal logic and four new axiomatic anonymity formulas.  
Semantically, PALM assumes connectivity and best-case or worst-case Kripke possible 
world structures for a single adversary.  The anonymity rules are shown in Table 34.  In 
the first rule, the anonymity set is denoted as IA.  Also, i is any agent and j is the 
adversary.  The last rule precludes the adversary from gaining knowledge directly from 
an honest agent.  Subsequent models are listed in Table 35. 
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Table 34: Anonymity Rules 
Formula Meaning 
 At least one agent sends a dummy message. 
 
 If an agent sends a real message, then the adversary thinks it is possible 
the agent sent a dummy message. 
 If an agent sends a dummy message, then the adversary does not know 
this. 
 
 No agent knows their own sent message type (dummy or real). 
 
6.2 Application of PALM Model 
The utility of PALM is demonstrated using a five scenarios that formally (1) prove 
the validity of each possibilistic anonymity definition and (2) captures the adversary 
epistemic and nondeterministic reasoning ability about anonymity in multi-agent systems.  
To determine if these anonymity formulas are well-formed and able to be semantically 
captured, the KT45n modal logic system and rules are used in a simple and then expanded 
message-sender mystery example. 
  
{| | , , }
( )
= ∈ ≠
∨
A A
G i
I k i I i j
C p
 ( )¬ →
≠
∧
G i j iC p pPi j
 ( )→¬
≠
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Table 35: PALM Anonymity Formulas and Semantic Models 
(n=number of agents, k=anonymity set, r=number of real messages, and d=number of dummy messages) 
Scenario  
Parameters 
Anonymity Rules/ 
Formulas (Γ) 
Best Case Model 
(k and r known) 
Worst Case Model 
(k and r ≥ 1 known) 
I. No 
anonymity 
n = 2,  
k = 1,  
r = 1,  
d = 0 
 
CG(p1 ∨  ¬p1) 
CG(¬p1 → Kj¬p1) 
CG(Pjp1) 
CG(¬K1p1 ∧ P1p1) 
 
  
II. Minimal 
& III. Total 
 
n = 3,  
k = 2,  
r ≤  1,    
1 ≤ d ≤  2 
 
CG(p1 ∨  p2) 
CG(p1→ ¬Kjp1) 
CG(p2→ ¬Kjp2) 
CG(¬p1 → Pjp1) 
CG(¬p2 → Pjp2) 
CG(¬K1p1 ∧ P1p1) 
CG(¬K2p2 ∧ P2p2) 
 
  
IV. Up-to |IA| 
 
n = 4,  
k = 3,  
r ≤  2,    
1 ≤ d ≤  3  
 
CG(p1 ∨  p2∨  p3) 
CG(pi → ¬Kjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬pi → Pjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬Kipi ∧ Pipi) i≠j 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V. k’- to k-
anonymity 
 
n = 6,  
k = 5,  
r = 2,  
d = 3, 
k’ = k/r 
 
CG(p1 ∨  p2) 
CG(p3 ∨  p4∨  p5) 
CG(pi → ¬Kjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬pi → Pjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬Kipi ∧ Pipi) i≠j 
 
 
OR 
 
 
CG(p1 ∨  p2∨ …∨  p5) 
CG(pi → ¬Kjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬pi → Pjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬Kipi ∧ Pipi) i≠j 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   OR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any  
 
k = n-1, 
r ≤ k-1, 
d = k – r 
 
CG(p1∨  …∨ pk) 
CG(pi → ¬Kjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬pi → Pjpi) i≠j 
CG(¬Kipi ∧ Pipi) i≠j 
 
 
 
k possible worlds 
 
 
2k-1 possible worlds 
 
 
 
¬p1 ¬p1 
p1 p2 
p1 p2 
p1, p2  
 
p1 p2 p3 
p1 p2 p3 
 
 
  p2, p3 p1, p3 
   p1, p2, 
      p3 
p1, p2 
p1 p2 
p1 p2 p3 
 
 
 
   p1, p2, 
 p3, p4, p5, 
 
p1, p2, 
p3, p4 p3 p4 p5 
p1 p2 
p3 p4 p5 p4 p5 
    p1 p2     p4 p5 
     p1, p2,       p3 
   p3, p4, 
      p5 
p2, p3, 
p4, p5 
… … 
… 
… 
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6.2.1 Simple Example. 
This is a variation of the wise-men puzzle [HuR04].  There are two message sending 
agents on an anonymous network.  The first is an honest agent.  The second is an 
inquisitive adversary.  The attack is an intersection attack of possibilities.  There are two 
dummy messages and one real message.  The real messages contain identifying 
information.  The dummy messages obscure an agent’s traffic sending patterns.  
Messages may be received in three different ways: DD, DR, and RD where D = dummy 
and R = real and the 1st letter is the message sent by the honest agent while the 2nd letter 
is the message sent by the adversary.  RR is not possible since only one real message 
exists.  The messages are randomly assigned to each agent but neither agent knows their 
own message type.  Each sends their message to the other agent.  The receiving agents 
know the received message type.  Suppose the adversary asks the honest agent “Did you 
send a real message?” The honest agent truthfully says “I don’t know”.  Now the 
adversary knows that he himself sent a dummy message.  “I don’t know” allows the 
adversary to rule out DR.  If the honest agent received an R message from the adversary, 
he would have said “No” instead of “I don’t know” since DR would have been the only 
way this could have been occurred.  This leaves DD and RD; hence, the adversary knows 
he sent a dummy message.   Thus, an adversary learns from and reasons with knowledge 
gained from the honest agent. 
Formally, let A = {1, 2} be the agents, group G = A, and agent j = 2 be the adversary.  
Let pi mean “agent i sent dummy message D”; hence, ¬pi means “agent i sent real 
message R”.  The adversary knowledge and reasoning ability is expressed as logic 
formulas proceeded by the CG operator.  Thus, a single, global, and active adversary is 
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assumed.  The first anonymity rule CG(p1 ∨  p2) means at least one agent will send a 
dummy message; otherwise, no anonymity exists.  The second set of rules CG(p1 →  
K2p1) and CG(¬p1 →  K2¬p1) indicate the adversary knows the received message type.   
Analogously, the third set of rules CG(p2 →  K1p2) and CG(¬p2 →  K1¬p2) mean the 
honest agent also knows the received message type.  Finally, the last rule CG(¬K1p1∧
¬K1¬p1) represents the honest agents response of “I don’t know” my sent message type. 
Let Γ = {CG(p1∨ p2), CG(p1→ K2p1), CG(¬p1→ K2¬p1), CG(p2→ K1p2), CG(¬p2→
K1¬p2)} be the initial common knowledge.  Let B = {CG(¬K1p1 ∧ ¬K1¬p1)} be the 
additional knowledge the adversary learns from the honest agent.  The next step is to 
prove adversary j knows about the dummy message or Kjp2 = K2p2.  Thus, Γ, B |- K2p2. 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
21    
22    
23    
Hence, the adversary knows about the dummy message.  
1 2( )GC p p∨ Premise ( )Γ
1 2 1( )GC p K p→ Premise ( )Γ
1 2 1( )GC p K p¬ ∨ ¬ Premise ( )Γ
2 1 2( )GC p K p→ Premise ( )Γ
2 1 2( )GC p K p¬ ∨ ¬ Premise ( )Γ
1 1 1 1( )GC K p K p¬ ∨¬ ¬ Premise ( )B
GC
2p¬ Assume
2 1 2p K p¬ ∨ ¬ 5GC e
1 2K p¬ e 8,9 (Modus Ponens)→
1K
2p¬ 1 10K e
1 2p p∨ 1GC e
1p 1 12,13e∨
1 1K p 2 11 14K i −
1 1 1 1K p K p¬ ∧¬ ¬ 6GC e
1 1K p¬ 1e 16∧
e 15,17¬
2p¬¬ 8 18i¬ −
2p 19e¬¬
2GC p 7 20GC i −
2GE p 21CE
2 2K p 2 22EK
⊥
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6.2.2 Expanded Example. 
Assume there are n logically omniscient agents, n-1 honest agents and one inquisitive 
adversary, on an anonymous network.  It is common knowledge that there are k sending 
agents where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, zero or more real messages and at most k dummy messages.  It is 
distributed knowledge that up to r real messages are assigned to the k agents where          
r ≤ k-1.  The messages are pseudo-randomly assigned one message per agent such that at 
most r real messages exist.  Neither an agent nor the adversary can distinguish between a 
real or dummy message.  Thus, k agents send messages, no more than r agents send a real 
message and d = k – r agents send a dummy message over the anonymous network.  
Obviously, a larger d enhances sender anonymity.  Each agent sends their respective 
message.  However, the receiver agents do not know the received message type.  The 
adversary must rely on the other agent’s responses, if any, to gain more knowledge and 
degrade anonymity.   
Under the current circumstances, if the adversary repeatedly asks the agents 
simultaneously ‘Do you know if you sent a real message?’, all k agents will repeatedly 
answer ‘no’.   The adversary may also ask “Did you send a message?” to determine 
anonymity set size k.  In the best case, the adversary knows the number of possible real 
messages (i.e., r value(s)) and is able to reason with minimal knowledge (least 
possibilities).  In the worst case, the adversary only knows that zero or more real 
messages are sent (i.e., 0 ≤ r ≤ k-1) and may have to reason with maximum knowledge 
(most possibilities).  In either case, the adversary builds a KT45n semantic PALM model 
and reasons about who sent real messages.  Therefore, sender anonymity is subsequently 
investigated to validate the different degrees of minimal, total, up to |IA| and k-anonymity 
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formulas.  The following five KT45n semantic model scenarios are used to prove the 
anonymity formulas:  
 
Scenario I:  No anonymity, Worst Case ( 2, 1, 1, 0)n k r d= = = =  
Scenario II:   Minimal, Best Case ( 3, 2, 1, 1)n k r d= = = =   
Scenario III:   Total, Worst Case ( 3, 2, 1, 1 2)n k r d= = ≤ ≤ ≤  
Scenario IV:   Up to |IA|, Worst Case ( 4, 3, 2, 1 3)n k r d= = ≤ ≤ ≤  
Scenario V:  k-anonymity, Best Case ( 6, 5, 2, 3)n k r d= = = =  
 
A simplifying assumption is connectedness.  Since the truth of modal properties at a 
world x in a Kripke model in KT45n depends only on worlds reachable from x, only 
connected graphs are considered to avoid concerns about definable properties of non-
connected possible worlds [DaO05].  This corresponds to the Dolev-Yao model [DoY83] 
where all messages go through the adversary.  In the best case(s), models are considered 
where only one or two binary equivalence relations exist for each of the k possible worlds 
x.  In the worst case, models are considered where each 2k-1 possible worlds x is 
reachable from the root and has one or more binary equivalence relation(s).  The 
adversary’s knowledge (Kj) and reasoning ability (equivalence relation, Rj) in the 
anonymous environment are the primary focus.  In all models, the adversary j does not 
send any messages and only attempts to use logic to discover who sent real messages to 
identify sender(s) identity.  Furthermore, pi and ¬pi have the same meaning as the simple 
example.  pi means “agent i sent dummy message D”.  Table 35 summarizes the scenario 
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anonymity parameters, anonymity rules or formulas, and best and worst case semantic 
models.    
In Scenario V, the best case model depends upon how well the adversary partitions 
the agents into anonymity sets or IA’s.  Hence, the agents would enjoy k’- to k-anonymity 
where k’ is the floor of the ratio of anonymous agents to real messages (k/r) if 0r ≠ .  
This is only significant if the adversary is able to subdivide the anonymity set of agents 
into smaller anonymity sets based on previous knowledge or new knowledge gained from 
observing message traffic patterns and/or logical reasoning from the honest agent 
responses. 
6.2.2.1  Scenario I: No Anonymity. 
In this two agent (n = 2) scenario, only a single agent (k = 1) sends a single real 
message (r = 1) and no agents send dummy messages (d = 0); hence, no anonymity exists 
after the message is sent.  However, before the agent sends the real message, as far as the 
adversary knows the agent may send a dummy or real message or CG(p1 ∨  ¬p1) and also 
thinks it is possible for the agent to send a dummy message or CG(Pjp1).  Even in this 
simple model, the inability to distinguish between “before” and “after” is self-evident.  
But it is common knowledge the agent does not know the message type CG(¬K1p1 ∧P1p1).  
After the message is sent, the adversary asks the agent if a message was sent.  The agent 
must say “Yes”.   Since no dummy message is sent (only a real one), it is now common 
knowledge or CG(¬p1).  Of course, one could argue that it is always common knowledge 
since CG(¬p1→ Kj¬p1). 
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Let A = {1, 2} where n = |A| = 2 and adversary j and agent(s) i ∈ A, G = A and 
P(Atoms) = {p1}, then the formal KT452 model ( , ( ) , )i i AW R L∈=M is W = {x}; Rj(x,x); 
L(x) = {p1}.  The graphical PALM model is shown in Figure 55 below.  
 
Figure 55: Scenario I PALM Model (KT45n, n=2) 
 
Only one possible world x exists.  This world is where the agent sends a real message 
or ¬p1.  The model assumes a reflexive accessibility relation for the adversary or Rj(x,x).  
These reflexive relations are assumed and not listed for the subsequent models.  The 
varying degrees of knowledge are listed in Table 36. 
 
Table 36: Scenario I Satisfied Formulas (φ ) (Adversary Knowledge) 
Op x 
p ¬p1 
∧  ¬p1 ∧ ¬p1 
∨  p1∨ ¬ p1 
¬ n/a 
→  p1→ p1, ¬p1→ ¬p1 
 
↔  p1 ↔ p1, ¬p1↔ ¬p1 
Kj ¬p1,   p1∨ ¬ p1, p1→ p1, ¬p1→ ¬p1, p1 ↔ p1,  p1 ↔ p1, ¬p1 ↔ ¬p1 
EG Same as Kj  
CG Same as Kj,  
¬p1→  Kj¬p1, Pjp1, ¬Kjp1 ∧ P1p1 
DG Same as Kj  
 
The adversary’s knowledge (Kj) and common knowledge (CG) consist of the satisfied 
propositional formulas in world x for this model or |x φ=M, .  Using these satisfied 
 
  
 
x 
¬p1 
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formulas, the anonymity formulas Γ and learned knowledge B1, it is possible to validate 
the sequent 1BΓ, |- φ .  First let φ  = Kj¬p1 then let φ  = Pjp1. 
 
Let Γ = {CG(p1 ∨ ¬p1),CG(¬p1→ Kj¬p1),CG(Pjp1)} and B1 = {CG(¬K1p1 ∨ P1p1),CG¬p1}.  
 
 
Therefore, both Kj¬p1 and Pjp1 are valid formulas and no anonymity exists. 
 
Proof: Γ, B1 |- Kj¬p1 is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let Γ = {CG(p1 ∨ ¬p1),CG(¬p1→ Kj¬p1),CG(Pjp1)} and B2 = {CG(¬K1p1∨ P1p1)}. 
 
     Proof: Γ, B2 |- Pjp1 is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
1  CG(p1∨ ¬p1)   Premise (Γ) 
2  CG(¬p1→ Kj¬p1)   Premise (Γ) 
3  CG(Pjp1)    Premise (Γ) 
4  CG(¬K1p1 ∨ P1p1)   Premise (B1) 
5  CG¬p1    Premise (B1) 
 
6      CG 
7  ¬p1    CGe 5 
8  ¬p1→ Kj¬p1   CGe 2 
9  Kj¬p1    → e 7,8 (Modus Ponens) 
10  CG(Kj¬p1)   CGi 9 
  
11  EG(Kj¬p1)   CE 10 
12  KjKj¬p1     EKj 11 
13  Kj¬p1    KT 12 
1  CG(p1∨ ¬p1)   Premise (Γ) 
2  CG(¬p1→ Kj¬p1)   Premise (Γ) 
3  CG(Pjp1)    Premise (Γ) 
4  CG(¬K1p1 ∨ P1p1)   Premise (B2) 
  
5  EG(Pjp1)    CE 3 
6  KjPjp1    EKj 5 
7  Pjp1    KT 6 
 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 194 - 
6.2.2.2  Scenario II: Minimal Anonymity. 
In this scenario of three agents (n = 3), two agents (k = 2) send two messages, one 
real (r = 1) and one dummy (d = 1); hence, minimal anonymity exists for the agents.  The 
adversary commonly knows at least one agent may send a dummy message or CG(p1 ∨  
p2).  It is common knowledge the anonymity rules state if the first or second agent sends a 
real message, the adversary thinks it is possible it is a dummy message or CG(¬p1→ Pjp1) 
and CG(¬p2→ Pjp2), respectively.  Also, if the agents send a dummy message, the 
adversary does not know this or CG(p1→ ¬Kjp1) and CG(p2→ ¬Kjp2).  Neither agent 
knows their own message type either or CG(¬K1p1 ∧P1p1) and CG(¬K2p2 ∧P2p2).  The 
agents make this common knowledge after the adversary asks “Do you know if you sent 
a real message?” 
Let A = {1, 2, 3} where n = |A| = 3 and adversary j and agent(s) i ∈ A, G = A and 
P(Atoms) = {p1, p2}, then the formal KT453 model ( , ( ) , )i i AW R L∈=M is W = {x, y}; 
Rj(x,y); L(x) = {p1}, L(y) = {p2}.  The graphical PALM model is shown in Figure 56 
below.  
       
Figure 56: Scenario II PALM Model (KT45n, n=3) 
 
Two possible worlds exist x and y.  A single reflexive, transitive, and symmetric 
accessibility binary relation for the adversary or Rj(x,y) exists between the worlds.  The 
varying degrees of knowledge are listed in Table 37.  The adversary’s knowledge (Kj) 
x 
 
y 
  p2 
Rj 
p1 
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and common knowledge (CG) consist of the satisfied propositional formulas for each 
world x and y for this model or |x φ=M,  and |y φ=M, .   
 
Table 37: Scenario II Satisfied Formulas (φ ) (Adversary Knowledge) 
Op x y 
p p1, ¬p2 ¬p1, p2 
∧  p1 ∧ ¬p2 ¬p1 ∧ p2 
∨  ¬p1∨ ¬p2 
p1∨  p2 
p1 ∨ ¬ p2 
¬p1∨ ¬p2 
p1∨ p2 
¬p1∨ p2 
¬ ¬(¬p1 ∨ p2)  
¬(p1 ∧ p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ p2) 
¬(p1∨ ¬p2)  
¬(p1 ∧  p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2)  
¬(p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
→  ¬p1→ ¬p2 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
p2→ p1 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
p1→ p2 
¬p1→ p2 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p2→ ¬p1 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
↔  p1 ↔ ¬p2 
¬p1 ↔ p2 
¬p1 ↔ p2 
p1 ↔ ¬p2 
Kj p1∨  p2 
¬p1∨ ¬p2 
¬(p1 ∧ p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
p1∨  p2 
¬p1∨ ¬p2 
¬(p1 ∧ p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
EG p1∨  p2 
¬p1∨ ¬p2 
¬(p1 ∧ p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
p1∨  p2 
¬p1∨ ¬p2 
¬(p1 ∧ p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
CG p1∨  p2                 ¬p1∨ ¬p2               ¬p1 → Pjp1 
¬(p1 ∧ p2)       ¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2)        ¬p2→ Pjp2 
p1→ ¬p2         ¬p1→ p2           ¬K1p1 ∧ P1p1 
¬p2→ p1           p2→ ¬p1          ¬K2p2 ∧ P2p2 
p1 → ¬Kjp1    p2 → ¬Kjp2 
DG Same as Kj Same as Kj 
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Using these satisfied formulas, the anonymity formulas Γ and learned knowledge B, it 
is possible to validate the sequent BΓ, |- φ .  First let φ  = ¬Kjp1, then let φ  = Pjp1.  In the 
first proof, please note that for any model, formulaφ  is satisfiable iff its negation ¬φ  is 
not valid [Gol05].  Let φ  = ¬Kjp1, then ¬Kjp1 is satisfiable iff ¬(¬Kjp1) = Kjp1 is not valid 
in M . 
 
 
Let Γ =            
 and   B =  
 
    
Proof 1:  Γ, B |- ¬Kjp1 is valid.  Minimal formula valid for one agent. 
 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
    
18    
19    
20    
21    
 
  
1 1 1 1( )GC K p P p¬ ∨
1 2( )GC p p∨ Premise ( )Γ
Premise ( )Γ
Premise ( )Γ
1 1( )G jC p K p→¬
Premise ( )Γ
2 2( )G jC p K p→¬
1 1( )G jC p P p¬ ∨
Premise ( )Γ2 2( )G jC p P p¬ →
Premise ( )B
Premise ( )B2 2 2 2( )GC K p P p¬ ∨
1jK p
GC
Assume
jK
1p
1 1jp K p→¬
9KT
2GC e
e 11,12 MP→1jK p¬
10 13iK i −1j jK K p¬
1jK p¬ 14KT
⊥ 9,15e¬
1jK p¬ 9 16i¬ −
1( )G jC K p¬
1( )G jE K p¬
17GC i
1j jK K p¬
18CE
19jEK
1jK p¬ 20KT
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}j j j jG G G G GC p p C p K p C p K p C p P p C p P p∨ →¬ →¬ ¬ → ¬ →
1 1 2 21 1 2 2{ ( ), ( )}.G GC K p P p C K p P p∨ ∨¬ ¬
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   Proof 2:  Γ, B |- Pjp1 is valid. 
 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10   Def.  
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
    
21    
22    
23    
24    
 
6.2.2.3    Scenario III: Total Anonymity. 
In this scenario of three agents (n = 3), two agents (k = 2) send two messages, one 
real (r = 1) and one dummy (d = 1) or no real (r = 0) and two dummy (d = 2); hence, 
minimal and total anonymity exists for the agents.  The adversary commonly knows 
either agent may send a dummy message or CG(p1 ∨  p2).  It is common knowledge that 
the anonymity rules state if the first or second agent sends a real message, the adversary 
thinks it could be a dummy message or CG(¬p1→ Pjp1) and CG(¬p2→ Pjp2), respectively.  
It is common knowledge that if either sends a dummy message, the adversary does not 
1 1 1 1( )GC K p P p¬ ∨
1 2( )GC p p∨ Premise ( )Γ
Premise ( )Γ
Premise ( )Γ
1 1( )G jC p K p→¬
Premise ( )Γ
2 2( )G jC p K p→¬
1 1( )G jC p P p¬ ∨
Premise ( )Γ2 2( )G jC p P p¬ →
Premise ( )B
Premise ( )B2 2 2 2( )GC K p P p¬ ∨
1jP p¬
GC
Assume
jK
1jP p
1j jK P p
1jP p
⊥
1jP p 19e¬¬
1( )G jC P p
1( )G jE P p
20GC i
1j jK P p
21CE
22jEK
1jP p 23KT
1jK p¬¬ ¬
1jK p
9j jP K= ¬ ¬
e 10¬¬
1 1jp P p¬ →
1p¬ 11KT
5GC e
e 13,14 MP→
12 15iK i −
16KT
9,17e¬
8 18i¬ −1jP p¬ ¬
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know this or CG(p1→ ¬Kjp1) and CG(p2→ ¬Kjp2), respectively.  Neither agent knows their 
own message type either or CG(¬K1p1 ∧P1p1) and CG(¬K2p2 ∧P2p2).  The agents make 
this common knowledge after the adversary asks “Do you know if you sent a real 
message?” 
Let A = {1, 2, 3} where n = |A| = 3 and adversary j and agent(s) i ∈ A, G = A and 
P(Atoms) = {p1, p2}, then the formal KT453 model ( , ( ) , )i i AW R L∈=M is W = {x, y, z}; 
Rj(x,y), Rj(y,z); L(x) = {p1}, L(y) = {p1, p2} and L(z) = {p2}.  The graphical PALM model 
is shown in Figure 57 below.  
                   
Figure 57: Scenario III PALM Model (KT45n, n=3) 
 
 
There are three possible worlds; x, y, and z.  There are two reflexive, transitive, and 
symmetric accessibility binary relations for the adversary as well.  The varying degrees of 
knowledge are in Table 38.  The adversary’s knowledge (Kj) and common knowledge 
(CG) consist of the satisfied propositional formulas for each world x, y, and z for this 
model or |x φ=M, , |y φ=M,  and |z φ=M, .  Notice that the adversary knows fewer 
“things” or formulas (see Kj row, 2nd column) in world y compared to worlds x and z.  
What the adversary knows in y is constrained by the two relations to what is known in the 
other two worlds.  Hence, a formula must be satisfied in all three worlds before the 
adversary may know it in world y.   Also notice the reduction in common knowledge 
formulas compared to the previous model.   
 
x 
 
y 
 
z 
  p2 p1,p2 
Rj Rj 
p1 
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Table 38: Scenario III Satisfied Formulas (φ ) (Adversary Knowledge) 
Op x y z 
p p1, ¬p2 p1, p2 ¬p1, p2 
∧  p1 ∧ ¬p2 p1 ∧ p2 ¬p1 ∧ p2 
∨  ¬p1∨ ¬p2 
p1∨  p2 
p1 ∨ ¬ p2 
¬p1 ∨  p2 
p1∨ p2 
p1∨ ¬p2 
¬p1∨ ¬p2 
p1∨ p2 
¬p1∨ p2 
¬ ¬(¬p1∨ p2)  
¬(p1 ∧ p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ p2) 
¬(¬p1 ∨ ¬p2) 
¬(p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
¬(¬p1 ∧ p2) 
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
¬(p1∨ ¬p2)  
¬(p1 ∧  p2)  
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2)  
¬(p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
→  ¬p1→ ¬p2 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
p2→ p1 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
p1→ p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p1→ ¬p2 
p2 → p1 
¬p2→ p1 
¬p2→ ¬p1 
p1→ p2 
¬p1→ p2 
p1→ ¬p2 
¬p2→ ¬p1 
p2→ ¬p1 
¬p2→ p1 
↔  p1 ↔ ¬p2 
¬p1 ↔ p2 
p1 ↔ p2 
¬p1 ↔ ¬p2 
¬p1 ↔ p2 
p1 ↔ ¬p2 
Kj p1 
p1∨  p2 
p1 ∨ ¬p2 
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
¬(¬p1 ∧ p2)  
¬p1→ ¬p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ p1 
p2→ p1 
p1∨ p2 
¬(¬p1 ∨ ¬p2) 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ p1 
 
p2 
p1∨ p2 
¬p1∨ p2 
¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2)  
¬(p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
p1→ p2 
¬p1→ p2 
¬p2→ ¬p1 
¬p2→ p1 
EG Same as Kj  Same as Kj  Same as Kj 
CG p1∨ p2               ¬p1→ p2          ¬(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) 
¬p2→ p1              p1 → ¬Kjp1         p2 → ¬Kjp2 
¬p1 → Pjp1           ¬p2→ Pjp2        ¬K1p1 ∧ P1p1 
¬K2p2 ∧ P2p2 
DG Same as Kj  Same as Kj Same as Kj 
 
 
Using these satisfied formulas, the anonymity formulas Γ and learned knowledge B, it 
is possible to validate the sequent BΓ, |- φ .  The first proof of Minimal anonymity lets φ  
= i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi.  The second proof of Total anonymity lets φ  = i j≠∧ Pjpi.       
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Let Γ = {CG(p1 ∨ p2),CG(pi → ¬Kjpi),CG(¬pi → Pjpi)} and B = {CG(¬Kipi ∨ Pipi)}. 
Proof: Γ, B |- i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi is valid.  Minimal formula valid i∀ agents, i≠j. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  CG(p1∨ p2)   Premise (Γ) 
2  CG(pi → ¬Kjpi)   Premise (Γ) 
3  CG(¬pi → Pjpi)   Premise (Γ) 
4  CG(¬Kipi ∨ Pipi)   Premise (B) 
5   CG 
6       p1∨ p2    Ce 1 
7     p1     Assume 
8  p1→ ¬Kjp1   CGe 2, i = 1 
9  ¬Kjp1    → e 7,8 MP 
10  ¬Kjp1 ∨  ¬Kjp2   ∨ i1 9 
 
11     p2     Assume 
12  p2→ ¬Kjp2   CGe 2, i = 2 
13  ¬Kjp2    → e 11,12 MP 
14  ¬Kjp1 ∨  ¬Kjp2   ∨ i2 13 
 
15  ¬Kjp1 ∨  ¬Kjp2   ∨ e 6,7-10,11-14 
16  i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi   Def. i j≠∨ ¬Kjpi ≡ ¬Kjp1∨ ¬Kjp2  
17  CG ( i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi)   CGi 16 
18  EG ( i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi)   CE 17 
19  Kj ( i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi)   EKj 18 
20  i j≠
∨ ¬Kjpi   KT 19 
 
AFIT/DCS/ENG/09-08 
 - 201 - 
 
 
Therefore, both 
i j≠
∨ Kjpi and i j≠∧ Pjpi are valid formulas and the minimal and total 
anonymity properties hold. 
 
6.2.2.4    Scenario IV: Up-to Anonymity. 
In Scenario IV there are four agents (n = 4), three agents (k = 3) send three messages: 
no real (r = 0) and two dummy (d = 3), one real (r = 1) and two dummy (d = 2), or two 
real (r = 2) and one dummy (d = 1); hence, minimal, total and up-to |IA| anonymity exists 
for the agents depending on adversary knowledge.  However, the adversary thinks the 
worst case is possible with up to three dummy messages sent (1 ≤ d ≤ 3).  The adversary 
Proof: Γ, B |- i j≠
∧ Pjpi is valid.  Total formula valid i∀ agents, i≠j. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  CG(p1∨ p2)   Premise (Γ) 
2  CG(pi → ¬Kjpi)   Premise (Γ) 
3  CG(¬pi → Pjpi)   Premise (Γ) 
4  CG(¬Kipi ∨ Pipi)   Premise (B) 
5   CG 
6       p1∨ p2    CGe 1 
7     ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2   DeMorgans, 6 
8  ¬p1    ∧ e1 7 
9  ¬p2    ∧ e2 7 
10  ¬p1→ Pjp1   CGe 3, i = 1 
11  ¬p2→ Pjp2   CGe 3, i = 2 
12  Pjp1    → e 8,10 MP 
13     Pjp2    → e 9,11 MP 
14  Pjp1 ∧ Pjp2   ∧ i 12,13 
15  i j≠
∧ Pjpi   Def. i j≠∧ Pjpi ≡ Pjp1 ∧ Pjp2 14 
16  CG( i j≠
∧ Pjpi)   CGi 15 
17  EG ( i j≠
∧ Pjpi)   CE 16 
18  Kj ( i j≠
∧ Pjpi)   EKj 17 
19  i j≠
∧ Pjpi   KT 18 
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commonly knows any agent may send a dummy message or CG(p1 ∨  p2 ∨  p3).  The other 
common knowledge is the same as before, except the formulas may be generally stated 
for any agent i as CG(pi→ ¬Kjpi), CG(¬pi→ Pjpi) and CG(¬Kipi ∨ Pipi). 
Let A = {1, 2, 3, 4} where n = |A| = 4 and adversary j and agent(s) i ∈ A, G = A and 
P(Atoms) = {p1, p2, p3}, then the formal KT454 model ( , ( ) , )i i AW R L∈=M is W = {x1, x2, 
x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}; Rj(x1,x2), Rj(x1,x3), Rj(x1,x4), Rj(x2,x5), Rj(x3,x6), Rj(x4,x7); the labeling 
function L is monotonically increasing from leaf to root world or L(x1) = {p1, p2, p3}, L(x2) 
= {p1, p2}, L(x3) = {p2, p3}, L(x4) = {p1, p3}, L(x5) = {p1}, L(x6) = {p2}, and L(x7) = {p3}.  
The PALM graphical worst case model is shown in Figure 58 below.  
                                              
Figure 58: Scenario IV PALM Model (KT45n, n=4) 
 
 
This represents the adversary’s a priori knowledge about the possible worlds assuming 
all k agents send messages (i.e., IA = { }A j− , k = |IA| = 3).  However, assume after fewer 
than n-1 agents send messages; the adversary asks all agents simultaneously “Did you 
send a message?”  Since the agents are honest, only |IA| say “Yes”.  The adversary now 
knows IA and an updated model represents the adversary’s a posterior knowledge (i.e., IA 
 
Rj 
x1 
    p3   p2 p1 
 
 
p1,p2, 
    p3 
p1,p2 p2,p3 p1,p3 x2 x4 
x7 x5 
x3 
x6 
Rj 
Rj 
Rj Rj Rj 
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⊂ A, |IA| < n-1).  Assume IA = {1, 2}, the adversary would use the previous worst case 
PALM model where k=2, r=1, and d=1 as shown in Figure 59 below.   
 
               
   Figure 59: Scenario IV Improved PALM Model (KT45n, n=3) 
 
 
Clearly, proving the up-to |IA| anonymity formula ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi is identical to proving the 
total anonymity formula i j≠
∧ Pjpi in the previous example.
x 
 
y 
 
z 
  p2 p1,p2 
Rj Rj 
p1 
Let Γ = {CG(p1 ∨ p2),CG(pi → ¬Kjpi),CG(¬pi → Pjpi)} and B = {CG(¬Kipi ∨ Pipi)}. 
 
Proof: Γ, B |- ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi’ is valid.  Up-to |IA| formula valid 'i∀ agents, 'i ∈IA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  CG(p1∨ p2)   Premise (Γ) 
2  CG(pi → ¬Kjpi)   Premise (Γ) 
3  CG(¬pi → Pjpi)   Premise (Γ) 
4  CG(¬Kipi ∨ Pipi)   Premise (B) 
5   CG 
6       p1∨ p2    CGe 1 
7     ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2   DeMorgans, 6 
8  ¬p1    ∧ e1 7 
9  ¬p2    ∧ e2 7 
10  ¬p1→ Pjp1   CGe 3, i = 1 
11  ¬p2→ Pjp2   CGe 3, i = 2 
12  Pjp1    → e 8,10 MP 
13     Pjp2    → e 9,11 MP 
14  Pjp1 ∧ Pjp2   ∧ i 12,13 
15  ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi   Def. ' Ai I∈∧ Pjpi ≡ Pjp1 ∧ Pjp2 14 
16  CG( ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi)   CGi 15 
17  EG ( ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi)   CE 16 
18  Kj ( ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi)   EKj 17 
19  ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi   KT 18 
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Therefore, ' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi is a valid formula and the up-to |IA| anonymity property holds.  
Scenario V is next. 
6.2.2.5    Scenario V: k-Anonymity. 
In this scenario of six agents (n = 6), five agents (k = 5) send five messages, two real 
(r = 2) and three dummy (d = 3); hence, minimal, total, up-to and k-anonymity exists for 
the agents depending on adversary knowledge.  The adversary best case is possible with 
known two real messages.  The adversary commonly knows any agent may send a 
dummy message or CG( ≠
∨
i j pi).  It is common knowledge that if an agent i sends a real 
message, the adversary thinks it could be a dummy message or CG(¬pi→ Pjpi).  It is 
common knowledge if agent i sends a dummy message, the adversary does not know this 
or CG(pi→ ¬Kjpi).  No agent knows their own message type or CG(¬Kipi ∧Pipi).  The 
agents make this common knowledge after the adversary asks “Do you know if you sent 
a real message?” 
Let A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} where n = |A| = 6 and adversary j and agent(s) i ∈ A, G = A 
and P(Atoms) = {pq: 1 ≤ q ≤ k}, the formal KT456 model ( , ( ) , )i i AW R L∈=M is W = {xs: 
1 ≤ s ≤ k}; Rj(x1,x2), Rj(x2,x3), Rj(x3,x4), Rj(x4,x5); and L(xi) = {pi}.  A best case graphical 
PALM model assuming |IA| = k is shown in Figure 60. 
This model represents the adversary’s a priori knowledge about the possible worlds 
assuming all k agents may send a message (i.e., IA = A–{j}, k = |IA| = 5).  Obviously,  k-
anonymity or 5-anonymity is achieved.  However, after the messages are  
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Figure 60: PALM Model (KT45n, n=6) 
 
sent, assume the adversary is able to distinguish between two separate “anonymity sets” 
1AI  and 2AI  where 1 2A A AI I I∪ ⊆ .  In this example, since r = 2, the adversary knows one 
real message is sent per group.  Assume 1AI = {1, 2} and 2AI = {3, 4, 5}, the adversary 
would use the PALM models where k=2, r=1, d=1 and k=3, r=1, d=2, respectively as 
shown in Figure 61. 
 
 
Figure 61: Improved PALM Model (KT45n, n=6) 
 
In effect, the adversary learned that Rj(x2,x3) is not necessary.  Obviously, at least k’-
anonymity is achieved for all k agents.  In this example, k’= k/r = 5/2 = 2 or 2-
anonymity. 
Clearly, the k-anonymity property holds but depends on how the adversary partitions 
the set of agents into anonymity sets.  The majority of researchers assume the adversary 
pre-partitions the agents in the anonymous system before an attack. 
 
    p5    p4 
Rj Rj p3 
x1 
   p2 Rj p1 
x2 
x3 x4 x5 
Rj 
 
    p5    p4 
Rj Rj 
p3 
x1 
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Rj 
p1 
x2 
x3 x4 x5 
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The k-anonymity formula
{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’ may be rewritten as two k’-anonymity 
formulas 
' 1Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi’ ∨ ' 2Ai I∈∧ Pjpi’.  Thus, proving the k’-anonymity formula is 
equivalent to proving a sequence of disjunctions of up-to |IA1| and up-to |IA2| formulas 
where k’ ≤  |IA1|, |IA2|  ≤  k.   
 Therefore, 
{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’ is a valid formula and only the k’-anonymity property holds. 
Let Γ = {CG( 1' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi), CG( 2' Ai I∈∧ Pjpi )}. 
 
Proof: Γ |- 
'{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’  is valid.  k’-anonymity formula valid 'i∀ agents, 'i ∈IA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  CG( 1' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi)    Premise (Γ) 
2  CG( 2' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi)    Premise (Γ) 
 
3   CG 
4       Pjp1 ∧ Pjp2    CGe 1, 1' Ai I∈  
5     Pjp3 ∧ Pjp4∧ Pjp5    CGe 2, 2' Ai I∈  
6  (Pjp1 ∧ Pjp2) ∨  (Pjp3 ∧ Pjp4 ∧ Pjp5) ∨ i1 4,5 
7  
1' Ai I∈
∧ Pjpi ∨ 2' Ai I∈∧ Pjpi   Def. 'i AI∈∧ Pjpi’  6 
8  
'{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’   Def. '{ }| |A kI ≥∨ 7 
9  CG( '{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’)   CGi 8 
10  EG ( '{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’)   CE 19 
11  Kj ( '{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’)   EKj 10  
12  
'{ }| |A kI ≥
∨
'i AI∈
∧ Pjpi’   KT 11 
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6.3 Model Limitations 
PALM models are easier to visualize, construct, and manipulate than operators on 
Boolean algebras inherent in process-calculi.  However, it has the limitations of idealized 
knowledge, no temporal logic and no dynamic logic; hence, the need for alternative 
formalisms such as algebraic, neighborhood, and topological semantics.  This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
Humans and even computers lack the ability to “know all logically possible things” 
yet PALM assumes logical omniscience.  An ability to reason with imperfect knowledge 
or only know a subset of all formulas is more realistic.  Humans tend to believe things 
that are false and not believe things that are true.  The logic of beliefs, desires, intentions 
or just plain common sense is not fully addressed in PALM.  Also, PALM is unable to 
handle counterfactual conditions and non-monotonic reasoning (changing one’s mind) as 
other formalisms do. 
PALM does not include the concept of time.  Time operators would allow a formula 
to be false now but true later or vice versa.  In the no anonymity Scenario I model, issues 
about the lack of temporal logic in KT45n were evident.  A combined time and 
knowledge logic may prove better than knowledge alone.  However, some claim that the 
time dimension of analyzing security protocols only adds computational complexity and 
is easily abstracted away.  Yet one formal approach uses Typed Model Logic plus 
[(OrL06)] to combine temporal and modal belief operators to specify, model, and reason 
about evolving theories of trust in agent based systems. 
Finally, any dynamic change in the adversary’s belief system is not captured.  In 
Scenario V, the adversary first believed the worst case possible worlds existed but then 
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reasoned a better model existed.  What caused this change?  An ability to capture what 
actions took place to change the adversary’s mind would prove most valuable.  An action 
logic is simply not part of PALM – which can only reason after an action has taken place 
(e.g., message is sent) and assumes new knowledge is statically gained. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter provides a rigorous, mathematical framework for modeling anonymous 
systems.  The primary contribution of this chapter is formalizing how anonymity is 
preserved or degraded in an anonymous network based on adversary reasoning ability.  
The two primary knowledge operators Kj (agent) and CG (common) and the epistemic and 
truth semantics made this possible.  A simple anonymous network example, message-
sender mystery, is discussed and proven with an expanded anonymous network example.  
Five scenarios are provided and the anonymity property formulas formally proved.  
Lastly, a few limitations of logical omniscience assumptions and lack of temporal and 
dynamic logic rules are highlighted.  
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes the dissertation research effort.  The research conclusions 
are given in Section 7.2.  Also, research contributions are delineated in Section 7.3.  
Lastly, Section 7.4 recommends future research to extend the research performed herein.  
7.1 Research Conclusions 
Historic to contemporary anonymity research issues have been surveyed.  Over ten 
varying quantifications of anonymity are explained and the few conceptual and formal 
frameworks related to anonymity have been discussed.  A methodology for the research 
was presented.  The results include a novel cubic and tree-based taxonomy.  In particular, 
seventeen wired and sixteen wireless anonymous communications protocols are explored 
and compared.  In addition, a unique synthesis of anonymity metrics was identified.  A 
formal epistemic logic framework was developed.  Finally, the research proves that the 
KT45n logic is able to semantically represent possibilistic notions of anonymity but lacks 
action and temporal logics and bounded adversary aspects.   
7.2 Research Contributions 
Conceptual frameworks, metrics and formal models provide the ability to visualize 
anonymity protocols and anonymity services and better understand how anonymity is 
preserved, degraded or eliminated during a cyber attack in wired and wireless networks.  
The contribution of each of the three research areas is described next. 
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7.2.1 Anonymous Network Taxonomy 
The contribution of the cubic/tree-based taxonomy (CT) is 3-fold.  First, CT provides 
a definition of anonymity that extends the classical definition of anonymity to include 
four subtle yet important anonymity properties of mutual, group, group communication 
and location anonymity.  Second, CT is the first known taxonomy to comprehensively 
cover both wired and wireless anonymous networks. CT complements previous wired 
anonymous network protocol family classifications and extends them with a novel peer-
to-peer (P2P) anonymous network protocol family specification.  CT is the only known 
taxonomy to capture the wireless anonymous protocol family relationships.  Finally, the 
systematic classification and visually intuitive comparison of state-of-the-art wired and 
wireless anonymous protocols in this research is an innovative guide for future 
researchers’ anonymity interests.  The work in this area resulted in three fully referred 
conference papers [KeR08b, KeR09, KeR09a] and one soon-to-be published journal 
paper. 
7.2.2 Anonymity Metrics 
Knowing the available metrics and understanding the subtle changes in anonymity 
levels is essential for any organization determined to better defend against cyber attacks.  
This research gives researchers and organizations an ability to confidently measure 
information leakage given their specific anonymity requirements and application 
environment.  The three accomplishments in this area include co-authoring a paper on 
analyzing client puzzles in Tor [Fra06], integrating data and network anonymity concepts 
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in a unique way [KeR08a], and exploring current metrics and issues in providing 
anonymity in mobile ad hoc networks [KeR08c].  
7.2.3 Formal Adversary Anonymity Reasoning Model 
One of the major benefits of formal methods is analytical techniques offer reasoning 
techniques that cover every possible state of a design, and well-defined proof techniques 
ensure the accuracy and correctness of a design.  However, building a good mathematical 
model for representing anonymous protocols, and, even more so, formulating an 
appropriate definition of anonymity, is a non-trivial task.  The model should be rich 
enough to represent a large variety of real-life adversarial behaviors, and the definition 
should guarantee the intuitive notion of anonymity is captured for any adversarial 
behavior under consideration.  The formalization should be as clear and easy to work 
with as possible.  This research took the first step towards building such an intuitive and 
mathematical model.  This phase of the research resulted in a paper  presented at the 
IEEE WIDA’08 conference [KeR08e]. 
7.2.4 Summary. 
The contribution of this research to the field of computer science lies in its innovative 
development of a synergistic taxonomy, metrics, and formal model of anonymous 
networks.  These contributions are summarized in Figure 62.  In the taxonomy area, two 
complementary taxonomies were developed for classifying and comparing the myriad of 
wired and wireless anonymous protocols.  Evolving issues in next generation mobile ad 
hoc anonymous wireless networks were highlighted.  In terms of anonymity metrics, a 
client puzzle solution to mitigating DoS attacks on the Tor anonymous network was 
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analyzed.  In addition, the seemingly disparate concepts of data and network based 
anonymity were merged to provide a common framework that researchers can use for 
future anonymity metric advances.  A unique overview of state-of-the-art anonymity 
metrics was given.  Finally, an epistemic-based model was created to model adversary 
reasoning ability. 
 
 
Figure 62: Summary of Contributions in Three Areas of Anonymous Networks 
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Figure 63 lists where each of the eight published research papers fall within each 
area.  Four published papers are in the areas of anonymity network taxonomy.  Three are 
in anonymity metric synthesis.  One workshop paper falls in the area of epistemic-based 
formal methods.   
 
 
Figure 63: Research Publications by Topic and Paper Type 
 
 
To gain a better appreciation of the knowledge expansion within each area, the simple 
metric of the percentage of newly published papers versus previously published papers is 
useful.  Figure 64 displays a comparison of this research’s contributions (in terms of 
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publications) versus the total number of publications that exist for the particular research 
area.     
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 64: Knowledge Expansion by Subtopic 
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7.3 Recommendation for Future Research 
The two prime areas for future research are in the anonymous network taxonomy and 
formal method topics.  The area of anonymity metrics is active and continues to receive 
significant attention by other researchers in the field.  Thus, an expansion of the 
conceptual taxonomy and formal models is in order. 
 For taxonomy, future work should more closely examine the last component – 
adversary capability – more completely to better articulate the overt and hidden adversary 
assumptions and implications for each anonymous protocol.  This would make it easier to 
identify comparable anonymous system for further empirical or theoretical investigation 
as well as identifying gaps in anonymous protocol design. 
For formal methods, immediate future work should relax the underlying PALM 
model assumption of logical omniscience and be applied toward a practical anonymous 
network such as Crowds or Tor.  Another productive step would incorporate temporal 
and dynamic logic to provide a more expressive and quantitative means to (semi)-
automatically verify anonymous protocols and properties.  This would likely require the 
use of an appropriate theorem-prover and/or model checker.  More interestingly, taking a 
modular or functional approach to analyzing a particular anonymous system, specific 
anonymity properties, and assumed adversary might prove most valuable.  This combined 
approach would not only specify the anonymity properties in a modal logic as was done 
with the research herein but would also specify the anonymous system in process calculi 
and/or functions views.  This process is represented in Figure 65.   
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Figure 65: Modular Approach Example [HuS04] 
 
In the process algebra approach in Figure 65(a), pπ -calculus represents the 
anonymous network behavior and is appropriate for modeling mobile networks.  In the 
epistemic approach in Figure 65(b), a dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) can represent the 
desired anonymity properties and may include temporal logic and action models.   In the 
function view approach in Figure 65(c), the interface layer has to be defined between the 
pπ -calculus system specification and DEL property specification.  The primary 
contribution of this research would be to fill in the corresponding interface layer gap, an 
assuredly NP-hard problem, to allow formal reasoning about an adversary and how 
anonymity is preserved or degraded in an anonymous network.  
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